

**BEFORE THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
APPEALS BOARD**

In the Matter of the Appeal of:

LIQUIVISION TECHNOLOGY, INC.
711 Market Street
Klamath Falls, OR 97601

Employer

Dockets. 08-R2D1-1712 through 1714

**DECISION AFTER
RECONSIDERATION**

The Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Board (Board), acting pursuant to authority vested in it by the California Labor Code and having taken the petition for reconsideration filed by Liquivision Technology, Inc. (Employer) matter under submission, renders the following decision after reconsideration.

JURISDICTION

Beginning on February 19, 2008, the Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Division) conducted an accident inspection at a place of employment in Granite Bay, California maintained by Employer. On April 15, 2008, the Division issued three citations to Employer alleging the following violations of workplace safety and health standards codified in California Code of Regulations, Title 8, and proposing civil penalties.¹

Citation 1, Item 1 alleged a General violation of section 5157(c)(4) [failure to implement a written permit space program]. Citation 1, Item 2 alleged a General violation of section 5157(e)(1) [failure to document completion of an entry permit prior to entry in a permit-required confined space]. Citation 2, Item 1 alleged a Serious violation of section 5157(k)(1) [failure to ensure divers were trained to perform assigned rescue duties]. Citation 3, Item 1 alleged a Serious violation of section 6056(b)(2)(C) [failure to ensure that a standby diver tended the hose at the underwater point of entry when diving was conducted in physically confining spaces].

Employer filed timely appeals of the citations.

¹ Unless otherwise specified, all references are to California Code of Regulations, Title 8.

Administrative proceedings were held, including a contested evidentiary hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Board. The parties stipulated that the proposed civil penalties were properly calculated and proposed in accordance with the Division's policies and procedures.

After taking testimony and considering the evidence and arguments of counsel, the ALJ issued a Decision on September 2, 2009. The Decision denied Employer's appeal and upheld all citations and classifications, imposing total civil penalties of \$8240.

Employer timely filed a petition for reconsideration of the ALJ's Decision. The Division filed an answer to the petition. Employer also filed a motion to file a supplemental petition in support of its petition for reconsideration, and a supplemental petition, both of which were properly served on all parties.²

ISSUE

Did the Administrative Law Judge properly rule on the Division's request for sanctions?

Was the ALJ's decision correct in upholding all citations and classifications?

EVIDENCE

The Decision summarizes the evidence adduced at hearing in detail. We summarize that evidence briefly below, focusing on the portions relevant to the issue presented.

Patrick Corcoran (Corcoran), an associate safety engineer with the Division, testified regarding the inspection he conducted at the Hinkle Reservoir. The reservoir is a large body of water covered with a thick rubberized Hypalon tarp bolted down around the perimeter, and having about twelve hatches for entry and exit. (Ex. 6.) It measures about 1400 feet long, 560 feet wide, and ranges in depth from fifteen to twenty feet. Employer was hired by the San Juan Water District to remove sediment powder from the floor of the reservoir, as part of their water treatment program.

² Board Regulation § 392.3 provides that a party may make a motion to file a supplemental answer or petition; the Board has discretion to accept a supplemental response if it believes acceptance of the document will aid in properly adjudicating the appeal. Because Employer had not yet received copies of the hearing tapes and exhibits at the time it had filed its initial petition, the Board finds good cause is shown for the filing of the supplemental appeal, and will allow it. The Division did not file an objection to the motion, and the supplemental appeal addresses the issues raised in Employer's initial petition for reconsideration.

According to Corcoran, he met two of Employer's supervisors at the site— Ron Trowbridge (Trowbridge), the dive supervisor, and Cameron Hagerman (Hagerman), the surface-air supplied dive team leader. Hagerman was in the water for the first portion of Corcoran's visit. Hagerman and another diver were attached to 300 foot "umbilical type" hoses, which fed compressed air to the divers. The umbilical lines also fed compressed air to the vacuum equipment and electrical cords to run the machinery. (Ex. 8.)

Corcoran testified that the divers wore weight belts to maintain negative buoyancy, in order to work on the floor of the reservoir, which also meant they needed assistance to get in and out of the hatch and reservoir. He also explained that the divers wear a helmet that is bolted to the dive suit, and if they needed to get to the surface of the water, under the tarp, to breathe, they would have to both rid themselves of some of their weights and gear, and get the bolted diving helmet off. On cross-examination, Corcoran did explain that the divers were also wearing a "bail-out bottle," or a reserve tank of air, on their backs, for emergencies. (Ex. 9.)

