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2004
COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP

HONORABLE JULIE CONGER
Chair
Alameda Superior Court Judge

VICTOR BEAUZAY, ESQ.
Former Applicants’ Attorney
Worker’s Compensation Law

HONORABLE NORMAN DELATERRE
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MR. JIM ZELKO
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan
Representing Self-Insurers

One Position for Committee Member
Representing Organized Labor is
Currently Vacant

One Position for Committee Member
From Outside the Workers’ Compensation Community is
Currently Vacant

DWC STAFF

DESTIE OVERPECK
DWC Staff Attorney

HON. KENNETH PETERSON
DWC Acting Chief Judge

LAURA ZARRY
Administrative Assistant
1. The Ethics Advisory Committee: A Profile

A. The Committee’s Functions

The Workers’ Compensation Ethics Advisory Committee (EAC) is a state committee independent of the Division of Workers’ Compensation, that is charged with reviewing and monitoring complaints of misconduct filed against workers’ compensation administrative law judges. As civil servants, workers' compensation administrative law judges are not subject to review by the California Commission on Judicial Performance, the agency which is responsible for investigating misconduct complaints directed at judges serving on the Superior and Appellate courts. The EAC was established on December 1, 1995, and held its initial meeting in April 1996. The Committee’s authority and duties are set forth in Title 8, California Code of Regulations, Sections 9720.1 through 9723.

The Committee holds its meetings at regular intervals to review complaints of judicial misconduct and to recommend to the Administrative Director of the Division of Workers’ Compensation (DWC) if a complaint warrants a formal investigation by the Administrative Director’s staff. When an investigation is conducted by the Administrative Director in reliance on the Committee’s recommendation, both the Committee and complainant are informed of the investigation's findings and of any disciplinary or other remedial action taken.
B. Committee Membership

Pursuant to Title 8, California Code of Regulations, Section 9722, the Ethics Advisory Committee is composed of nine members who are appointed by the DWC Administrative Director for four year terms.

The Committee's composition is reflective of the various constituencies within the California workers' compensation community, and is composed of the following members:

- a member of the public representing organized labor;
- a member of the public representing insurers;
- a member of the public representing self-insured employers;
- an attorney who formerly practiced before the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board and who usually represented insurers or employers;
- an attorney who formerly practiced before the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board and who usually represented applicants (injured workers);
- a presiding judge;
- a judge or retired judge; and;
- two members of the public outside the workers' compensation community.

Committee member The Honorable Julie Conger, Alameda County Superior Court Presiding Judge, is currently the Chair of the Committee.

The EAC holds meetings approximately four times each year at the DWC Headquarters located at 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Ninth Floor, San Francisco, California, 94102. While EAC meetings are open to the public, when the Committee engages in the review and discussion of actual complaints, the Committee meets in executive session, and that portion of the proceedings is closed to the public.
The Committee is assisted in carrying out its functions by an attorney and secretary on the staff of the Division of Workers' Compensation.
2. Ethical Standards for Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judges

Pursuant to Labor Code Section 123.5, workers’ compensation administrative law judges are appointed by the Administrative Director from an eligibility list of attorneys who have met all qualifications imposed by the State Personnel Board, and who have received passing scores on a competitive civil service examination. Unlike judges in the Superior Courts, who are appointed or elected for specific terms, workers' compensation administrative law judges are designated as non-exempt civil service employees who may only be removed for cause under applicable civil service laws. The terms and conditions of employment for non-supervisory judges are governed by a collective bargaining agreement entered into between the State of California and the California Attorneys, Administrative Law Judges and Hearing Officers in State Employment (CASE). Although previously referred to as "workers' compensation referees," in 1998 the Legislature amended Labor Code Section 27, and adopted the new title of "workers' compensation administrative law judge," effective January 1, 1999. This change of title did not impact in any manner on the ethical obligations to which judges must adhere.

Currently, workers’ compensation administrative law judges must comply with ethical standards imposed by three separate legal authorities: (1) The Code of Judicial Ethics, (2) The Political Reform Act of 1974, and (3) the DWC Ethics Regulations.

A. Code of Judicial Ethics
Under Labor Code Section 123.6, workers’ compensation administrative law judges are required to adhere to the Code of Judicial Ethics (CJE) (previously entitled the California Code of Judicial Conduct). The CJE was formally adopted by the California Supreme Court on January 16, 1996. The CJE is divided into six separate canons which address issues such as conflicts of interest, disqualification and recusal, prohibited financial and political activities, ex parte communications with litigants, and judicial conduct towards litigants and court staff.

B. Political Reform Act

Title 8, California Code of Regulations, Section 9721.2(a) provides that no judge "may accept any gift, honorarium or travel that is forbidden to legislators under the Political Reform Act of 1974."

In 1974, California voters approved Proposition 9, which enacted the Political Reform Act of 1974 (codified in Sections 81000, et seq. of the Government Code). In 1990, the Legislature expanded the Political Reform Act, by enacting Government Code Sections 89500 to 89503.5, which mandated broad restrictions on receipt of honoraria, gifts and travel by judges, elected state and local government officials, and members of specific state commissions. Under Government Code Section 89502, payments cannot be accepted for giving speeches or attending conferences, conventions and social events (exceptions were made for activities connected with teaching and the practice of a profession). In addition, Government Code Section 89503 prohibits the acceptance of "gifts from any single source in any calendar year with a total value of more than two hundred fifty dollars." Political Reform Act provisions are enforced by the Fair Political Practices Commission.
In compliance with the Political Reform Act, all workers' compensation administrative law judges must file an annual Statement of Economic Interests with the Fair Political Practices Commission.

