Dennis Altnow, owner, Tiger Lines, Inc.
"There's been a dramatic and rapid turnaround (with regards to premiums and claims frequency)."
James Little, President of Fremont Compensation Insurance
(Quoted in Forbes, March 13, 1995)
"We've seen the number of our indemnity claims per 1,000 employees drop significantly...there are fewer stress claims...there are now fewer medical-legal mills generating questionable claims... also the reserved and paid amounts on vocational rehabilitation has dropped."
Stuart Niesen, Workers' Compensation Manager
Northrop-Grumman
"The premium drop is dramatic at the very least. It would be fair to say that with the larger accounts in California -- those with workers' compensation premiums in the $500,000 to $1 million range -- reductions in rates are in the range of 50 to 70 percent."
John McCann, "Workers' Comp Executive"
(Quoted in Northern California Medicine, March 1995)
"The fraud program is working very well, Although arrests have leveled off now, convictions are going up. We're very pleased about the way the fraud legislation is working."
Willie Washington, Director of Workers' Compensation
California Manufacturers' Assn.
"This is a perfect example of what can happen in the marketplace, when competition is encouraged and unnecessary regulation is eliminated."
Richard Wiebe, Department of Insurance
(Quoted in San Francisco Business Times, Feb 17-23, 1995)
"Workers' comp reform is one reason the California economy is becoming competitive and heating up. It's helped stop employer flight to other states and has made it more attractive for businesses to hire people."
Frank Floyd, Manager Communications and Education, SCIF
(Quoted in Northern California Medicine, March 1995)
"...stress and post termination claims are way down...of those filed to date, we have been readily able to deny them without need for great expenses. There have been no challenges to the denials."
Greg Vach, Director of Workers' Compensation
Ralston Purina Company
"We think things are generally going in the right direction and are positive on reform. At Safeway, we see savings in vocational rehabilitation expenses, where costs are down; bills for medical legal reports are down because of the new fee schedule; and, although we don't have a lot of post termination claims, we have seen less of those in the past year. We are optimistic about the positive impact of these reforms."
Michael Herberger, Corporate Workers' Compensation Manager
Safeway
"Pete Wilson has made giant strides in reforming California's workers' compensation system, but state programs this corrupt can't be turned on a dime."
Damon Darlin, Forbes, March 13, 1995
"Across California, companies...are facing dramatically lower workers' compensation premiums -- due largely to changes in state law that opened this once tightly regulated field to fierce competition on Jan. 1."
Ilana DeBare, Sacramento Bee, February 27, 1995
"The (alternative dispute resolution) program is supported by a wide spectrum of organized labor, contractors and engineers and employer organizations. They claim the program provides speedy adjudication of disputes and prompt payments of claims without getting bogged down by the bureaucratic red tape of the California workers' compensation system."
Hallye Jordan, California Workers' Compensation Inquirer, Feb. 1995
"The (CWCI) study will show that claims seem to be moving through the system faster and that lawyers are less involved in claims than in the past. This might mean that some of the reforms are working."
Bill Molmen, CWCI General Counsel
(Quoted in Northern California Medicine, March 1995)
Governor Pete Wilson
July 16, 1993
Since taking office, Governor Wilson consistently recognized that California's workers' compensation system stifled job creation and retention and economic growth in California. The workers' compensation system in California posed an interesting irony: While California employers paid among the highest workers' compensation insurance premiums in the nation, injured workers in California received among the lowest benefits in the nation. An increasing portion of the premium dollar was being siphoned by multiple interests who profited handsomely from the workers' compensation system.
Meaningful reform of this system was vital to improving California's economic climate, as the spiraling costs associated with workers' compensation forced employers to reduce payrolls, relocate jobs to other states, or avoid considering California as a site in which to expand. The Governor's three years of consistent effort paid off in a series of legislative enactments, most of which were signed into law in July, 1993.[1]
Progress started, however, in Governor Wilson's first year in office. On July 16, 1991, he signed a bill limiting out-of-control "stress claims" by requiring employees to have worked at least six months for an employer before such a claim could be filed. The Governor's leadership and determination on the issue of workers' compensation reform indicated to current and prospective California employers that more meaningful reforms would be pursued and realized.