Corcoran asked two employees who were stationed on the surface, Trowbridge and Chad High (High), what Employer's emergency procedures were. They informed Corcoran that they were trained to call 911 in an emergency. Later on, Hagerman confirmed that the employees did not have emergency rescue training. Corcoran also spoke to Bill Huber (Huber), Employer's operations manager, via telephone at a later time, and requested the Employer's permit-required confined space documentation. Huber told Corcoran that the Employer did not have a program, and did not believe such a program applied because "every time we put on a helmet, we're in a confined space." Huber also told Corcoran that the Employer did not conduct mock rescue operations.

Corcoran testified to his experience observing surface-supplied-air diving, and personal experience with recreational underwater diving. He described having worked around boat yards, and having seen this particular type of diving while working near a naval base in the Philippines, where he had the opportunity to witness friends and Navy SEALs performing surface air supplied diving. He also testified to having engaged in research and study into commercial diving as part of his work as a compliance officer. Corcoran also has 25 years of diving experience, with a certification from the Professional Association of Diving Instructors.

Corcoran's work experience includes working as an ocean lifeguard in New Jersey, an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT), and teaching basic skills to nursing students overseas. His education includes a master's degree in public health from UC Berkeley. He explained that from education and work experience, he knows that lack of oxygen to the brain can be deadly within four to six minutes, and a local fire department, such as the fire department in

Granite Bay, may not have the ability to reach an injured diver in the time necessary to prevent serious injury or death.

Employer presented one witness, its Chief Executive Officer, Brent Ray Budden (Budden). Budden has been in the commercial diving field for over 40 years, and had cleaned the Hinkle reservoir in the past. Budden testified that it was his understanding that an “underwater point of entry” is not a surface entrance, but is a reference to a location in the water, for example, an entryway from a larger underwater area to a smaller room. Budden explained that Employer had recently done an inspection of a tube, and had placed a diver at the “underwater point of entry” to the tube, in order to regulate the hose of the diver who would be entering the small tube.

DECISION AFTER RECONSIDERATION

In making this decision, the Board relies upon its independent review of the entire evidentiary record in the proceeding. The Board has taken no new evidence. The Board has also reviewed and considered Employer’s petition for reconsideration and the Division’s answer to it.

Labor Code section 6617 sets forth five grounds upon which a petition for reconsideration may be based:

- (a) That by such order or decision made and filed by the appeals board or hearing officer, the appeals board acted without or in excess of its powers.
- (b) That the order or decision was procured by fraud.
- (c) That the evidence does not justify the findings of fact.
- (d) That the petitioner has discovered new evidence material to him, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the hearing.
- (e) That the findings of fact do not support the order or decision.

Employer petitioned for reconsideration on the basis of Labor Code section 6617(a), (c) and (e).

1. Did the Administrative Law Judge properly rule on the Division’s request for sanctions?

Employer argues that the ALJ improperly granted the Division’s motion for sanctions against Employer for failure to provide discovery in response to the Division’s requests for the production of documents, and failure to provide a list of witnesses as requested during discovery. Employer’s representative, Budden, stated that Employer never received the request for documents, as the two requests were improperly addressed to “Klamath” rather than “Klamath Falls.” The parties participated in a pre-hearing conference call, but the

Division was represented by another attorney at that time, and the parties had no record of the discussion. Budden was Employer's only witness, and stated that the only testimony he planned to present was related to the Employer's understanding of the regulations. Employer also wished to introduce a portion of the regulations, and possibly the Cal/OSHA consultation manual on confined spaces.

The ALJ found that sanctions were appropriate, as parties are required to know the regulations and how to proceed in advance; Board rules and regulations provide for the exchange of witness lists as well as documents and other relevant materials prior to hearing. She explained to Budden that pursuant to her ruling, she would entertain objections from the Division should he testify outside the realm of the specific safety orders, which excluded testimony on the events of the Division's inspection. After testimony related to Employer's Exhibit A, the appendix of section 5157, the ALJ ruled the document would be excluded, as well as testimony related to the document, as the Employer had not produced it during discovery.

