WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH LEVESQUE, *Applicant*

vs.

BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.; ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY; administered by CORVEL, *Defendants*

Adjudication Number: ADJ11836498
Van Nuys District Office

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND DECISION AFTER RECONSIDERATION

Defendant seeks reconsideration of the Findings and Award (F&A) issued on July 8, 2026, wherein the workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) found, in relevant part, that while employed by defendant on December 10, 2017 as a bartender, applicant sustained injury arising out of and occurring in the course of employment (AOE/COE) to the head, brain, cervical spine, lumbar spine, right shoulder, left elbow, right hip, psyche, and sleep and is 100% permanently and totally disabled "based on the range of evidence" and "according to the fact" and entitled to a life pension. The WCJ ordered defendant to administer workers' compensation benefits in accordance with the F&A, with jurisdiction reserved in the event of a dispute.

Defendant contends that F&A is not based upon substantial medical evidence as the reporting of psychiatric panel Qualified Medical Evaluator (PQME), Howard Greils, M.D., upon which the F&A is partly based, is defective in that Dr. Greils did not have an opportunity to review the reporting of defendant's vocational expert, Nick Corso. Defendant further contends that the WCJ improperly closed discovery, thereby preventing defendant from obtaining a proper rebuttal to the reporting of Dr. Greils and applicant's vocational expert, Steve Ramirez, in violation of defendant's due process rights. Lastly, defendant avers that applicant's out-of-state residence prejudiced their ability to investigate applicant and prepare a rebuttal.

We have received an Answer from applicant. The WCJ prepared a Report and Recommendation on Petition for Reconsideration (Report), recommending that the Petition for Reconsideration (Petition) be denied.

We have considered the allegations in the Petition and Answer and the contents of the report, and we have reviewed the record in this matter. Based upon our review of the record, and as discussed below, we will grant the Petition for the limited purpose of amending Finding of Fact 7 to reflect that applicant successfully rebutted the permanent disability rating schedule (PDRS), is 100% permanently and totally disabled, and entitled to a life pension. We otherwise affirm the F&A.

FACTS

Applicant filed an Application for Adjudication of Claim alleging that while employed by defendant as a bartender on December 10, 2017, he sustained injury AOE/COE to the head, brain, cervical spine, lumbar spine, right shoulder, left elbow, right hip, psyche, and sleep.

The parties retained Dr. Greils as the psyche PQME, Alexander Latteri, M.D. as the orthopedic PQME and Mark Levine, M.D. as the neuropsyche Agreed Medical Evaluator (AME).

As detailed by the WCJ, Drs. Greils, Latteri, and Levine expressed the following in their reports:

> Orthopedic PQME Alexander Latteri, M.D., reported January 2, 2020 (Joint Exhibit 5). Dr. Latteri diagnosed traumatic head injury with residuals including a five-inch scalp laceration, stuttering, memory problems, vertigo, tinnitus, and severe persistent headaches, together with cervical and lumbar injury, right hip and right shoulder injury, and left elbow epicondylitis. He found that one hundred percent of the disability was a direct consequence of the industrial injury and that there was no basis for apportionment.
>
> Neuropsychiatric AME Mark Levine, M.D., reported on May 4, 2022, May 11, 2023, September 11, 2023, and May 27, 2025 (Joint Exhibits 4, 3, 2, and 1 respectively). Dr. Levine diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder and post-concussive syndrome and assigned impairment for memory deficits. He found no reason to apportion any part of the cognitive disability to non-industrial factors.
>
> Psychiatric PQME Howard Greils, M.D., reported October 11, 2019, August 26, 2020, and April 30, 2025 (Joint Exhibits 8, 7, and 6 respectively). Dr. Greils diagnosed chronic post-traumatic stress disorder, insomnia related to PTSD, pain disorder, and panic disorder with agoraphobia, and assigned a GAF of 50.

(Report, pp. 2-3.)

