

**WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

JORGE GALINDO, *Applicant*

vs.

**NISSAN AUTOMOTIVE OF MISSION HILLS, INC.;
CASTLEPOINT NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, in liquidation, administered by
CALIFORNIA INSURANCE GUARANTEE ASSOCIATION, *Defendants***

**Adjudication Number: ADJ7835304
Marina del Rey District Office**

**OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR RECONSIDERATION
AND DECISION AFTER RECONSIDERATION**

Applicant seeks reconsideration of the Finding and Order (F&O) issued on July 2, 2025 by a workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ), wherein the WCJ found in pertinent part that pursuant to Labor Code¹ section 3208.3, subdivision (d) (section 3208.3(d)), applicant did not sustain a psychiatric injury arising out of and in the course of his employment (AOE/COE).²

Applicant contends that his unrebutted testimony at trial met his burden of proof to establish a psychiatric injury AOE/COE pursuant to section 3208.3, subdivision (d), caused by a sudden and extraordinary employment condition.

Defendant filed an Answer to Petition for Reconsideration (Answer), and the WCJ filed a Report and Recommendation on Petition for Reconsideration (Report), recommending that the petition be denied.

We have reviewed the record in this case, the allegations of the Petition for Reconsideration, the Answer and the contents of the Report. Based on the record and for the reasons in the Report and those set forth below, it is the decision of the majority to grant

¹ All further references are to the Labor Code unless otherwise noted.

² In addition, the WCJ's Finding of Facts numbers 4 and 5 and the Order in its entirety were all issued as a direct result of the WCJ's finding that applicant did not sustain an injury to his psyche but are not related to the legal and factual issues raised on reconsideration.

reconsideration for the sole purpose of amending the F&O to correct Finding of Fact number 3, but to otherwise affirm the WCJ's decision.

I.

Former Labor Code section 5909 provided that a petition for reconsideration was deemed denied unless the Appeals Board acted on the petition within 60 days from the date of filing. (Lab. Code, § 5909.) Effective July 2, 2024, Labor Code section 5909 was amended to state in relevant part that:

- (a) A petition for reconsideration is deemed to have been denied by the appeals board unless it is acted upon within 60 days from the date a trial judge transmits a case to the appeals board.
- (b)
 - (1) When a trial judge transmits a case to the appeals board, the trial judge shall provide notice to the parties of the case and the appeals board.
 - (2) For purposes of paragraph (1), service of the accompanying report, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 5900, shall constitute providing notice.

Under Labor Code section 5909(a), the Appeals Board must act on a petition for reconsideration within 60 days of transmission of the case to the Appeals Board. Transmission is reflected in Events in the Electronic Adjudication Management System (EAMS). Specifically, in Case Events, under Event Description is the phrase "Sent to Recon" and under Additional Information is the phrase "The case is sent to the Recon board."

Here, according to Events, the case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on August 19, 2025 and 60 days from the date of transmission is Saturday, October 18, 2025. The next business day that is 60 days from the date of transmission is Monday, October 20, 2025. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10600(b).)³ This decision is issued by or on Monday, October 20, 2025, so that we have timely acted on the petition as required by Labor Code section 5909(a).

Labor Code section 5909(b)(1) requires that the parties and the Appeals Board be provided with notice of transmission of the case. Transmission of the case to the Appeals Board in EAMS

³ WCAB Rule 10600(b) (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10600(b)) states that: "Unless otherwise provided by law, if the last day for exercising or performing any right or duty to act or respond falls on a weekend, or on a holiday for which the offices of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board are closed, the act or response may be performed or exercised upon the next business day."

provides notice to the Appeals Board. Thus, the requirement in subdivision (1) ensures that the parties are notified of the accurate date for the commencement of the 60-day period for the Appeals Board to act on a petition. Labor Code section 5909(b)(2) provides that service of the Report and Recommendation shall be notice of transmission.