In his first year, Governor Wilson also signed significant legislation attacking workers' compensation fraud. This legislation created a specific felony for workers' compensation fraud and provided dedicated funding for the Department of Insurance's Bureau of Fraudulent Claims and local district attorneys for investigations and prosecutions. This legislation focused attention on workers' compensation fraud, where there had previously been little focus. The anti-fraud activities set in motion by this legislation have been credited by many people involved with workers' compensation as having a significant deterrent impact on fraudulent activities, and thus for reducing costs through lower claims.
In December, 1991, Governor Wilson appointed the Council on California Competitiveness. This 17-member bipartisan panel, composed of business and labor representatives, was charged with finding ways to remove the barriers to creating jobs and thus increasing state revenues in California. In April, 1992, the Council issued its final report to the Governor, California's Jobs and Future. The Council found California's workers' compensation system a "national embarrassment." The Council reported,
The cost of this inefficient and fraud-ridden system rose from less than $4 billion in 1981 to over $10 billion in 1991 -- an increase of over 200 percent in a decade. During this same period, the workforce increased by about 25 percent, and the incidence of disabling work injury per 1000 workers actually decreased. The reasons for this dramatic run-up in costs are simple. None of the major participants in the system has any real incentive to operate efficiently and hold down costs.Additionally, defects in the system have created an open invitation to abusive and fraudulent claims. Billions of dollars are wasted, and the system is training a generation of cheaters. The losers are (1) California employers forced to pay among the highest compensation rates in the nation and (2) genuinely injured workers whose benefits are among the lowest. This outrage must end. Fraud must be discouraged, although it is not always policeable. Features of the system that create potential incentives to file bogus claims must also be reformed.[2]
This cogent assessment of workers' compensation in California summarized the urgent need for reform, the dynamics involved, and the system's detrimental effect on California's economy.
In 1993, Governor Wilson finally was able to sign the kind of workers' compensation reform he had been fighting to achieve since entering office. It started in the spring, when he signed Senate Bill 31 to place severe limits on the fees paid for medical-legal evaluations. Then in July, the Governor signed a package of workers' compensation reform measures. These bills made significant and structural cost-saving reforms while increasing benefits for legitimately injured workers. It was estimated that the 1993 legislation would reduce workers' compensation expenditures by about $1.5 billion annually -- a significant savings in an $11 billion system. Half of the savings were slated to reduce employer costs, with the other half earmarked to increase weekly benefits to injured workers over a three-year period. These were, however, only the savings that could be confidently calculated; most observers now believe the bills have resulted in the short term, in significantly greater savings than the $1.5 billion figure. Indeed, based on reductions in the minimum rate, the premiums paid by insured employers declined from $9 billion in 1993 to $7.5 billion in 1994, a savings of $1.5 billion. These figures do not include self-insured employers, so the savings likely are greater. And, as a further indication of savings, premiums have continued to fall as the market adjusts to competitive rating and reform. According to San Francisco Business Times, insurance industry estimates for 1995 following repeal of the minimum rate law anticipate premiums of only $4 billion to $5.5 billion.[3]
The number and cost of workers' compensation claims has dropped significantly. The Workers' Compensation Insurance Rating Bureau (WCIRB), which serves as the statistical agent for workers' compensation insurance, reports a sharply declining trend in the number of workers' compensation claims since the enactment of tougher anti-fraud laws in 1991. Preliminary data indicates the number of indemnity claims per $1 million of payroll declined by more than 31% between 1991 and 1994. The average cost of indemnity claims shows a similar pattern, declining from a high of $13,285 in 1991 to $12,261 in 1994, a reduction of nearly 8%. With this kind of reduction in the frequency and cost of claims, it is no secret why employers' premiums have plummeted.