The parties also retained vocational experts, who provided the following, as outlined by WCJ:

> Applicant's expert, P. Steve Ramirez, M.S., CRC, IPEC, reported October 24, 2023 (Applicant's Exhibit 1). Defendant's expert, Nick Corso, M.A., CRC, CDMS, reported April 5, 2024 (Defendant's Exhibit A). Both vocational reports were received in evidence without objection. (MOH/SOE, pp. 3-4.)
>
> The Ramirez report was served on Defendant on December 13, 2023 (approximately four months before Defendant's own vocational evaluation and more than two years before the mandatory settlement conference). Mr. Ramirez concluded that Applicant is 100% vocationally disabled, not amenable to rehabilitation, and has lost 100% of his earning capacity, and expressly stated that the work restrictions on which he relied "are solely applicable to the industrial injuries and based on the above industrial apportionment." (Applicant's Exhibit 1, p. 16.) He separately addressed the Appeals Board's *en banc* decisions in *Nunes* and concluded that the industrial injuries were the sole cause of the vocational disability. (Applicant's Exhibit 1, p. 14.)
>
> Mr. Corso reached the contrary conclusion that Applicant is amenable to vocational rehabilitation and is "able to perform part- or full-time work within his limitations in the open, competitive labor market." (Defendant's Exhibit A, p. 58.)

(*Id*. at p. 3)

Following the issuance of said vocational reports, the applicant sought supplemental reports from Drs. Greils and Levine. The WCJ noted that:

> Applicant served notice of his request for supplemental reporting from the medical-legal evaluators reviewing the Ramirez report and waited the statutory objection period before transmitting it. Defendant did not object, and did not transmit the Corso report to either evaluator. Dr. Greils reviewed the Ramirez report and issued a supplemental report dated April 30, 2025, stating: "I have had the opportunity to review my previous reports as well as the vocational feasibility evaluation... I adopt the findings of the vocational expert." (Joint Exhibit 6, p. 11.) AME Dr. Levine likewise reviewed the Ramirez report and issued a supplemental report dated May 27, 2025, stating that based on his own empirical findings and clinical impression he had no reason to disagree with Mr. Ramirez's arguments and conclusions. (Joint Exhibit 1, p. 4.)
>
> The Corso report has been in Defendant's possession since April 5, 2024. Nothing in the record suggests that any party, or the Court, ever prevented Defendant from serving it on Dr. Greils or Dr. Levine at any point during the approximately twenty-two months that followed, while discovery remained open.

(*Id*. at pp. 3-4.)

Thereafter, on July 9, 2025, defendant filed a Declaration of Readiness to Proceed to Status Conference on the issue of discovery. The matter proceeded to hearing and the parties ultimately agreed to proceed to a Mandatory Settlement Conference "to finalize discovery." (Minutes of Hearing, October 29, 2025.) At the Mandatory Settlement Conference, the WCJ indicated that seeing as how "no formal discovery efforts [have been] undertaken since 10/29/25[,]" the matter [will] be set for trial over defendant's objection. (Minutes of Hearing, February 2, 2026.)

At trial, the parties stipulated, in relevant part, that while employed by defendant as a bartender on December 10, 2017, applicant sustained injury AOE/COE to the head, brain, cervical spine, lumbar spine, right shoulder, left elbow, right hip, psyche, and sleep. The sole issue set for determination was whether applicant's permanent disability rating was 75%, as per defendant, or 100%, as per applicant. (Minutes of Hearing and Summary of Evidence (MOH & SOE), April 14, 2026.)

On July 8, 2026, the WCJ issued a F&A which held, in relevant part, that while employed by defendant as a bartender on December 10, 2017, applicant sustained AOE/COE to the head, brain, cervical spine, lumbar spine, right shoulder, left elbow, right hip, psyche, and sleep and is 100% permanently and totally disabled "based on the range of evidence" and "according to the fact" and entitled to a life pension. The WCJ thus ordered defendant to administer workers' compensation benefits in accordance with the F&A and Opinion on Decision (OOD), with jurisdiction reserved in the event of a dispute. The OOD explained that the F&A was based upon "[a]pplicant's credible testimony" and the reports of Drs. Latteri, Greils, and Levine and the vocational reports Mr. Ramirez and Mr. Corso.

It is from this F&A that defendant seeks reconsideration.

DISCUSSION

I.