Here, according to the proof of service for the Report and Recommendation by the workers' compensation administrative law judge, the Report was served on August 19, 2025, and the case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on August 19, 2025. Service of the Report and transmission of the case to the Appeals Board occurred on the same day. Thus, we conclude that the parties were provided with the notice of transmission required by Labor Code section 5909(b)(1) because service of the Report in compliance with Labor Code section 5909(b)(2) provided them with actual notice as to the commencement of the 60-day period on August 19, 2025.

II.

The issue presented on reconsideration is whether applicant may be paid compensation for a psychiatric injury in this matter pursuant to section 3208.3(d), which provides in relevant part:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this division, no compensation shall be paid pursuant to this division for a psychiatric injury related to a claim against an employer unless the employee has been employed by that employer for at least six months. The six months of employment need not be continuous. This subdivision shall not apply if the psychiatric injury is caused by a sudden and extraordinary employment condition...

(Lab. Code, § 3208.3(d).)

As an initial matter, section 3208.3(d) does not preclude the compensability of a psychiatric injury but rather, states that “*no compensation shall be paid* pursuant to this division for a psychiatric injury related to a claim against an employer unless the employee has been employed by that employer for at least six months. (Lab. Code, § 3208.3(d), italics added.) Therefore, we grant reconsideration for the sole purpose of correcting the WCJ’s erroneous finding that pursuant to 3208.3(d), applicant did not sustain a psychiatric injury AOE/COE. (F&O, Finding of Fact no. 3.) We otherwise affirm the WCJ’s decision as we agree that defendant met its burden of proof to establish that applicant was not employed by Nissan Automotive of Mission Hills, Inc., (Nissan Mission Hills) “for at least six months.” (Lab. Code, § 3208.3(d).)

Further, we agree with the WCJ and disagree with the dissenting opinion that applicant did *not* meet his burden of proof to establish that his alleged psychiatric injury was “caused by a sudden and extraordinary employment condition...” and therefore excluded from the prohibition of payment under section 3208.3(d). (Lab. Code, § 3208.3(d).) As set forth by the WCJ in the Report:

The definition of a “sudden and extraordinary employment event” has evolved since the enactment of this code section. One of the seminal cases is *Matea v. WCAB*, (2006) 77 CCC 1522, which agreed with the court in *Walmart Stores Inc. v. WCAB (Garcia)* (2003) 68 CCC 1575, that catastrophic and unexpected events such as “a gas main explosion or work force violence”, or events which would reasonably be expected to cause psychological problems, would fit within the exception found in Labor Code Section 3208.3(d). However, *Matea* went on to clarify that it would not include all accidental injuries, but only those that were NOT caused by a “regular or routine employment event”. This is defined as an event that is uncommon, unusual, and which occurred unexpectedly. It is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.

In this case, the Applicant testified that as a driver and a delivery person, he was required to “deliver engines, transmissions, fenders, rims, tires, and stereos”. (Summary of Evidence, 12/17/2024, p. 4 lines 19-21). On the date of injury, 6/2/2011, he and five other men lifted a 900 lbs. engine, three men on each side. The three men on the other side dropped the pulley and the Applicant immediately felt a burning sensation from the bottom of his back to the top of his neck. (Summary of Evidence, 12/17/2024, p. 4, lines 22-25; p. 5, lines 1-6). This description of the injury is further elaborated upon with Applicant’s testimony at the next trial. (Summary of Evidence, 3/11/2025, p. 2, lines 6-16).

It is uncontroverted that the injury occurred when the applicant was performing a function, i.e. lifting an engine that he himself testified was a part of his expected job duties. This activity, therefore, does not meet the *Matea* requirement that in order to qualify as an exception to the 6-month prohibition, the injury must occur as a result of a “sudden and extraordinary condition of employment”. Applicant argues that he had never lifted a 900 lbs. engine before and that this was the first time. Therefore, this qualifies as “sudden and extraordinary”. However, this WCJ finds that the case law would not support that conclusion on these facts.