C. DWC Ethics Regulations

In the 1993, the California Legislature enacted comprehensive workers' compensation reform legislation. One significant component of the reform legislation was Assembly Bill 1252, which amended Labor Code Section 123.6 and directed the DWC Administrative Director to adopt ethics regulations which “[t]o the extent possible … shall be consistent with the procedures established by the Commission on Judicial Performance for regulating the activities of state judges, and, to the extent possible, with the gift, honoraria, and travel restrictions on legislators contained in the Political Reform Act of 1974.” In addition, the reform legislation directed the Administrative Director to require workers' compensation administrative law judges to participate in continuing education, including courses in ethics and conflicts of interest issues, to further their effectiveness as judges. (Labor Code Section 5311.5.)

In compliance with the 1993 revisions to Labor Code Section 123.6, the Administrative Director adopted regulations which established the Ethics Advisory Committee and mandated strict ethical standards for workers’ compensation administrative law judges. The ethics regulations, which became effective December 1, 1995, are contained in Title 8, Code of California Code of Regulations, Section 9720.1 et seq.

The ethical standards contained in the DWC ethics regulations are actually more stringent than the standards imposed on superior court judges. Title 8, California Code of Regulations, Section 9721.2 states that:
“[N]o judge may accept any gift, payment, honorarium, travel, meal or any other thing exceeding five dollars in value, the cost of which is significantly paid for by attorneys who practice before the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board or by others whose interest have come or are likely to come before the Board, without first obtaining the written approval of the administrative director ....”

In order to preclude any uncertainty, Section 9721.2 defines, “others whose interests have come or are likely to come before the Board” to include, but not be limited to:

“[A]ny person or entity which is or has been a party or lien claimant in a workers’ compensation proceeding, represents a party or lien claimant, provides education, consulting or other services relating to workers’ compensation, [or] otherwise participates in the workers’ compensation adjudicatory process ....”

The practical impact of Section 9721.2 is broad and far reaching, since a broad range of activities are precluded. Under Section 9721.2, a judge may not receive an honorarium for delivering a speech to an organization composed of claims administrators or workers’ compensation attorneys. Equally prohibited would be accepting tickets to an athletic event from an insurance carrier’s attorney, gifts of vacation travel from an industrial medical group, or accepting complimentary meals and entertainment from a language interpreting firm.

D. Requests to the Administrative Director for Approval of Gifts, Travel, Meals and Honoraria

Labor Code Section 123.6(b) provides that:

“Honoraria or travel allowed by the court administrator, and not otherwise prohibited by this section in connection with any public or private conference, convention, meeting, social event, or like gathering, the cost of which is
significantly paid for by attorneys who practice before the board, may not be accepted unless the court administrator has provided prior approval in writing to the workers' compensation administrative law judge allowing him or her to accept those payments.”

The ethics regulations promulgated by the Division of Workers’ Compensation to implement Labor Code Section 123.6(b) address not only honoraria and travel, but specifically provide that judges may not accept any gift, meals or any other thing exceeding five dollars in value if the item was paid for by attorneys who practice before the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board. It should be emphasized that besides attorneys, Section 9721.2 of the ethics regulations also prohibits judges from accepting gifts, meals, travel, etc. from "others whose interests are likely to come before the Board." Hence, travel, gifts, meals, etc. offered to judges by physicians, medical groups, interpreters, and vocational rehabilitation counselors exceeding five dollars in value cannot be accepted by a judge unless prior written approval has been obtained from the Administrative Director.

Section 9721.2(c) of the ethics regulations provides for exceptions to the prior written approval requirement in certain enumerated situations. A judge is not obligated to obtain prior written approval to accept: (1) Gifts or other things of value received from a family member who does not appear before the judge, (2) “ordinary, modest social hospitality in a private home, or attendance at a wedding, graduation or religious ceremony”, or (3) payments, “including a division of attorney’s fees,” received by the judge from a former employer for services performed before the judge was appointed. In addition, a judge does not require prior approval to engage in union activities.

In 2004, the Administrative Director processed approximately 75 requests for advisory ethics opinions or for written approvals to receive gifts, teaching fees, honoraria, or to
speak at an educational seminar. The majority of these requests were processed by the Administrative Director within three working days of receipt.

During 2004, the most common request submitted to the Administrative Director sought approval to be a speaker or panelist at an educational seminar or convention sponsored by an organization within the workers’ compensation community. In these situations, no honoraria were offered the employees.

The second most frequently encountered request sought advice on the application of the Code of Judicial Ethics or the DWC ethics regulations to a particular situation. Many judges requested guidance on disclosure and recusal requirements. In addition, numerous approval requests were submitted seeking approval to receive gifts of educational materials, attend educational seminars or courses on a tuition waiver basis, or to accept invitations to social functions hosted by persons or groups within the workers’ compensation community.