While it is too early to provide a definitive analysis of the reasons for the dramatic drop in claims and their costs, significant contributors likely include (1) the aggressive efforts to combat workers' compensation fraud, (2) the reduction in medical-legal evaluation fees, and (3) the limitations on psychiatric and post-termination injury claims.
These provisions were all in effect on or before July 16, 1993, and undoubtedly led to the demise of major workers' compensation fraud "mills" in Southern California. These mills spent millions of dollars in the expensive Southern California media market, commonly advertising for disgruntled or laid off workers to file retaliatory stress claims. The money these mills sucked from the system came from the treatment and medical-legal evaluations they performed. The combination of changes in the 1993 reforms put many of these mills out of business, significantly reducing the number of claims coming into the workers' compensation system.
Due to the time it takes to determine the compensation payable in many cases, it is not yet possible to quantify all savings from reform. Although a complete accounting of the savings is several years away, employers are already realizing savings: The 1993 legislation and 1994 regulatory action by the Department of Insurance reduced the minimum insurance premium paid by California employers by over 31%, and with the advent of open competitive workers' compensation insurance pricing in 1995, most employers are seeing even greater savings. A review of the initial filings of 45 of the largest insurers indicates an additional reduction in the base rates of about 7%, increasing to as much as 15% with typical premium modifications and reductions.
Employers with good safety records are seeing tremendous benefits from this competitive system that allows insurers to reward them for their efforts with lower insurance prices.
The workers' compensation reforms signed by Governor Wilson over the past three years made fundamental change in virtually every aspect of the system and initiated some of the most innovative approaches to cost containment in the nation.
The agencies charged with implementing the reforms have worked in overdrive during the past two years. A brief summary of the reforms and the status of implementation follows.
Workers' compensation fraud was hardly recognized, less prosecuted, by law enforcement authorities before the 1991 workers' compensation fraud legislation signed by Governor Wilson. This legislation imposed harsher penalties, established a specific felony for workers' compensation fraud, and provided dedicated source of funding for workers' compensation fraud investigation and prosecution.
Now, $25 million a year is provided to district attorneys and the Department of Insurance's Bureau of Fraudulent Claims to fight workers' compensation fraud. The impact is apparent, particularly in the Los Angeles area, where the major mills producing questionable claims have been closed. Since 1992, DOI has investigated over 980 cases of alleged workers' compensation fraud resulting in 155 arrests. Local district attorneys have prosecuted 318 defendants and obtained 159 convictions.
The rapidly increasing cost of medical-legal evaluations had become a significant cost driver, as well as the funding source for the unsavory mills which convinced disgruntled workers to file suspect claims with the promise of large cash awards.
Until the enactment of Senate Bill 31 in April, 1993, the law required medical-legal evaluations -- medical evaluations obtained to prove a contested claim -- to be paid at the 73rd percentile of the charges for similar evaluations in a previous one-year period, a formula designed to increase the cost annually. The amount was figured based on the amount billed for evaluations rather than the amount actually paid. Thus, an incentive existed for medical-legal evaluators to submit higher bills in order to receive a greater increase in rates. The cost of each evaluation depending on the specialty, reached $1,000 to $1,500.
SB 31 repealed this inflationary statutory schedule of fees and directed the Department of Industrial Relations' Division of Workers' Compensation to administratively promulgate a new fee schedule for medical-legal evaluations. The new fee schedule was initially adopted effective August 3, 1993, reducing fees substantially. A basic evaluation now is paid at $500, about half the amount under the previous schedule. SB 31 also established rules to stem the costly practice of multiple medical-legal evaluations.