Preliminarily, under Labor Code[1] section 5909(a), the Appeals Board must act on a petition for reconsideration within 60 days of transmission of the case to the Appeals Board. Transmission is reflected in Events in the Electronic Adjudication Management System (EAMS). Specifically,

[1] All further statutory references will be to the Labor Code unless otherwise indicated.

in Case Events, under Event Description is the phrase "Sent to Recon" and under Additional Information is the phrase "The case is sent to the Recon board."

Here, according to Events, the case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on September 11, 2026, and 60 days from the date of transmission is November 10, 2026. This decision is issued by or on November 10, 2026, so that we have timely acted on the Petition as required by section 5909(a).

Section 5909(b)(1) requires that the parties and the Appeals Board be provided with notice of transmission of the case. Transmission of the case to the Appeals Board in EAMS provides notice to the Appeals Board. Thus, the requirement in subdivision (1) ensures that the parties are notified of the accurate date for the commencement of the 60-day period for the Appeals Board to act on a petition. Section 5909(b)(2) provides that service of the Report shall be notice of transmission.

Here, according to the proof of service for the Report, the Report was served on September 11, 2026, and the case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on September 11, 2026. Service of the Report and transmission of the case to the Appeals Board occurred on the same day. Thus, we conclude that the parties were provided with the notice of transmission required by section 5909(b)(1) because service of the Report in compliance with section 5909(b)(2) provided them with actual notice as to the commencement of the 60-day period on September 11, 2026.

II.

Turning to the merits of the Petition, we agree with the WCJ that discovery was properly closed at the Mandatory Settlement Conference, there was no further duty to develop the record, and defendant was provided with due process. As expressed by the WCJ in his Report:

> Due process in this forum requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. (*San Bernardino Community Hospital v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (McKernan) (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 928, 936.) Defendant received both in full measure.
>
> Defendant received the Ramirez report on December 13, 2023. It obtained its own vocational evaluation, and Applicant appeared for it. It received notice of Applicant's request for supplemental medical-legal review of the Ramirez report and the statutory period within which to object, and did not object. It received Dr. Greils' April 30, 2025 report and Dr. Levine's May 27, 2025 report. It received a written demand for a 100% stipulated award on June 9, 2025. It participated in a status conference on October 29, 2025 at which it jointly agreed that discovery would be completed before the next MSC. It participated in the MSC on February

2, 2026. It cross-examined Applicant at trial. It stipulated to the admission of every exhibit.

What Defendant did not do, at any point during the roughly twenty-two months between its receipt of the Corso report and the close of discovery, is serve that report on Dr. Greils. No order barred it from doing so. No objection by Applicant could have barred it from doing so. Defendant's own Petition identifies no impediment other than its later-filed request for an order it never needed. "Diligence and good faith are required of *both* sides." (emphasis, original) (*McKernan*, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 937.)

A party is not denied due process when it fails to avail itself of a procedure that was open to it throughout. (Cf. McKernan, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 937 ["There is nothing fundamentally inequitable in requiring a party to comply with established procedural rules which are designed to improve the overall fairness and efficiency of an adjudicatory procedure."].)

***

Labor Code section 5502(d)(3) provides that "[d]iscovery shall close on the date of the mandatory settlement conference," and that "[e]vidence not disclosed or obtained thereafter shall not be admissible unless the proponent of the evidence can demonstrate that it was not available or could not have been discovered by the exercise of due diligence prior to the settlement conference."

Defendant cannot make that showing. The Corso report is dated April 5, 2024. It was not merely available before the MSC; it was in Defendant's hands for nearly two years before the MSC and was in fact disclosed and admitted. The only thing that did not happen before the MSC was a step Defendant chose not to take.