E. Advisory Opinions Issued by the Administrative Director:
Section 9723(f) grants the Administrative Director authority to issue advisory opinions, on a discretionary basis, in response to a request from a workers’ compensation administrative law judge or other interested person concerning the application of the Code of Judicial Ethics or the DWC ethics regulations to a specific situation.

In January 1997, the Administrative Director released three advisory opinions informing the workers’ compensation community of the Division’s ethics policies. The first advisory opinion defined those DWC employees performing “quasi judicial duties” who would be required to comply with the ethics regulations. The second advisory opinion addressed policies towards judges who self-publish books or who are owners of companies that publish their books. The third advisory opinion, which was issued with the concurrence of
the Ethics Advisory Committee, addressed DWC policies regarding judges accepting teaching fees, travel expenses, meals and complimentary admission to educational seminars.
3. Complaint Procedures

A. Filing a Complaint

Any person may file a complaint with the Ethics Advisory Committee. Although the Committee requires that complaints be presented in writing, the Committee will accept anonymous complaints.

Under Title 8, California Code of Regulations, Section 9723(e), no civil action or adverse employment action may be initiated or maintained against a person based on statements made to the Ethics Advisory Committee, or to the Administrative Director and his or her staff, during the course of an ethics investigation. Persons aggrieved by the conduct of a workers' compensation administrative law judge are not limited to, or required to pursue, a complaint before the EAC. Because many individuals prefer to present their particular complaints to the local presiding judge directly responsible for supervising a judge, Section 9722.1(a) of the ethics regulations provides that “[n]othing in these regulations prohibits any person from complaining directly to a presiding judge or to the administrative director. The presiding judge or the administrative director may, but is not required to, refer such complaints to the Committee.”

Examples of misconduct by a judge which may be properly presented to the Committee include: prohibited ex parte communications with litigants, excessive delays in issuing decisions, a failure by the judge to disclose to the parties a financial interest in a case, expressions of racial or gender prejudice, displays of harassment, profanity or rudeness towards litigants, accepting gifts or favors from litigants, and intoxication while performing judicial duties.
The EAC has adopted an official complaint form, and a sample is contained in the appendix to this report. While use of the complaint form is not mandatory, its use is encouraged since the form contains helpful examples of judicial misconduct, and it advises complainants that a decision by a judge which contains legal error does not constitute an ethical violation. Because a complaint can ultimately result in an adverse personnel action being initiated against a judge, the complaint form contains a notice advising complainants that it is unlawful to knowingly make a false or fraudulent material statement.

To further assist persons who may have complaints of misconduct involving other individuals within the workers' compensation system, the complaint form provides the names and addresses of those regulatory agencies responsible for investigating complaints of misconduct involving attorneys, claims administrators, Qualified Medical Evaluators, and other physicians.

Generally, a Committee case is opened with a letter from an injured worker, an attorney, or lien claimant who has been a party to a proceeding before the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board. After a complaint is received, the Committee’s staff attorney reviews the complaint to ascertain if it concerns a workers’ compensation administrative law judge or other DWC employee. While Labor Code Section 123.6 only required the Administrative Director to adopt ethics regulations for the Division’s judges, the ethics regulations which were ultimately adopted are more encompassing and define the term “referee” to include “all persons performing judicial or quasi-judicial duties.” (Title 8, California Code of Regulations, Section 9720.2.)

In January 1997, the Administrative Director issued an Advisory Opinion, which defined those DWC employees who would be considered “judges” for purposes of the ethics regulations. It was determined that, due to the quasi-judicial nature of their job duties,
rehabilitation consultants, DWC compliance officers (auditors), and DWC staff counsel would be required to comply with the ethics regulations.

Although workers' compensation compliance officers (auditors) and rehabilitation unit consultants must adhere to the Division's ethics regulations since they perform "quasi-judicial" duties, the EAC has limited its focus to reviewing complaints involving the conduct of judges only. Accordingly, any complaints alleging misconduct on the part of auditors or rehabilitation unit consultants are forwarded to the Presiding Judge in the office where the employee is assigned.

All complaints concerning judges are entered in the official log and assigned a case number and file folder. The complainant is then advised in writing that his or her complaint has been received, and that it will be presented to the Committee at the next scheduled meeting. The written reply informs the complainant of the history and functions of the EAC, and further advises that follow-up correspondence will be sent explaining the Committee's recommendation.

Every complaint received by the EAC which involves allegations of misconduct by a judge is formally reviewed by the Committee. In order to assure objectivity in its deliberations and recommendations, the Committee has adopted a policy requiring that the names of the complainant, the judge in question, as well as the specific WCAB office where the alleged misconduct occurred, be expunged from the complaints reviewed at each meeting.

As in all prior years since the inception of the EAC, the majority of complaints received during 2004, were submitted by injured workers. Numerous injured workers addressed their dissatisfaction with the decision reached by the judge concerning the amount of workers' compensation benefits to which they were entitled. Additionally, many complaints focused on the alleged misconduct of attorneys, claims administrators, and physicians.
Because a significant number of injured workers submit complaints that allege legal or factual errors by judges, the information flyer furnished with the EAC complaint form reminds complainants that legal errors made by judges do not constitute judicial misconduct. (Canon 1, Code of Judicial Ethics.) Complainants alleging legal errors are further advised to seek assistance concerning the filing of a timely Petition for Reconsideration.