A study reported by the California Workers' Compensation Institute indicates this "key provision of California's 1993 workers' compensation reform is working." According to their analysis, the average payment for medical-legal reports is now $583. Furthermore, they found frequent use of agreed medical evaluators, indicating a high reliance on a single medical evaluator to determine medical issues, even on disputed claims. This is particularly gratifying because "dueling docs" had been identified as a very inefficient aspect of the system.
One large employer, Rockwell International, reports a 65 percent drop in medical-legal expenses as a result of medical-legal evaluation reforms. In one year, Rockwell's quarterly medical-legal costs plunged from about $400,000 to $141,000.
Psychiatric injury claims -- the so-called stress or psyche claims -- became the foremost symbol of what had gone wrong with the California workers' compensation system. According to the Department of Industrial Relations' Division of Labor Statistics and Research, the number of stress claims increased steadily and dramatically. In 1981, there were 1,844 such claims in California. By 1990, the number of stress claims had increased to 10,444. In one year, between 1990 and 1991, stress claims increased approximately 50 percent to 15,668.[4]
A low threshold of proof in the stress cases certainly encouraged claims -- claimants needed to prove only that 10 percent of the cause of the psychiatric injury was related to employment. Post-termination claims -- retaliatory claims filed by discharged employees -- ran a close second to stress claims as a symbol of a system whose costs spiraled, driven in part by such marginal claims.
Severe limits were placed on these types of claims, primarily in urgency legislation which was signed into law by Governor Wilson and became effective on July 16, 1993. Most significantly:
Because stress claims are subjective and so often marginal, they frequently are litigated. In order for a claim to be litigated a claimant files an application for adjudication with a local Division of Workers' Compensation office. Since the enactment of stricter standards for stress claims, the number of applications for adjudication filed involving a psychiatric injury has declined dramatically, particularly in the Los Angeles area. Statewide, the number of claims filed at local DWC offices decreased 40% from August 1993 to April 1995. In Southern California the decline has been even more dramatic. In the Los Angeles office, for instance, these claims have declined by two-thirds.
Employers are noticing the positive effects of this aspect of the reforms. For example, the Workers' Compensation Manager at Northrop-Grumman reports significant improvement in the area of job related stress claims, projecting a 45% decrease in 1994 as compared to 1992. Ralston Purina's Workers' Compensation Manager echoes that "... stress and post-termination claims are way down. And of those stress claims filed to date, we have been readily able to defend them without need for great expense."
When vocational rehabilitation became a mandatory benefit in 1975, it was projected to increase costs by 2.7 percent. However, over 15 years, the cost increased an average of 23 percent and accounted for about 12 percent of the system's costs. Before workers' compensation reform, vocational rehabilitation functioned as a virtually open-ended entitlement. It represented one of the most significant cost drivers.
A significant amount of savings is anticipated from the changes made in the vocational rehabilitation area, primarily from the cap of $16,000 on any vocational rehabilitation plan. Eliminating entitlement to vocational rehabilitation services where the employer offers modified or alternative work meeting certain criteria is also expected to reduce costs significantly while expediting an injured worker's return to work. With few exceptions, the reform legislation also limits injured workers to participating in only one vocational rehabilitation program and eliminates out-of-state plans.
The regulations necessary to implement the changes in vocational rehabilitation were promulgated by the Division of Workers' Compensation on January 1, 1994. However, since vocational rehabilitation generally comes late in the life of a workers' compensation claim the full effect will not be seen for some time. There are already reports, though, of increasing efforts to bring employees back to modified or alternative work to avoid the costly vocational rehabilitation benefit.
One carrier, Heath Cal Compensation & Liability Insurance Company, reports a significant increase in the number of employers offering alternative modified work duties as opposed to vocational rehabilitation. The carrier expects this trend to grow. Among the advantages of this alternative that have been expressed to Heath Cal: 1) Employees would rather accept modified work than the reduction in pay that would result with taking an entry-level job in a new skill gained through vocational rehabilitation, 2) Employers benefit from lower workers' compensation costs, and 3) Insurance carriers must contend with much less paperwork.