The ALJ's ruling on the Division's motion did not address the Board's requirements for imposition of sanctions, which call for a showing of "surprise" by the party requesting sanctions, prior to imposition of those sanctions under section 372.7. As explained in the Decision After Reconsideration, *Central Chevrolet*, section 372.7(a) stands for the proposition that "failure to comply with discovery requests may result in sanctions *upon a showing of surprise.*" (*Central Chevrolet*, Cal/OSHA App.05-2615, Decision After Reconsideration (Sept. 12, 2008). [*italics in original.*]) Furthermore, that claim of surprise is to be "substantiated by the facts and evaluated on a case by case basis," before appropriate sanctions are issued. (*Ibid.*)

Although the ALJ's decision does not reference surprise as an element in granting sanctions, the Division did state at hearing that it was unaware that Budden would testify, and that it was "at a total loss" as to what he would testify to, since he was not present at the reservoir during the inspection. The Division, however, failed to make any showing of surprise related to the Cal/OSHA promulgated document, which can be found at Title 8, Section 5157, Appendix A. As the Division's witness testified, it is an appendix to the confined space standard section 5157 for permit required confined spaces in general industry. It is the Division's burden as the party requesting sanctions to show surprise under 372.7.

Under these specific facts, the ALJ's decision to impose sanctions is missing an analytical step, but the final outcome is appropriate. The Employer failed to provide either a witness list or the requested discovery, as the Division was able to show. The Division also demonstrated surprise at the Employer's

CEO being called to testify, and as such, the ALJ had authority under 372.7 to invoke sanctions such as:

- (1) An order prohibiting the introduction of designated matters into evidence by the abusing party; and/or
- (2) An order establishing designated facts, claims or defenses against abusing party in accordance with the claim of a party adversely affected
- (3) Any other order as the Administrative Law Judge or the Appeals Board may deem appropriate under the circumstances.

In this instance, the Board does not believe that the ALJ's sanctions were so harsh as to constitute reversible error. Section 372.7(a)(3) grants the ALJ the discretion to craft an appropriate remedy for discovery abuses. The Board has previously found, and agrees in this instance, that "the ALJ is in the best position to determine from a case management standpoint what remedy needs to be fashioned in order to promote a fair adjudication of the issues and maintain an orderly proceeding. Wide latitude is granted to the ALJ..." (*California Pipe Line, Inc.*, Cal/OSHA App. 00-2739, Decision After Reconsideration (Apr. 3, 2002).)

Although the ALJ excluded certain testimony from her decision, those questions, and Employer's response, remain on the record for the Board to examine. As Employer described to the ALJ in the discussion leading to her decision to grant sanctions, the bulk of Employer's case centered on its analysis and interpretation of the safety orders. Employer did not present, or plan to present, any witness who was present for the Division's inspection of the worksite at issue. The Board notes it has reviewed the record in its entirety, and it is the Board's conclusion that had the testimony and evidence of Employer been allowed by the ALJ, it would not have altered the outcome of the decision.

2. Was the ALJ's decision correct in upholding all citations and classifications?

Citation 1, Item 1

Citation 1, Item 1 alleges a general violation of section 5157(c)(4):
If the employer decides that its employees will enter permit spaces, the employer shall develop and implement a written permit space program that complies with this section. The written program shall be available for inspection by employees and their authorized representatives.

Employer argues that the Hinkle Reservoir is not a permit-required confined space, and therefore, it was not required to comply with § 5157(c)(4).

Section 5156(b) is the Scope, Applications and Definitions section located in General Industry Safety Orders Group 16, Control of Hazardous Substances, Article 108, Confined Spaces. This section includes a list of industries and operations which are covered by § 5156, and states at 5156(a): For operations and industries not identified in subsection (b)(2), the confined space definition along with other definitions and requirements of section 5157, Permit-Required Confined Spaces shall apply. The Employer's operations are not listed in 5156(b), making section 5157 the appropriate safety order. (Decision, footnote, p. 7).