Many complaints contain conclusory statements and lack an adequate discussion of the circumstances surrounding the alleged misconduct. Few complaints furnish supporting evidence of misconduct. Conclusory and unsubstantiated complaints alleging that a judge "does not give employers a fair day in court " or that the judge "conspired with the insurance adjuster to deny me benefits" are generally not helpful to the Committee.

All complaints which fail to allege facts that might constitute judge misconduct are forwarded to the Administrative Director with a recommendation that no further action be taken on the complaint. The complainant is then advised in writing that the Committee has considered the complaint and, inasmuch as no misconduct was either alleged or established, the Committee has decided that no further action is appropriate.

B. Investigation by the Administrative Director
Where a complaint makes allegations, which if true would constitute misconduct by a judge, the Committee will recommend that the Administrative Director conduct an investigation. Should a complaint substantially allege criminal conduct, invidious discrimination, sexual harassment, or other serious acts that might require immediate action, it is referred to the Administrative Director on a priority basis. Normally, the investigation of a complaint is conducted by the DWC Associate Chief Judge responsible for the WCAB district office where the judge in question is employed. The course of the investigation is monitored by the DWC Chief Judge. During the investigation, the WCAB
case file may be reviewed, witnesses may be interviewed, written statements may be taken, and additional information may be solicited from the complainant. Should the investigation disclose facts establishing improper, fraudulent, or unprofessional conduct on the part of other parties to the workers’ compensation case, such as an attorney or physician, the findings are reported to the State Bar of California, the Medical Board, or other appropriate disciplinary forum.

Pursuant to Section 9722.1(f) of the ethics regulations, the Administrative Director is required to inform a judge of the nature of a complainant’s allegations, and afford the judge the opportunity to submit a response. As provided by Government Code Section 19574.5, the Administrative Director has the option of placing a judge on leave of absence for up to 15 days during the pendency of the investigation should the complaint allege misappropriation of public funds or property, drug addiction, immorality, or “acts which would constitute a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.” Any disciplinary action taken against a judge by the Administrative Director is in the form required by Government Code Sections 19574 or 19590(b). The right of the Administrative Director under Title 8, California Code of Regulations, Section 9720.1 et seq. to enforce ethical standards among judges does not replace or reduce a judge’s procedural rights under the State Civil Service Act. (Government Code Section 18500 et seq.) Furthermore, the rights and obligations of the Administrative Director and judges concerning the probationary period mandated by Government Code Sections 19170 through 19180 are not affected.

When the Administrative Director’s staff has completed its investigation, the Committee is briefed on the investigation’s findings, as well as any disciplinary or other remedial action taken.
4. Complaint Digest

A. Complaint Statistics

During the year 2004, with 135 Workers' Compensation Administrative Law Judges and 25 Presiding Workers' Compensation Administrative Law Judges employed at 24 district offices in California, the Ethics Advisory Committee received 45 complaints concerning workers' compensation administrative law judges. (See Table 1 at Page 33.)

The last Committee meeting conducted in 2004 was held on December 13, 2004. By that time, the Committee had received 44 of the 45 complaints that were submitted in 2004.

With regard to fourteen of the complaints reviewed in 2004, the Committee determined that an insufficient showing of misconduct had been demonstrated by the complainant to warrant further investigation and action by the Administrative Director. These fourteen complaints essentially alleged that the judges made procedural errors or their decisions contained legal errors. This type of complaint, even if later established to have merit, does not constitute judicial misconduct pursuant to Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Ethics. One complaint filed in 2004 was later withdrawn.

Investigations were completed for one complaint filed in 2002, five complaints filed in 2003, and fourteen complaints filed in 2004. The Committee determined that the investigation revealed no ethical violations in the 2002 complaint, in the five 2003 complaints, and in thirteen of the 2004 complaints. However, the Committee found that the investigations
revealed that ethical violations had occurred in one of the complaints filed in 2004. The judges named in the complaint were disciplined. (See complaint number 7 on page 24.)

The Committee recommended that the Administrative Director conduct a formal investigation in the remaining cases it reviewed in 2004.

The following groups within the workers’ compensation community filed the 45 complaints during 2004:

- Injured workers whose cases were filed with the WCAB 36 Complaints
- Anonymous 3 Complaints
- Applicant attorneys practicing before the WCAB 2 Complaint
- Defense attorneys practicing before the WCAB 1 Complaint
- Claims Administrator 1 Complaint
- Hearing Representative 1 Complaint
- Police Officer 1 Complaint

B. Disposition of Complaints investigated by the Administrative Director on the recommendation of the Ethics Advisory Committee

Of the 44 complaints reviewed by the EAC in 2004, the Committee recommended that the Administrative Director conduct twenty-nine investigations. By December 31, 2004, fifteen cases were still under investigation, and fourteen investigations had been completed.
Complaints filed during 2004 which are still under active investigation:

1. An injured worker alleged that two workers’ compensation administrative law judges (WCALJ) deprived her of her right to a fair trial. One WCALJ told her that she should not go to trial because the doctor’s report said her injury was not work related. She further alleged that a second WCALJ told her that it was not true that the doctor’s report described the injury as non-industrial and that the first judge made a mistake. The second WCALJ allegedly told the injured worker that she needed to hire an attorney or he would “throw her case out.” The second WCALJ also refused to exclude the Agreed Medical Evaluator’s report even though the injured worker was unrepresented.