Defendant's answer to section 5502(d)(3) is to invoke Labor Code sections 5701 and 5906. The Court of Appeal has squarely rejected that use of those sections. In *McKernan*, the Board had relied on sections 5701 and 5906 to admit evidence not disclosed at the MSC. The court annulled, holding that "[t]he Board's power to develop the record cannot be used to circumvent the clear intent and language of section 5502, subdivision (d)(3)," and that "the clear and explicit language of section 5502, subdivision (d)(3) should prevail over the more amorphous powers given by sections 5701 and 5906 where the former statute applies." (*McKernan*, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at pp. 935-936.) The court further held that the absence of prejudice to the opposing party "cannot be the deciding factor," because a contrary rule "would threaten to make section 5502, subdivision (d)(3) meaningless." (*Id*. at p. 938.) *Telles Transport, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1166-1167 is to the same effect.

The procedural predicate for section 5502(d)(3) was fully satisfied here. A Pre-Trial Conference Statement was completed at the MSC on February 2, 2026,

framing the issues and stipulations and disclosing the exhibits, exactly as section 5502(d)(2)-(3) and Rule 10759(b) contemplate. Defendant participated in that process. There was no trial by surprise: every exhibit, including both vocational reports, had been disclosed, and every exhibit was admitted at trial without objection.

Defendant disputes the WCJ's notation that no formal discovery had been undertaken since the October 29, 2025 status conference. Even accepting Defendant's account, the efforts it identifies from that period, attempts on January 19 and January 26, 2026 to schedule a third deposition, do not include any effort to serve the Corso report on Dr. Greils. That is the discovery Defendant now says was indispensable, and it is the one thing the record does not show Defendant attempting during the period when it could freely have accomplished it.

The undersigned's ruling at trial was consistent with these authorities. The WCJ's observation at the MSC that the trial judge could address whether additional discovery was needed did not confer on Defendant an exemption from section 5502(d)(3); it left the question to the trial judge, who considered it and found no statutory good cause.

***

The duty to develop the record arises where the record is insufficient to permit a decision where, for example, "neither side has presented substantial evidence on which a decision could be based." (*McKernan, supra*, 74 Cal.App.4th at pp. 937-938; see *McClune v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1121-1122; *Tyler v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 389, 392; *Kuykendall v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 396, 403-404.) Under *McDuffie v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority* (2002) 67 Cal.Comp.Cases 138 (Appeals Bd. *en banc*), on which Defendant relies, the threshold question is whether the record is inadequate; only if it is does the question of how to supplement it arise.

This record was not inadequate. It contained four reports from an AME, three from a psychiatric PQME, one from an orthopedic PQME, two competing vocational expert reports, and the sworn testimony of the Applicant. Every medical opinion in the record that addressed employability supported the finding made. The undersigned was able to decide the single framed issue on that evidence and did so.

The duty to develop the record is not a mechanism for permitting a party to strengthen its case after it has elected not to develop that case while discovery was open. (*See McKernan, supra*, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 938 [Board "abuses its discretion when it purports to exercise this power to relieve a party from the sanctions of section 5502, subdivision (d)(3) in the absence of a showing of statutory good cause"].) The distinction is between a record that is deficient and a record that is merely unfavorable. This record is the latter.

(Report, pp. 8-11.)_

We also agree that applicant's alleged relocation is not dispositive. As stated by the WCJ:

> Defendant contends its ability to investigate was hindered because it was not told Applicant had moved to Connecticut. Defendant cites no statute, regulation, or case imposing a duty on an applicant to report changes in physical location as distinct from the address of record. Applicant's mailing address of record remained unchanged, all notices were properly served there, and Applicant testified that he is homeless and has no permanent Connecticut address to report.
>
> More fundamentally, this contention was not raised as an issue at trial, no offer of proof was made as to what surveillance or investigation would have shown, and the argument is speculative. Applicant's homelessness, his living situation in a friend's garage, and his relocation were fully explored on cross-examination and were part of the evidence the undersigned weighed in finding him credible.

(*Id*. at p. 15.)