Under 5157(c)(1), the employer is tasked with evaluating its workplace to determine if any spaces are permit-required confined spaces. Definitions are provided at section 5157(b). A "confined space" is defined as a space that:

- (1) Is large enough and so configured that an employee can bodily enter and perform assigned work; and
- (2) Has limited or restricted means for entry or exit (for example, tanks, vessels, silos, storage bins, hoppers, vaults and pits are spaces that may have limited means of entry.); and
- (3) Is not designed for continuous employee occupancy.

Beginning with the first criterion, it is undisputed that employees were able to bodily enter the reservoir, for the purpose of performing cleaning work. The second criterion, that the space have limited means of entry and exit, was also shown. The Division introduced a schematic of the reservoir, showing 12 hatches, through which divers may enter or exit the water. (Ex. 6.) The third criterion is also met. The reservoir has been designed for the storage of water, and is obviously not suitable for continuous employee occupancy.

The Employer takes issue with the ALJ's analysis of whether the reservoir fits the definition of a "permit-required confined space" under 5157(b):

Permit-required confined space (permit space) means a confined space that has one or more of the following characteristics:

- (1) Contains or has a potential to contain a hazardous atmosphere;
- (2) Contains a material that has the potential for engulfing an entrant;
- (3) Has an internal configuration such that an entrant could be trapped or asphyxiated by inwardly converging walls or by a floor which slopes downward and tapers to a smaller cross-section; or
- (4) Contains any other recognized serious safety or health hazard.

There is no evidence in the record of a hazardous atmosphere, or sloping or converging walls or floors, making elements one and three inapplicable. In order to analyze characteristic two, the section's definition of "engulfment" must be examined. According to 5157(b):

Engulfment means the surrounding and effective capture of a person by a liquid or finely divided (flowable) solid substance that can be aspirated to cause death by filling or plugging the respiratory system or that can exert enough force on the body to cause death by strangulation, constriction, or crushing.

The ALJ found that it is common knowledge that water has the potential ability to “engulf” a person. (Decision, p. 9.) Corcoran testified to the depth of the water, and the drowning hazard. Based on the above definitions, the ALJ found that there was a permit-required confined space.

The Employer argues that in analyzing whether the space is a “confined space” under section 5157(b), the Division and ALJ erred by not taking into consideration the specialized equipment that its divers would be wearing before entering the reservoir. A diver in the water, suggests the Employer, is not exposed to an “engulfment hazard,” as he or she is fully safeguarded from potential risk of injury. The regulations, however, include no language directing the Employer to survey their spaces with the assumption that the employee who enters the space will be in appropriate safety gear. The purpose of section 5157(c)(1) is for the employer to conduct a workplace survey and to determine if the space creates an exposure hazard of some kind to employees. Once the determination is made, if the space is permit-required, the employer may develop a program for safe entry, which may include personal protective gear, monitoring and communication tools, and other equipment. In this instance, the reservoir is an enclosed space with fifteen to twenty feet of water, with limited means of entry and exit, creating the potential for engulfment—or the surrounding and capture, filling of lungs with water, and eventual death that is generally called drowning-- of an employee. The definition of permit-confined space is met.

The ALJ was able to credit Corcoran’s testimony that the Employer was unable to provide its written permit space program, as required under § 5157(c)(4). Corcoran also testified that Suber, Employer’s operations manager, told Corcoran over the telephone, that the Employer did not have a permit space program. The Division established, by a preponderance of the evidence, a general violation of section 5157(c)(4).

Citation 1, Item 2

Citation 1, Item 2 alleges a general violation of section 5157(e)(1), which reads as follows:

Permit system. Before entry is authorized, the employer shall document the completion of measures required by subsection (d)(3) by preparing an entry permit.

The ALJ found that Corcoran credibly testified that the Employer was unable to produce documentation in the form of an entry permit to show it had complied with (d)(3) (the permit-required space program). The ALJ correctly found that the Division established a violation of section 5157(e)(1) by a preponderance of the evidence.

Citation 2, Item 1

Citation 2, Item 1 alleges that Employer violated section 5157(k)(1) and relevant subsections:

Rescue and emergency services. The employer shall ensure that at least one standby person at the site is trained and immediately available to perform rescue and emergency services. The following requirements apply to employers who have employees enter permit spaces to perform rescue services. [...]

(B) Each member of the rescue service shall be trained to perform the assigned rescue duties. Each member of the rescue service shall also receive the training required of authorized entrants under subsections (g) and (h).