2. An applicant’s attorney alleged that she signed in and met with the defense counsel who wanted a continuance because of an amendment alleging psychological damages. She reminded him that the case was set for a priority conference on the issue of AOE/COE as the injured worker was not receiving benefits and suggested the matter be set for trial on the limited issue. She left for ten minutes. While she was gone, the judge allegedly met with the defense counsel (conducted an ex parte communication) and took the case off calendar. The judge said the case was set for a mandatory settlement conference. The complainant alleged that: (1) improper ex parte communication occurred; (2) the case was taken off calendar in violation of the law; and (3) once the error was brought to the judge’s attention, she refused to put the matter back on calendar.

3. An injured worker alleged that the judge: (1) ignored the Superior Court’s restraining order by forcing personal contact on two dates; (2) arbitrarily opened, closed, and re-opened discovery for only the defendant on three dates; (3) refused to force the defendant to provide constant moderate pain control before or after trial despite the Qualified Medical Evaluator’s authorization; and (4) was aware that the defendant had attempted murder of the injured worker.
4. An injured worker alleged that the judge was biased towards the defense, was selective regarding what he allowed to be put on the record, and prohibited discovery concerning the claims adjuster’s handling of the case. He alleged that these allegations constitute a denial of due process, a refusal to allow hearings on penalties in violation of due process, and a refusal of a request for expedited hearing for over ninety days.

5. An injured worker alleged that his file was missing documents and was informed by the judge that his file needed to be reconstructed. It was not reconstructed for over a year. He alleged that an attorney was responsible for taking documents out of the file, as they reappeared later. He also alleged that the lawyers knew that the Permanent & Stationary report had been issued for over a year, but told the judge they needed more time to obtain a P&S report. It allegedly took over four years from the time the parties agreed to a permanent disability rating for settlement to be finalized. The complaint also stated that the defendant did not have someone with settlement authority present at the mandatory settlement conference and that the judge should not have taken the matter off calendar. The injured worker contended that the court failed to process his Declaration of Readiness for four months, that he was required to produce another copy because it was lost, and then the mandatory settlement conference was not set until eight months after the date of the original Declaration of Readiness requesting a mandatory settlement conference.

6. An injured worker alleged that the judge snapped at him, threatened to take away his 100% disability award and chuckled. He also alleged that the defense attorney called the judge “judgy.” He contended that the judge is biased against him.

7. A separate complaint was filed by the injured worker who filed the complaint listed in number 6. In this complaint the injured worker alleged that the judge retaliated against him for previously filing a judicial ethics complaint.
8. In a third complaint, the same injured worker listed above alleged that the WCALJ hampered his attempts to acquire information to enforce a Findings and Award, that the defendants failed to provide a print out of benefits, and that the defendants issued a bad check and refused to issue a replacement check. The judge allegedly vacated an enforcement of an award. Also, the injured worker alleged that the judge ruled against a commutation of the award, but handed him a card from a settlement service that buys awards.

9. An unrepresented injured worker alleged that she appeared five times in the judge’s courtroom with no progress. She alleged that the judge verbally manipulated her into withdrawing her statement, that the judge denied her medical benefits, that the judge told her she needed to obtain her own doctor and that defense did not need to pay for her psychiatrist. The judge allegedly was rude and would not let her leave the witness chair even after she told the judge that she was uncomfortable. She also alleged that the judge would not let her get her paper work when she was on witness stand. The injured worker complained that the judge allowed her former attorney to be present. The judge allegedly allowed the defense attorney to interrogate the injured worker in a hostile manner and was nice to the defense attorney. Finally, the injured worker alleged that when she told the judge that she needed an hour to do paper work, the judge left the courtroom and did not return.

10. A represented injured worker alleged that the judge violated Canon 3B(1) (which requires a judge to hear and decide all matters assigned) by refusing to accept the evidence prepared at the mandatory settlement conference, by rescinding her previous order to have all discovery end on a specific date without good cause showing, and by taking a court date off calendar for no good cause (defense counsel was not present and must have been aware of the order, although the injured worker and her attorney were not). She also alleged that the judge violated Canon 3B(2) (which requires a judge to be faithful to the law regardless of
partisan interests) by refusing to rule on a motion to join the State of California Dept. of Self-Insurance; that the judge violated Canon 3B(7) (which requires a judge to accord every person a full right to be heard) by refusing to allow the injured worker to participate in the mandatory settlement conference; and that the judge violated Canon 3B(8) (which requires a judge to dispose of all matters fairly and promptly) by allowing the case to continue after the award and order and a Supreme Court decision in her favor, by compelling her to attend a Qualified Medical Evaluation even though treatment was refused, and by refusing to set the case for trial.

11. A police officer complained that a WCALJ insisted that a photo citation should be dismissed, was rude, threw her WCALJ business card on his desk, and said, “See what happens when one of you guys comes before me.”