Lastly, we agree that applicant successfully rebutted the PDRS to establish a 100% permanent and total disability. As outlined by the WCJ in his Report:

> The scheduled rating is prima facie evidence of the degree of permanent disability, but it is rebuttable. (Lab. Code, § 4660.1; *Ogilvie v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd*. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1273-1277.) Under the method derived from *LeBoeuf v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1983) 34 Cal.3d 234, an applicant rebuts the schedule by proving that the industrial injury precludes him from participating in vocational rehabilitation and from competing in the open labor market, such that his diminished future earning capacity is greater than the schedule reflects. (*Contra Costa County v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (Dahl) (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 746, 759-761.) The diminished earning capacity must be attributable to the industrial injury rather than to non-industrial factors such as general economic conditions, illiteracy, or lack of education. (*Ogilvie, supra*, 197 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1274-1275.) Where that showing is made, permanent total disability may be found "in accordance with the fact" under Labor Code section 4662(b), and section 4660.1(g) expressly preserves that result.
>
> That is precisely the showing made here, and it was made through evidence Defendant itself stipulated into the record.
>
> Mr. Ramirez performed an individualized analysis of each medical impairment and each work restriction, concluded that the psychiatric, neuropsychological, and cognitive deficits eliminate Applicant's ability to perform competitive employment, and concluded that Applicant is not amenable to rehabilitation and has lost 100% of his earning capacity. He addressed apportionment as *Nunes v. State of California, Dept. of Motor Vehicles* (2023) 88 Cal.Comp.Cases 741

(Appeals Bd. *en banc*) and *Nunes II* (2023) 88 Cal.Comp.Cases 894 (Appeals Bd. *en banc*) require, reviewing the apportionment determinations of Drs. Latteri, Greils, and Levine and concluding that the industrial injuries are the sole cause of the vocational disability. That conclusion is consistent with Dr. Latteri's finding of zero apportionment orthopedically and Dr. Levine's finding that there is no basis to apportion any part of the cognitive disability to non-industrial factors.

Two medical-legal evaluators independently concurred. Dr. Greils, the psychiatric PQME jointly used by the parties, adopted the vocational findings. Dr. Levine, the parties' Agreed Medical Evaluator, concurred as well and also questioned Applicant's capacity to participate in the competitive labor market in his own reporting years earlier, before he ever saw a vocational report. An AME is presumed to have been selected because of expertise and neutrality, and the AME's opinion should ordinarily be followed unless there is good reason to find it unpersuasive. (*Power v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 775, 782.) No such reason was offered at trial, and none is offered in the Petition. Indeed, the Petition does not mention Dr. Levine's May 27, 2025 supplemental report (Joint Exhibit 1) at all.

As Applicant correctly observes in his Answer, there is no medical report in this record that disputes the 100% determination. Defendant offered no contrary medical opinion, sought no rebuttal medical evidence on permanent disability, and stipulated to the admission of every medical report in the case.

***

Defendant's central premise, that the Award rests on a "one-sided" evidentiary foundation, is not supported by the record. The Corso report was admitted as Defendant's Exhibit A without objection and is expressly identified in the Opinion on Decision as evidence the undersigned considered. The Petition itself concedes that Defendant "never argued that the WCJ was prohibited from considering both vocational reports." The undersigned did consider both, and found the Ramirez analysis the more persuasive.

The Opinion on Decision is not required to catalogue every evidentiary sub-argument, but the reasons for that weighing bear stating here. First, Mr. Corso's conclusion that Applicant can work rests substantially on the availability of "remote/home-based work," a premise he draws from Dr. Levine's earlier, provisional 2022 and 2023 reporting. But Dr. Levine had expressly deferred to Dr. Greils on that point, and both evaluators later resolved the question against that premise in their 2025 supplemental reports. Mr. Corso's foundation was thus superseded by the very evaluators he relied upon. Second, Applicant testified credibly that he cannot type, has no computer skills, cannot complete a test, and could not perform a remote or home-based job. Third, Mr. Corso's apportionment analysis is expressly contingent: he states that a 100% rating would be precluded "[i]f PTP Dr. Maloff's Apportionment is upheld." Dr. Maloff's report was never

> offered or admitted into evidence, and the Appeals Board's decisions must be based on the admitted record. (*Hamilton v. Lockheed Corp.* (2001) 66 Cal.Comp.Cases 473, 476 (Appeals Bd. *en banc*).) Fourth, much of Mr. Corso's analysis turns on motivation — that Applicant "can benefit from vocational services if so motivated," that he "considers himself unable to work," and that SSDI receipt correlates with reduced incentive to work. The *LeBoeuf* inquiry is not whether an injured worker is willing to be retrained; it is whether the industrial injury precludes him from being retrained. (*Dahl, supra*, 240 Cal.App.4th at pp. 759-760.)