Northrop-Grumman already reports favorable effects from the cap on vocational rehabilitation services, as they are finding vocational rehabilitation firms working hard to stay under the cap. Dole Fresh Vegetables' Risk Manager projects savings from the encouragement to offer more modified jobs will be in the neighborhood of 50%.
On January 1, 1995, California's minimum rate law for workers' compensation insurance ceased to exist, replaced by what the Firemark Group of New Jersey called "... the ultimate in free competition." Insurance premiums have plummeted as a result. The new marketplace could be accurately characterized as a shopper's market.
Since 1915, California's minimum rate law established a minimum rate which workers' compensation insurers had to charge for coverage. The law was binding on all carriers, including the State Compensation Insurance Fund. The Legislature enacted the minimum rate law out of concern for the solvency of workers' compensation insurers. The law guaranteed that an adequate price was charged in order to cover losses. The Insurance Commissioner was vested with the authority to adjust the minimum rate as necessary, based on the recommendations of the Workers' Compensation Insurance Rating Bureau (WCIRB). The Insurance Commissioner based the minimum rate on the combined losses for each industrial classification, with built-in factors for expenses, dividends, and profit. It was illegal to price coverage below the minimum rate.
One effect of the minimum rate law, however, was guaranteed profits for insurance carriers. It also stifled competition among insurance carriers, since they could not lower their rates to attract business.
Under the new competitive rating law, the WCIRB issues only advisory rates. These advisory rates include claims losses and the cost of claims administration, but do not include carriers' other expenses or any allowance for profit. These rates serve only as guidelines, leaving insurers free to price policies based on expected claims costs and other expenses. Workers' compensation insurance premium rates now vary from insurer to insurer, making it possible for many employers to find a better price by shopping around. An employer's experience modification, or history of losses, still must be used by all carriers in evaluating rates. The Insurance Commissioner now may regulate rates only to ensure that they are adequate to maintain a carrier's solvency.
Medical treatment costs account for nearly half the cost of workers' compensation benefits and have been growing rapidly for some time. Workers' compensation has not had available the types of cost containment tools available in health plans for non-occupational injuries. There are no co-payments, no coverage limits, and the maximum period an employer can count on to manage an employee's care is just 30 days.
A number of reforms were enacted to control the fast growing cost of providing medical treatment to injured workers:
The loss of control over medical care after 30 days has been an impediment to instituting the kind of managed care that has been successful in controlling costs in non-occupational health plans. Without the right to manage care, there has been little ability to check the tendency in the current fee-for-service system to extend the duration and extent of medical treatment in order to increase billings.
The reform created a program to certify and monitor workers' compensation health care organizations (HCOs). HCOs are medical care systems created to offer managed care services for work-related injuries and illnesses. The employer who uses an HCO gains control of medical care of injured employees for up to 365 days.
Regulations covering the standards for certification and enrollment procedures have been adopted, and proposed regulations to establish a schedule of fees are currently undergoing revision. To date, DWC has received 12 applications, and four applicants have been certified as HCOs. Approximately 20 applications are pending in the Department of Corporations, which must first pass on those applicants not already licensed as a disability insurer or a health maintenance organization.
The only pre-existing tool for controlling medical treatment costs was the Official Medical Fee Schedule. It sets forth fees for medical procedures which are generally payable in workers' compensation cases. However, it was very outdated; it did not include fees for many common procedures, and did not apply to hospitals or pharmaceuticals.
Comprehensive revision of the Official Medical Fee Schedule was completed and became operative on April 1, 1994. The new schedule is based on the American Medical Association's Current Procedural Terminology coding structure, containing thousands of additional procedures and pharmaceutical charges. It currently covers outpatient hospital charges and will be amended to cover inpatient services in late 1995.
Treatment guidelines are designed to provide physicians and payers some guidance as to the appropriate scope and duration of treatment. This provision was included in the reform to help guard against inappropriate or excessive treatment, which increases costs.