(C) Each member of the rescue service shall practice making permit space rescues at least once every 12 months, by means of simulated rescue operations in which they remove dummies, manikins, or actual persons from the actual permit spaces or from representative permit spaces. Representative permit spaces shall, with respect to opening size, configuration, and accessibility, simulate the types of permit spaces from which rescue are to be performed.

Corcoran testified as to conversations he had with management representatives of Employer. On the day of the inspection, two of Employer's employees informed Corcoran that they had been instructed to call 911 in the event of an emergency. According to Corcoran, neither Trowbridge nor High, the two employees who were working on the surface of the reservoir, were suited up. Hagerman, when he came up from the water, also told Corcoran that the employees were to call 911, and did not have emergency training. Finally, Corcoran was informed by Suber that the Employer did not conduct mock rescues, although the Employer did provide some practical training on safety.

Based on the fact that there was no one at the worksite ready and able to perform rescue and emergency services, the ALJ found a violation of § 5157(k)(1). The Board agrees with that finding. No employee was ready and able to provide the emergency services required by the standard, and by a preponderance of the evidence, the Division has shown that the Employer has

failed to provide the required training to designated members of its rescue service.

In order to uphold the finding of a serious violation, the Division must prove that there is a substantial probability that serious physical harm could result from the violation. Specifically, the Division must be able to show that “death or serious physical harm is more likely than not to occur in a given situation.” (*Mascon, Inc.*, Cal/OSHA App. 08-4278, Denial of Petition for Reconsideration (Mar. 4, 2011).) “Substantial probability” does not refer to the likelihood of an accident occurring in the workplace due to the violative condition, but rather to the probability of a death or serious harm occurring, should the accident or exposure take place. (*Vernon Melvin Antonsen & Colleen K. Antonsen, individually and dba Antonsen Construction*, Cal/OSHA App.06-1272, Amended Decision After Reconsideration (Aug. 30, 2012).)

Evidence upon which the Board may base a finding of substantial probability of serious physical harm or death must be based upon a sound and reasonable evidentiary foundation; for instance, the parties may present reliable or generally accepted empirical evidence, scientific or experience based rationale. (See, *Wright & Associates, Inc.*, Cal/OSHA App. 95-3649, Decision After Reconsideration (Nov. 29, 1999).) Employer disputes the ALJ’s reliance on Corcoran’s testimony, due to his having limited experience inspecting commercial diving operations during the course of his employment with the Division.

Although Corcoran had not inspected many diving operations, he established his training, experience and education as an industrial hygienist with a master’s degree in environmental health and an EMT with experience in the field, including performing rescues as a lifeguard. He also showed familiarity with diving, including holding a license to teach open-water diving for the past 25 years. Based on his knowledge and expertise, Corcoran was able to credibly testify that the predominant hazard for a diver is interference to the diver’s air supply.

Corcoran believed, and the ALJ found credible, that the absence of qualified rescue personnel on site lead to a substantial probability of serious injury due to lack of oxygen to the diver. He testified that the Employer’s divers were weighted down, and due to the limited number of hatches, if a diver was in distress, he or she would have difficulty getting to the surface. Corcoran also explained that the majority of hatches on the reservoir are kept closed, and divers are assisted with a ladder when they are entering and exiting the open hatch. The divers also were not equipped with a diver’s knife or other means to get through the heavy tarp, so without assistance, divers who were injured or in distress would have a problem reaching the surface.

Lack of oxygen, according to Corcoran, can lead to a serious brain injury or death within four to six minutes. He also explained that many fire departments are not qualified to do a confined space entry, and if prior arrangements are not made with the local emergency services to let them know that a confined space project is on-site, rescue may take even longer, as a specialized unit may need to be called out.

The Division established that on February 19, 2008, a diver who may have suffered from lack of oxygen while diving in the Hinkle Reservoir, would have more likely than not suffered a serious injury due to the lack of a trained and available rescuer ready to perform emergency services. (See, *Ray Products, Inc.*, Cal/OSHA App. 99-3169, Decision After Reconsideration (Aug. 20, 2002).) Employer offered no evidence or testimony to disprove the Division's credible testimony, which established that should an accident occur, there would be a substantial probability of serious injury, due to Employer's failure to follow the mandates of § 5157(k)(1). (See, *Benicia Foundry & Iron Works, Inc.*, Cal/OSHA App. 00-2976, Decision After Reconsideration (Apr. 24, 2003).)