The facts here are analogous to the situation in *SCIF v. WCAB (Garcia)* (2012) 77 CCC 307, Cal Wrk. Comp. PD Lexis 343, where the Applicant, an avocado picker, fell from a 24 ft. ladder and testified that he had never had such a fall, nor was he aware that anyone else had. The WCJ in that case found, and the WCAB upheld, that since the Defendant had not introduced contradictory evidence showing that the injury was “regular or routine”. The Applicant had discharged his burden of proving a sudden and extraordinary event. The Court of Appeals, however, annulled the decision and remanded to the lower court

with instructions to deny the psychiatric injury based on *Labor Code Section 3208.3(d)*, reasoning that the lack of evidence from the Defendant showing the injury was due to a regular or routine event does not make the Applicant's psychiatric injury compensable. The burden of proof lies with the Applicant. The Court pointed out [in that case], that falling from a tree would not be unusual but would be a typical hazard expected for an avocado picker. He was injured while engaged in his usual and customary job duties.

The instant case is similar to the *Garcia* case in that the Petitioner was injured while engaged in a regular and routine event—lifting automobile parts. Although the nature of his injury was severe, the hazard of being injured while lifting an engine is not uncommon, unusual or totally unexpected. Regular job duties must be considered in assessing whether a “sudden and extraordinary employment event” occurs. *McKee v. Aerotek, Inc.* (2021) 86 CCC 1055. The incident here was severe and very injurious to the Petitioner, but the fact that the injury occurred as a result of a regular job duty, and within six months of his employment, does not allow him a compensable psychiatric claim pursuant to Labor Code 3208.3(d).

(Report, pp. 3-5, emphasis added.)

Accordingly, we grant reconsideration for the sole purpose of correcting the erroneous finding of fact that applicant did not sustain a psychiatric injury AOE/COE (Finding of Fact no. 3), but otherwise affirm the WCJ's decision.

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that applicant's Petition for Reconsideration of the Finding and Order issued on July 2, 2025 by a workers' compensation administrative law judge is **GRANTED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED as the decision after reconsideration of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board that the Finding and Order issued on July 2, 2025 by a workers' compensation administrative law judge is **AFFIRMED** except it is **AMENDED** as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

...

3. Based on Labor Code section 3208.3, subdivision (d) (Lab. Code, § 3208.3(d)), no compensation shall be paid to applicant for a claimed psychiatric injury in the pending claim against this employer (ADJ7835304).

...

WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

/s/ KATHERINE A. ZALEWSKI, CHAIR

I CONCUR,

/s/ CRAIG L. SNELLINGS, COMMISSIONER

I DISSENT (See Dissenting Opinion),

/s/ ANNE SCHMITZ, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER



DATED AND FILED AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

October 17, 2025

**SERVICE MADE ON THE ABOVE DATE ON THE PERSONS LISTED BELOW AT
THEIR ADDRESSES SHOWN ON THE CURRENT OFFICIAL ADDRESS RECORD.**

**JORGE GALINDO
ROSE, KLEIN & MARIAS, LLP
HERMANSON, GUZMAN & WANG, PC**

AJF/abs

I certify that I affixed the official seal of the
Workers' Compensation Appeals Board to this
original decision on this date. *abs*

DISSENTING OPINION OF DEPUTY COMMISSIONER SCHMITZ

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion that applicant did not meet his burden to establish that his alleged psychiatric injury was “caused by a sudden and extraordinary employment condition...” and therefore excluded from the prohibition of payment under Labor Code⁴ section 3208.3, subdivision (d) (section 3208.3(d)). As a result, I would grant reconsideration in order to rescind the WCJ’s finding that pursuant to section 3208.3(d), applicant is precluded from payment for his alleged psychiatric injury and issue a new finding that applicant met his burden of proof to establish that his alleged psychiatric injury was “caused by a sudden and extraordinary employment condition” pursuant to section 3208.3(d).⁵

The only evidence produced by any party at trial on this issue was by applicant through his own testimony, as follows:

When he worked at Nissan Mission Hills, he worked as a driver and delivery person. He would deliver engines, transmissions, fenders, rims, tires, and stereos. ***He delivered these items in a small pickup truck. He delivered them himself.***

On 6/2/11, the date of his injury, he was supposed to deliver an engine, and he asked for a cherry picker so that he could load it onto the truck. The dealer had been open about five to six months at that time. ***When he asked for the cherry picker, he was told that there was a long line and that he needed to load it.*** It took three men on each side of the engine to lift it. ***While they were attempting to lift it, the other side lost control of the pulley, and he could not move. It was a 900-pound engine. He had never lifted an engine like this before. This was the first time they lifted it.***

...