12. A claims adjuster complained that the judge did not issue her decision for 296 days and that the judge failed to make a decision on the defendant’s motions and discovery issues for over a year.

13. A represented injured worker alleged trial delays as follows: trial was set; the defense attorney did not bring exhibits, so the trial was continued for two months; delays caused the trial to start late and all of the witnesses were not able to testify, so the case was continued for another two months. The defense attorney asked for a new date because of a conflict with a religious holiday and the trial was continued. The defense counsel did not show up, so the case was continued for two more months. Additionally, the judge was allegedly friendly with a defense witness, and allegedly rude, abusive and intimidating to the injured worker during her testimony. The injured worker alleged that the judge’s summary of the trial was unreasonable, lacked cites to case law or the Labor Code, and referred to a witness who did not testify. Finally, the injured worker alleged that documents disappeared from the court files.
14. An unrepresented injured worker complained that four judges who have handled his case acted improperly. The judges allegedly waited too long before ruling on motions, failed to base an order on substantial evidence, prevented the transcript from being prepared until after the Board issued a ruling on a petition for reconsideration, tried to prevent the injured worker from filing a petition for reconsideration, set forth false facts in the report and recommendations, twice ruled on a motion to compel a psychiatric exam one day after injured worker received notice of the motion (before the injured worker had an opportunity to respond), failed to require the defendant to seek agreement regarding an Agreed Medical Evaluation, required the injured worker to travel to a distant district office instead of making the judge travel to the local district office, improperly quashed the injured worker’s subpoenas of judges, granted a petition to quash before the injured worker received copy of the petition, and dated an order one day after the postmark on the envelope. The injured worker contended that one judge finally overturned the orders compelling the injured worker to medical exams, suspending proceedings and barring accrual of disability payments. One judge allegedly claimed that the injured worker’s signature on the Declaration of Readiness concerning the issue of the defendant’s refusal to authorize the Qualified Medical Evaluation meant that all discovery was completed. Finally, the injured worker alleged that at the mandatory settlement conference, the judge was brusque with injured worker.

15. A represented injured worker alleged that a WCALJ attempted to intimidate her while she was waiting for her attorney by telling her that she had committed fraud despite the fact that a previous judge had already ruled that the fraud claim should be excluded.

Complaints filed during 2004 for which investigations were completed in 2004:

1. An injured worker alleged his attorney (whom he later dismissed) was given preferential treatment. The injured worker complained that the prior attorney coerced him by
fraud and threat to sign a blank stipulation which agreed to an 81% disability and gave up other rights. Upon discovery of the fraud, the injured worker filed a motion to set aside the stipulation. The judge allegedly said he would not set aside the stipulation if the rating came out between 15% and 99%; the injured worker contended that this was because the judge did not want to have to report the attorney for fraud. The rater assigned a 100% medical rating. The stipulation also awarded 20% attorney fees. The judge denied the petition stating apportionment was at issue. After the injured worker filed a petition for reconsideration, the judge rescinded his order and set a trial to hear testimony. When the injured worker filed a Declaration of Readiness for an expedited hearing, he received the Notice of Hearing four months later, despite the fact that the court informed him that expedited hearings should be scheduled within two weeks to six weeks.

The Associate Chief Judge thoroughly investigated the allegations. A review of the investigation revealed that the bases of the allegations were legal and that there was no evidence of ethical misconduct on the part of the WCALJ.

2. A recently hired WCALJ sold his former practice to three local firms who represent applicants. Whenever a case in which an attorney from one of the three applicants’ firms is assigned to the judge, he discloses the financial arrangement to all parties. He only presides over the case if the parties voluntarily sign a written waiver. One of the applicants’ law firms complained that this disclosure policy allows the opposing counsel an opportunity to delay the cases and/or to use the waiver as a negotiating tool.

The Ethics Committee opined that the judge’s relationship with the three firms is a disqualifying one, and that the disqualification could only be waived in writing. The WCALJ’s actions did not constitute ethical or procedural misconduct.
3. An injured worker alleged that he requested an expedited hearing, which should have been scheduled for thirty days but was scheduled for ninety days. By doing this, the judge allegedly halted his access to prescriptions.

The allegations were investigated. Although the Ethics Committee noted that there may have been an administrative scheduling error, the Committee determined that the record did not support a finding of judicial misconduct. Allegations of legal or administrative errors by judges do not fall within the purview of the Ethics Advisory Committee since, even if the allegations were later proven to be correct, they do not constitute ethical violations. Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Ethics provides that "[a] judicial decision or administrative act later determined to be incorrect legally is not itself a violation of this Code."

4. An injured worker resubmitted her complaint from last year alleging additional facts. She contended that the judge was rude when she talked to him in the waiting room. (She was waiting because she needed help from the Information & Assistance Officer.) She alleged that after she left the waiting area, the judge came outside where she was sitting and stated, "I brought [the California Highway Patrol Officer] to ask if you are sitting out here to find my car to do something to it," insinuating that she was a threat. Allegedly, the judge also told her, "If you file anything you will lose." She requested that the witnesses be interviewed.