The Employer misunderstands the burden for establishing substantial probability of serious injury when it argues the Division has erred by not offering evidence of other types of accidents besides an issue with the integrity of a divers air supply. Employer's position seems to be that no brain injury could occur in this manner, as divers are equipped with a backup personal air supply (or "bail bottle"), and the probability of an interruption of the air hose, as well as the diver having an issue with their bail bottle, is almost negligible, in Employer's opinion. However, the likelihood of the accident is not the basis on which the Board determines if a citation is serious. (*Preferred Framing, Inc.*, Cal/OSHA App. 99-2808, Decision After Reconsideration (Aug. 20, 2002).) Rather, the standard requires us to assume an accident occurs and then determine if the consequences of such accident would be a serious injury or illness. (Lab. Code § 6432(c) (2008).)³

Employers may defend against a serious citation by showing that the violative condition occurred at a time and under conditions which did not provide the employer with a reasonable opportunity to detect it. (*Irby Construction*, Cal/OSHA App. 03-2728, Decision After Reconsideration (Jun. 8, 2007).) As the ALJ found, in this instance, the Employer had a significant period of time at the worksite to discover that there were no trained rescue service personnel present to provide emergency services. (Decision, p. 13.) The Board upholds the finding of a serious violation and the accompanying penalty.

³ Labor Code § 6432 was amended in 2010, effective January 1, 2011. We apply the statute as in effect at the time of the alleged violations.

Citation 3, Item 1

The Division cited Employer for an alleged serious violation of § 6056(b)(2)(C), which is a safety order related to Diving Operations. The article includes several different forms of diving; section 6056(b) contains regulations specifically drawn for surface-supplied-air diving. The relevant subsection reads as follows:

A standby diver equipped with surface-supplied gear or a pair of SCUBA divers shall hose tend at the underwater point of entry when diving is conducted in enclosed or physically confining spaces.

The section does not provide definitions for the various terms used. Generally, the Board will construe language according to the context and approved usage, in the absence of evidence of a contrary meaning. (*Pacific Erectors, Inc.*, Cal/OSHA App. 00-118, Decision After Reconsideration (November 27, 2001).) Corcoran testified, and the Employer did not dispute, that hose tending typically means to ensure that the diver's air supply hose does not "kink or have slack in it" which could cause it to become caught on something or the air to be cut off. (Decision, p. 14.) According to Corcoran, under the surface-supplied-air regulation, there should have been someone standing near the hatch, tending the hose, and there was not.

Employer argues that the Division's interpretation of the regulation, which was adopted by the ALJ, goes against the plain meaning. The point of entry that the regulation is referring to is under the water, not on the surface. Employer's argument is well-taken; section 6056 at various points makes distinctions between "water," "underwater," and "the surface." These word choices would have little meaning if the Board were to find no difference between "underwater" and "the surface." It is clear that the purpose of § 6056(b)(2)(C) is to require a surface-supplied diver, or two SCUBA divers, to be present to hose tend, at the point of entry *under the water*, where a surface-supplied diver is entering an enclosed, or physically confined space located beneath the water. That the regulation makes a distinction between SCUBA divers and surface-supplied divers also suggests that the hose-tenders are meant to be located under the water, not on the surface.

Having found the reservoir to be a confined space in the discussion of Citation 1 above, and that the operation Employer was engaged in on February 19, 2008 to be a surface-supplied diving operation, the Board finds section 6056(b)(2)(C) was applicable to Employer. However, the Division has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Employer did not have one surface-supplied diver at the underwater point of entry, in the Hinkle Reservoir, for the purpose of hose-tending. According to the Division's testimony, there were at least two divers in the water on the date of the

inspection. On cross-examination, Division's inspector admitted he did not see under the water, to observe if there was a standby diver, or a pair of scuba divers. It was not established by a preponderance of the evidence that one diver was not hose-tending under the water and near the hatch, per the regulation. Therefore, the Board will vacate Citation 3.

ART CARTER, Chairman
ED LOWRY, Board Member

JUDITH S. FREYMAN, Board Member

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH APPEALS BOARD
FILED ON: FEBRUARY 7, 2014