At the date of injury, he had never before lifted an engine that weighed up to 900 pounds. It's not something that they did every day; this was the first time. Three men were on one side of the engine, and three men were on the other side of the engine. **The three men on the other side dropped their side, and the 900-pound engine pulled his neck to his lower back, and it felt like fire.**

⁴ All further references are to the Labor Code unless otherwise noted.

⁵ I would also rescind the WCJ’s Finding of Facts numbers 4 and 5 and the Order in its entirety as these were all issued as a direct result of the WCJ’s finding that applicant did not sustain an injury to his psyche.

This is the first time this had ever happened to him while working for this company.

(MOH/SOE, December 17, 2024, pp. 4-5, 7.)⁶

He does not know if the group of three individuals on the opposite side of the engine lost control or what happened, *but they let go of the engine, and it just suddenly went down. Nobody said, “Oh, we’re dropping the engine.” It just happened,* so he was pretty much holding almost the entire weight of the engine. **He had never lifted such an engine before. This was the first time working for Mission Hills Nissan that he had to lift an engine like this.** He basically had the weight of the entire engine; about two minutes later, he felt a fire from his spine to his neck.

...

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY:

Regarding his specific job duties on a typical day at Mission Hills Nissan, he would clock in, look at the diagram of what they had and what he had to deliver that day, start getting the parts, load them, and deliver them. Normally those parts included fenders, mirrors, and door handles. **He would always load the parts into the truck by himself. He never had to put an engine in his truck before as part of his duties; this was his first time ever.**

...

Reference is made to an April 2018 report Dr. Taylor issued. Starting on page 53 of that report, Dr. Taylor reported that applicant worked by himself full time Monday through Friday, from 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., driving a pickup truck to deliver Nissan automotive parts to collision centers and repair shops throughout the greater Los Angeles area; applicant confirms that is accurate. Dr. Taylor went on to report that those parts would include engines, transmissions, bumpers, rims, tires, whatever the customer ordered; **applicant confirms that is correct, but applicant is clarifying today that it was really just the one engine that he ever really had. Besides that engine, the heaviest item that he would have had to put in his truck was a fender. He never had to lift an alternator.**

Reference is made to applicant’s March 2019 deposition; on page 38 applicant testified that the heaviest item he had to lift by himself was an alternator. Applicant confirms that it is his testimony today that he actually never had to lift

⁶ I take judicial notice pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (g) and/or (h) of the meaning of “cherry picker” as an aerial, mechanical work platform or bucket used to provide temporary access for people or equipment to inaccessible areas, usually at height and *designed to lift weights up to one ton (2,000 pounds), and usually capable of being set up and operated by a single person.*

an alternator. In a typical day, he would load things into his truck for delivery two times per day.

(MOH/SOE, March 11, 2025, pp. 2-3, emphasis added.)

Section 3208.3(d) states, in relevant part:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this division, no compensation shall be paid pursuant to this division for a psychiatric injury related to a claim against an employer unless the employee has been employed by that employer for at least six months. The six months of employment need not be continuous. **This subdivision shall not apply if the psychiatric injury is caused by a sudden and extraordinary employment condition...**

(Lab. Code, § 3208.3(d), emphasis added.)⁷

Applicant bears the burden of proof to establish the “sudden and extraordinary” exemption from the subdivision’s preclusion from payment for psychiatric injury. (*Matea v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.* (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1448-1449 (*Matea*) [71 Cal.Comp.Cases 1522].) Whether a psychiatric injury is “caused by a sudden and extraordinary employment condition” is based on the unique facts of each case. (*Id.*, at p. 1449.) The Legislature’s intent was “to limit claims for psychiatric injuries resulting from routine stress and routine injuries during the first six months of employment.” (*Ibid.*, citing *Wal-Mart Stores v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.* (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1437-1439 (*Garcia*) [68 Cal.Comp.Cases 1575].) The *Matea* Court discussed what type of occurrences or events may be contemplated by section 3208.3(d):