The CHP officer was interviewed and denied that the described conversation took place. Following its review, the Committee concluded that the Administrative Director should take no further action on this complaint because the allegations that were set forth in the complaint were not factually supported.
5. A defense attorney alleged that the judge made personal and derogatory statements about attorneys in his reports and recommendations. Other attorneys corroborated his complaints.

The Associate Chief Judge investigated the complaints. Although the Ethics Committee concluded that there was no ethics violation, the judge was counseled to be more courteous and diplomatic.

6. An injured worker alleged that the judge was aware that the defense attorney would not work with the injured worker and that the defense attorney talked with the Qualified Medical Evaluator and supplied medical records to him. He also alleged that the judge was abrupt and rude on a regular basis. Finally, the injured worker alleged that the judge selected two QME reports that were biased and contained misinformation.

The Associate Chief Judge investigated the complaint. The files revealed that the stipulated Findings and Award was based upon the opinion of an Agreed Medical Evaluator that supported the award. The Committee determined that the record did not support a finding of judicial misconduct.

7. An anonymous complaint alleged that the judge failed to make a decision within the statutory time frame. Various attorneys who practice before this judge have made the same complaint. It was alleged that the judge extends the date that the cases are submitted to allow additional time to issue the decision.

The investigation revealed that in ten audited files, the judge had violated the statutory time frame one time. The judge and the presiding judge were counseled that the 90-day rule is not excused due to secretarial shortage. Additionally, the WCAB policy and procedures manual has been changed so that decisions will be completed in a timely manner.
8. An anonymous complaint alleged that the judge has been spending his time shopping for real estate instead of assuming his judicial duties.

Because the judge had recently moved to a new area, he had been given permission to look for a new house. The house searching activities were not during state time. Therefore, the Ethics Committee determined that the judge had not acted unethically.

9. Anonymous attorneys contended that an entire board should be closed as it is corrupt, and those that practice there engage in ex parte communications.

This complaint was investigated. The Ethics Committee determined that the facts did not support a finding of judicial misconduct.

10. An unrepresented injured worker alleged that the judge refused to accept his exhibits, the judge treated him in a prejudicial manner, the judge had the defendant serve the Findings and Award instead of having the court serve the document, and the judge was dishonest.

The Associate Chief Judge investigated the complaint. Procedural errors were identified; however, the investigation revealed that the errors were harmless. Specifically, the exhibits that were referred to in the complaint were fully considered by the judge, but the judge incorrectly referred to both the injured worker’s exhibits and the defendant’s exhibits as the defendant’s exhibits. Additionally, the judge designated the defendant to serve the Findings and Award, which was improper under Rule 10500. The judge was advised of the procedural errors. The Ethics Committee concluded that the judge did not violate the Code of Judicial Ethics or the Divisions ethics regulations. Allegations of legal or administrative errors by judges do not fall within the purview of the Ethics Advisory Committee since, even if the allegations were later proven to be correct, they do not constitute ethical violations.
Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Ethics provides that "[a] judicial decision or administrative act later determined to be incorrect legally is not itself a violation of this Code."

11. A represented injured worker alleged that she did not want to settle her case. The attorneys asked the judge to speak to her. Allegedly, the judge yelled at her for not settling and intimidated her. She also contended that the judge agreed to release her attorney from the case, said he would remember the case, and said that she would not receive more than $5,000 if she went to trial.

The investigation revealed that the judge approved of a $35,000 settlement after speaking with the injured worker. Both attorneys indicated that the judge was composed and patient with the injured worker. The Ethics Committee reviewed the investigation and concluded that the facts did not support a finding of judicial misconduct.

12. A represented injured worker alleged that he failed to receive time sensitive correspondence from the court in time for his appeal because his new address had not been entered. He alleged that none of his evidence was accepted. Although the fraud charges were dropped, the judge allowed testimony regarding fraud to justify a requirement of the injured worker to pay back benefits. The injured worker was not allowed to refute this evidence. Finally, the injured worker alleged that he had new evidence that he was not allowed to introduce at the trial.

The investigation revealed that the injured worker received his mail at a post office box which he used throughout the case. No official correspondence was returned. Some late-offered evidence was excluded as it had been readily available prior to the first trial and mandatory settlement conference. The Ethics Committee determined that the judge did not act unethically.
13. An injured worker alleged that he filed a petition for change of venue. When no order issued, he called the District Office and was told that his file had been destroyed. He was informed that the file destruction was a mistake and that he should send copies of his documents to reconstruct the file, which he did. Following the reconstruction of the file, the judge issued an order with the wrong defendants listed. The injured worker also complained that the order was issued late and contended that the judge altered the record to make it appear that the motion was filed in September instead of July.

After reviewing the investigation, the Ethics Committee determined that clerical errors had been made, but that the judge had not acted unethically.

14. An injured worker resubmitted his complaint from the previous year, alleging that the seven issues he complained of were not satisfactorily addressed by the Ethics Committee. The seven allegations were the following: (1) omitting evidence in the records; (2) transferring the case to a non assigned WCALJ on three occasions; (3) misusing the Labor Codes; (4) discriminating against an unrepresented Hispanic; (5) not applying penalties against an insurance claims administrator; (6) not using a court reporter at the hearing and trial; and (7) making discriminatory, insulting and threatening jokes against an injured worker.