(*Id*. at pp. 5-8.)

> We note, however, that within the F&A, in Finding of Fact 7, the WCJ states that:
>
> The Applicant is 100% Permanently and Totally Disabled based on the range of evidence and according to the fact and is therefore entitled to a life pension.

"Range of evidence" is an approach primarily associated with older cases wherein parties obtained competing QMEs and each QME's report constituted substantial evidence, which then formed a range from which the WCJ could decide. (*Blackledge v. Bank of America* (2010), 75 Cal.Comp.Cases 613, 625 (Appeals Bd. en banc) (rating must be based on substantial medical evidence).) Today, the term "range of evidence" is not often used, but remains permissible when deciding between competing reports, both of which constitute substantial medical evidence.

Here, the scenario of competing med-legal reports is not the basis upon which the WCJ found applicant to be 100% permanently and totally disabled. As noted above, and in accordance with *Ogilvie*, applicant rebutted the PDRS by proving through Mr. Ramirez's vocational reporting that the industrial injury precluded him from participating in vocational rehabilitation and from competing in the open labor market, thus diminishing his future earning capacity to a greater extent than the schedule reflects. The psyche PQME, Dr. Greils, and AME, Dr. Levine, separately concurred with these findings.

Defendant argues that the reporting of Dr. Greils is not supported by substantial evidence. Notwithstanding the fact that applicant has already successfully rebutted the PDRS, we highlight the following observations outlined by the WCJ on Dr. Greils' reporting:

> A medical opinion constitutes substantial evidence if it is framed in terms of reasonable medical probability, is not speculative, is based on pertinent facts and an adequate examination and history, and sets forth reasoning in support of its conclusions. (*E.L. Yeager Construction v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (Gatten) (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 922, 928.)

> Dr. Greils evaluated Applicant on three occasions across nearly six years, took histories, performed examinations, reviewed the record, diagnosed specific psychiatric conditions, assigned a GAF of 50, and addressed apportionment. Defendant does not identify any factual error in his reporting, any assumption he made that the record contradicts, or any respect in which his reasoning is unexplained. Defendant's sole objection is that he did not see one particular document; a document Defendant possessed and never sent him.
>
> A medical-legal opinion does not cease to be substantial evidence merely because a party elected not to place its own expert's report before the evaluator. If it did, any litigant could manufacture a reversible defect in the opposing side's medical evidence simply by withholding its own.

(Report, p. 9.)

Accordingly, we grant the Petition for the limited purpose of amending Finding of Fact 7 to reflect that applicant successfully rebutted the permanent disability rating schedule (PDRS), is 100% permanently and totally disabled as a result of the subject injury and entitled to a life pension. We otherwise affirm the F&A.

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that defendant's Petition for Reconsideration of the Findings and Award issued on July 8, 2026, is **GRANTED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, as the Decision After Reconsideration of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, the Findings and Award issued on July 8, 2026, is **AFFIRMED**, **EXCEPT** as **AMENDED** below.

FINDINGS OF FACT

***

7. Applicant has successfully rebutted the PDRS to establish that he is 100% Permanently and Totally Disabled as a result of the December 10, 2017 injury and entitled to a life pension.

***

WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

/s/ JOSEPH V. CAPURRO, COMMISSIONER

I CONCUR,

/s/ PAUL F. KELLY, COMMISSIONER

/s/ CRAIG L. SNELLINGS, COMMISSIONER

DATED AND FILED AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

November 9, 2026

SERVICE MADE ON THE ABOVE DATE ON THE PERSONS LISTED BELOW AT THEIR ADDRESSES SHOWN ON THE CURRENT OFFICIAL ADDRESS RECORD.

JOSEPH LEVESQUE
LARSON, LARSON & DAUER
LAW OFFICE OF HEYWOOD G. FRIEDMAN

RL/cm

I certify that I affixed the official seal of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board to this original decision on this date.
cm