Webster’s Third International Dictionary (1993), at page 2284, defines “sudden” as “happening without previous notice or with very brief notice : coming or occurring unexpectedly : not foreseen or prepared for.” The same dictionary defines “extraordinary” as “going beyond what is usual, regular, common, or customary”; and “having little or no precedent and usu[ally] totally unexpected.” (Webster’s 3d Internat. Dict., *supra*, at p. 807.) Gas main explosions and workplace violence are certainly uncommon and usually totally unexpected events; thus, they may be sudden and extraordinary employment conditions. **However, we believe that there may also be other “sudden and extraordinary” occurrences or events within the contemplation of section 3208.3, subdivision (d) that would naturally be expected to cause psychic disturbances even in diligent and honest employees. Therefore, if an employee carries his or her burden of showing by a preponderance of the**

⁷ This provision also applies to psychiatric injury claims pled as a compensable consequence of a physical injury. (*Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Garcia)* (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1435 [68 Cal.Comp.Cases 1575].)

evidence that the event or occurrence that caused the alleged psychiatric injury was something other than a regular and routine employment event or condition, that is, that the event was uncommon, unusual, and occurred unexpectedly, the injury may be compensable even if the employee was employed for less than six months.

(*Matea, supra*, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1448-1449, emphasis added.)

In this case, just as in *Matea*, “the record is sparse and the facts are few concerning” what caused applicant’s alleged psychiatric injury. (See *Matea, supra*, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1450.) As set forth above, applicant testified that on the date of his alleged psychiatric injury, June 2, 2011, he worked as a driver and delivery person who delivered engines, transmissions, fenders, rims, tires, and stereos for Nissan Mission Hills – in a small pickup truck and *by himself*. He testified that *on the date of his injury, applicant was instructed to manually lift a 900-pound engine into his small pickup truck without the mechanical assistance of the cherry picker, and then further, applicant was expected to deliver that 900-pound engine in a small pickup truck by himself*. It should also be noted that applicant testified that he was given no verbal warning before the 900-pound engine came crashing down on him which raises an inference of fact that there were no safety “spotters” utilized by his employer during this dangerous lift.⁸

The facts of this case represent the distinction between “the circumstance of ‘an ordinary occupational event’ that becomes ‘extraordinary.’” (*State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Garza)* (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 796, 808 [83 Cal.Comp.Cases 185] citing *Garcia, supra*, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 774.) In other words, there is substantial evidence provided by applicant that “something particularly unusual happened” to cause applicant’s alleged psychiatric injury. (*Id.*, at p. 809 citing *Garcia, supra*, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 774.) Therefore, and contrary to the majority decision, applicant’s testimony carries his “burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the event or occurrence that caused the alleged psychiatric injury was something other than a regular and routine employment event or condition, that is, that the event was uncommon, unusual, and occurred unexpectedly...” (*Matea, supra*, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1449.)

⁸ “This division [Division 4] and Division 5 (commencing with Section 6300) shall be liberally construed by the courts with the purpose of extending their benefits for the protection of persons injured in the course of their employment.” (Lab. Code, § 3202; see *State Employees' Retirement System v. Industrial Acci. Com. (Lund)* (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 380, 382–383 [1950 Cal.App. LEXIS 1542] [reviewing court “required to indulge all reasonable inferences which may be drawn legitimately from the facts in order to support the findings of the commission, and in doing so all that is required is reasonable probability; not absolute certainty...”].)