The Industrial Medical Council, which was given the responsibility of establishing medical treatment guidelines, has nearly completed work on guidelines for occupational asthma and contact dermatitis, is working to complete guidelines for the neck and low back, and has identified seven other areas in which guidelines will be adopted by the council.
There has been considerable interest nationally, as well as in many states, in the notion of "24-Hour coverage." There are inherent inefficiencies and incentives to cost shift when separate systems are maintained for occupational and non occupational injuries. For example, administrative aspects of general health insurance and workers' compensation coverage are duplicative, and costly litigation sometimes results as to which insurer is liable for treating an injury or illness.
Under 24-Hour Coverage, an employer contracts with a single health care provider to serve all of an employee's medical needs whether an injury or illnesses occurs on the job or is non-occupational. Employers should realize cost savings through a combination of the two types of coverage, while employees would realize the added convenience of having one doctor or the same health care provider for all of their medical needs. However, there are a number of difficult issues in trying to combine the two types of coverage. California is now one of just two states operating a pilot project to determine the potential for this type of coverage.
Under Assembly Bill 3757, which Governor Wilson signed in 1992, 24-Hour Coverage pilot projects have been created in four counties: San Diego, Los Angeles, Santa Clara, and Sacramento:
Employers, particularly small business owners, had concerns not only about costs, but also about the lack of information about the claims and other factors affecting their premiums. Although employers pay all of the costs associated with workers' compensation claims, they also were given little information about the claims process and had little involvement in it. A number of provisions were enacted to deal with these concerns:
These provisions all became effective on January 1, 1994.
In addition to reducing the cost of medical evaluations, several provisions were included in the reform to reduce the number of evaluations. Most significantly:
The amount of permanent disability benefits payable to an employee who has suffered permanent impairment or limitations is defined in the Permanent Disability Rating Schedule, which has not been substantially revised since the 1940s. Disputes over this issue are frequent, often giving rise to costly litigation.
The reform legislation directed the Division of Workers' Compensation to update the Permanent Disability Rating Schedule by January 1, 1995, but required the approval of the new labor-management Commission on Health and Safety and Workers' Compensation for any changes in the standard disability ratings. The Division of Workers' Compensation has completed work on updating the occupational groupings and variants, and on disabilities to add to the schedule. These changes are designed to increase the consistency and uniformity of disability ratings. These changes are being evaluated to ensure they do not inadvertently increase total costs.
Self-insurance has been limited to government agencies and very large private employers. Most private employers must buy an insurance policy instead. Under self-insurance, employers assume direct liability for any workers' compensation losses and post bonds to guarantee the payment of any claims. Smaller employers have not had the option to self-insure -- but now they will as a result of workers' compensation reforms.
The reforms permitted groups of smaller employers to band together in order to qualify for self-insurance. The Director of Industrial Relations has promulgated the necessary regulations so that groups of employers may apply for self-insurance, which offers a cost-saving approach to workers' compensation coverage for many employers.
Part of the 1993 reforms focused on reducing workers' compensation costs by preventing occupational injuries and illnesses. Two basic strategies were enacted, both implemented by the Department of Industrial Relations' Division of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH):
Identified employers first receive a letter from DOSH requesting several items: the employer's analysis as to why losses have been high, copies of recent annual injury logs, information on the number of employees and hours worked during the past four years, a copy of the employer's Injury and Illness Prevention Program, a description of the workplace activities that are the source of injuries and illnesses, and an action plan for reducing the injury and illness rate.
After a review of the documents, the high hazard consultation service will contact the employer to provide consultation services or verify that the employer has requested that its own insurer has agreed to provide loss control services. High hazard employers who respond are placed on a secondary inspection list, and are subject to compliance inspections on a random basis. Employers who do not respond, or do not cooperate with consultation activities, are placed on a primary compliance inspection list.
Half the estimated savings from the reforms are to go into higher benefits for injured workers over a three-year period. The first phase of the benefit increase was delayed six months to provide time for the cost saving reforms to be implemented. For workers injured on or after July 1, 1995, the following benefits will apply:
One of the more innovative provisions of the reforms allows parties to a collective bargaining agreement in the construction industry to agree to an exclusive panel of medical treatment providers, an exclusive panel of medical evaluators, an exclusive panel of vocational rehabilitation providers, and an alternative dispute resolution process. This pilot program was designed to allow parties with equivalent bargaining power the flexibility to design innovative, less costly methods of benefit delivery and dispute resolution.
The Division of Workers' Compensation has the responsibility to ensure those who enter these arrangements are qualified to do so under the law, and to evaluate these new arrangements. To date, the Division of Workers' Compensation has approved five sets of parties to enter into these agreements:
A new labor-management commission was created to oversee the state programs for the prevention and compensation of industrial injuries. The Commission on Health and Safety and Workers' Compensation is charged with making a continuous study of these programs, and has also been given responsibility for approving health and safety grants and changes in standard ratings in the Permanent Disability Rating Schedule.
The Commission consists of four management representatives and four labor representatives. Appointments to this commission have been made, and it is holding monthly meetings to fulfill its responsibilities.
After two rancorous years of pursuing legislative reforms and then several years working in overdrive to implement these reforms, the Department of Industrial Relations believes we can say that California can see the light at the end of the tunnel on workers' compensation reform. Meaningful reform is a reality, and California sent an unmistakable message with this accomplishment that its economy is back in business. The results and benefits are clear: employers have enjoyed substantial reforms in workers' compensation premiums, while injured workers now receive substantially higher benefits. To maintain this progress, we will continue to monitor workers' compensation to identify and pursue any additional legislative or regulatory reforms necessary.
Workers' Compensation Reform Legislation
During The Wilson Administration
AB 971 (Peace), Chapter 115, Statutes of 1991 -- Eliminated "stress claims" for employees employed for less than 6 months.
SB 1218 (Presley), Chapter 116, Statutes of 1991 -- Increased the penalties for workers' compensation fraud and provided a dedicated source of funding to investigate and prosecute workers' compensation fraud cases.
AB 3757 (Bronzan), Chapter 1131, Statutes of 1992 -- Created a "24-hour pilot program" to determine the benefits of providing both occupational and non occupational care through one exclusive provider of care.
AB 2329 (Peace), Chapter 904, Statutes of 1992 -- Required any advertising soliciting workers' compensation claims to disclose that filing a false or fraudulent claim is a felony.
AB 110 (Peace), Chapter 121, Statutes of 1993 -- The omnibus workers' compensation reform legislation. Among other provisions, AB 110 established the Employer Bill of Rights, capped vocational rehabilitation benefits, emphasized the role of the treating physician in the evaluation process, incrementally increased temporary and permanent disability benefits, and extended injury prevention efforts.
AB 119 (Brulte), Chapter 118, Statutes of 1993 -- Placed severe limits on psychiatric injury and post-termination claims.
AB 1300 (Brown), Chapter 120, Statutes of 1993 -- Enhanced the tools for combating workers' compensation fraud.
SB 30 (Johnston), Chapter 228, Statutes of 1993 -- Repealed the "minimum rate law" which precluded insurers from charging less for workers' compensation insurance than the rates established by the Department of Insurance.
SB 31 (Johnston), Chapter 4, Statutes of 1993 -- Limited medical-legal evaluation fees and the circumstances under which these fees can be charged.
SB 983 (Greene), Chapter 117, Statutes of 1993 -- Authorized alternative arrangements for the delivery of workers' compensation benefits and dispute resolution in the construction industry.
SB 1005 (Lockyer), Chapter 227, Statutes of 1993 -- Created the labor-management commission to oversee the programs for preventing and compensating occupational injuries.
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