I note that defendant attempted on cross-examination to impeach applicant's credibility by comparing prior testimony as to whether applicant had previously delivered engines for defendant employer. (See MOH/SOE, March 11, 2025, pp. 2-3.) However, the WCJ appears not to have found defendant's attempt effective as the WCJ made no adverse finding against applicant's credibility and did not address this limited cross-examination testimony in the Opinion on Decision or the Report. Regardless, and as set forth above, even if it were to be assumed *arguendo* that delivering engines was "regular and routine event" for delivery truck drivers at Nissan Mission Hills in the first six months of employment, the "extremely unusual circumstances" (see *Garcia, supra*, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 774) that turned the injury producing incident of June 2, 2011 into a "sudden and extraordinary employment condition" under section 3208.3(d), has to do with applicant being instructed to manually lift that 900-pound engine into a small pickup truck without the mechanical assistance of the cherry picker or safety spotters, and further, was then expected to deliver that 900-pound engine in a small pickup truck by himself.

Finally, and also as in *Matea*, defendant presented no evidence to rebut applicant's testimony, i.e., to establish that it was a "routine and regular employment event" within the first six months of their employment that delivery drivers would be instructed to manually load 900-pound engines into small pickup trucks *without the mechanical assistance of a cherry picker, without safety spotters, and then to deliver those 900-pound engines alone*. Under these circumstances,

We must assume, as the WCJ assumed, that they are uncommon, unusual and totally unexpected events; otherwise, The Home Depot would have presented testimony to the contrary. Therefore, in the absence of any contrary evidence, when Matea presented evidence that he was injured as a result of all the lumber from a rack falling onto him, he met his burden of proving that he was injured as a result of a sudden and extraordinary employment condition as required by section 3208.3, subdivision (d). Accordingly, the Board erred in interpreting section 3208.3, subdivision (d), to find otherwise.

(*Matea, supra*, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1450, emphasis added.)

I emphasize that the failure of a defendant to present contrary evidence is only relevant in cases such as this case, where an applicant has already met their burden to establish that their alleged psychiatric injury was caused by a "sudden and extraordinary employment condition" pursuant to section 3208.3(d) and decisional law. As stated in *Guzman*,

[The employee] had the burden to prove that his psychiatric injury was caused by a sudden and extraordinary employment event. [Citation.] He did not meet that burden. [The employee's] observations during his brief employment at [the employer's worksite] and his prior unspecified fruit-picking experiences do not establish his injury was caused by an event that was uncommon, unusual and totally unexpected. **There was no evidence the employer violated any safety regulations.** An event does not become presumptively extraordinary because the employer offers no evidence it is regular or routine. ... '[S]uch a broad interpretation could place a greater risk of liability on those employers whose safety measures are better and more effective, i.e., those who manage to prevent accidents on the job from becoming routine or commonplace.'" (*Id.* at pp. 774–775.) The *Garcia* court concluded that, "[i]n the absence of more persuasive evidence that [the employee's] fall was extraordinary, his claim for psychiatric injury is barred under section 3208.3, subdivision (d) ." (*Id.* at p. 775.)

(*Guzman, supra*, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 809, emphasis added.)

Accordingly, I would grant reconsideration and as my decision after reconsideration, I would rescind the WCJ's finding that pursuant to section 3208.3(d), applicant is precluded from payment for his alleged psychiatric injury and issue a new finding that applicant met his burden of proof to establish that his alleged psychiatric injury was "caused by a sudden and extraordinary employment condition" pursuant to section 3208.3(d).⁹

⁹ I would also rescind the WCJ's Finding of Facts numbers 4 and 5 and the Order in its entirety as these were all issued as a direct result of the WCJ's finding that applicant did not sustain an injury to his psyche.

Thus, I respectfully dissent.



WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

/s/ ANNE SCHMITZ, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER

DATED AND FILED AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

October 17, 2025

SERVICE MADE ON THE ABOVE DATE ON THE PERSONS LISTED BELOW AT THEIR ADDRESSES SHOWN ON THE CURRENT OFFICIAL ADDRESS RECORD.

**JORGE GALINDO
ROSE, KLEIN & MARIAS, LLP
HERMANSON, GUZMAN & WANG, PC**

AJF/abs

I certify that I affixed the official seal of the
Workers' Compensation Appeals Board to this
original decision on this date. *abs*