The Ethics Committee responded to each of the allegations:

1. Omitting evidence in the records: Allegations of legal errors by judges do not fall within the purview of the Ethics Advisory Committee since, even if the allegations were later proven to be correct, they do not constitute ethical violations. Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Ethics provides that "[a] judicial decision or administrative act later determined to be incorrect legally is not itself a violation of this Code."

2. Transferring a case to a non assigned WCALJ: The Ethics Committee determined that this allegation did not constitute judicial misconduct, but instead was an administrative decision.
3. Misusing the Labor Codes: The Ethics Committee determined that the allegations concerning a misuse of the Labor Code were not factually supported.

4. Discriminating against an unrepresented Hispanic: The Ethics Committee did not identify any evidence to support the allegation that the judge discriminated against the injured worker because he is Hispanic and/or unrepresented.

5. Not applying penalties against an insurance claims administrator: As stated in response to issue number one, this is an allegation of a legal error which is not within the purview of the Ethics Advisory Committee.

6. Not using a court reporter at the hearing and trial: This allegation was not supported by the record.

7. Making discriminatory, insulting and threatening jokes against an injured worker: This allegation was not supported by the record.
Complaints filed during 2003 for which investigations were completed in 2004:

1. The injured worker complained that the WCALJ refused to read his pleading objecting to a proposed order and that the WCALJ publicly stated he did not have to read anything that the injured worker wrote. The injured worker further alleged that the WCALJ delayed his case for nearly two years, that the WCALJ ordered the defense attorney to oppose the plaintiff’s motion and made him write the opposition in the courtroom, and that the WCALJ ordered the injured worker to rewrite his petition because he did not want the injured worker to petition for the things he did. The injured worker alleged that the WCALJ held the final hearing before injured worker had completed discovery, allowed the insurance company to oppose the WCALJ's orders, refused to enforce the prior judge’s orders that the injured worker was to receive medical treatment and lied. Additionally, the injured worker stated that the WCALJ used a court reporter who he knows refuses to supply transcripts to the injured worker, engaged in ex parte communications with a defense attorney, refusal to allow treatment and attempted to kill the injured worker. The injured worker stated that the actions were motivated by discrimination because the WCALJ is Jewish and the injured worker is black.

An investigation was performed by the Associate Chief Judge. Following its review of the investigation, the Committee did not identify any violations of the California Code of Judicial Ethics or the Division’s ethics regulations.

2. An injured worker complained that the WCALJ denied his due process rights by allowing an attorney who was not “of record” to represent the defendant employer by allowing the attorney to complete the Notice or Representation on day of trial. The injured worker alleged that the WCALJ dismissed the Serious and Willful charge due to the statute of limitations without allowing the injured worker to present explanation. The injured worker
also alleged that although the trial was scheduled for a full day, the WCALJ left without explanation and continued the trial for three months. Finally, despite the fact that his former attorney agreed to accept $250 for fees, the WCALJ awarded the attorney 10% and forced the injured worker to sign the settlement agreement.

After reviewing the investigation, the Ethics Committee determined that the allegations concerning ethical misconduct were not factually supported.

3. An unrepresented injured worker complained that the WCALJ allowed the insurance company to make his medical decisions and took away his civil rights. He complained that the WCALJ held hearings without the court reporter and then called her in to take the minutes. He also alleged that the WCALJ told him not to call the employer or the insurance company.

The Associate Chief Judge investigated this complaint. All proceedings, except for conferences, were held in the courtroom. The record further revealed that no request for a court reporter was made. The Ethics Committee determined that the allegations concerning ethical misconduct were not factually supported.

4. An injured worker alleged a mandatory settlement conference was scheduled before one judge, but the defense asked for a continuance. The continuance was granted, and the proceeding was transferred to a different judge. After meeting with the defense, the WCALJ told the injured worker that the request for mileage, penalties and interest since 1972 was too much, and the WCALJ would only allow mileage from 1999. The injured worker told the Information & Assistance Officer that he wanted the first judge, but the Information & Assistance Officer recommended that he wait for the order on the mileage issue and then appeal. A new hearing was set, but the judge was not present. A second hearing was set, but because the defense attorney’s hearing officer was sick, the WCALJ postponed the
The judge said that a new hearing date would be sent in the mail. The injured worker never received notice of a new hearing date and alleged that he was told by the Information & Assistance Officer that the case was taken off calendar for no reason.

The allegations were investigated. The Ethics Committee determined that there was no evidence of judicial misconduct.

5. An unrepresented injured worker alleged that the WCALJ was insensitive, abusive, atrocious and arbitrary. She alleged that the Minutes confuse the name of applicant and the name of her companion. The WCALJ's decorum makes her doubt that he is impartial. When she asked for a continuance due to health concerns, the WCALJ declared her incompetent and required a guardian ad litem.

The Associate Chief Judge investigated the allegations. The Ethics Committee determined that there was no evidence of judicial misconduct.

Complaints filed during 2003 which are still under active investigation:

1. An injured worker alleged that more than 90 days passed after the hearing and before the order was issued. He also complained that there was an ex parte communication between the defense attorneys and the WCALJ. The injured worker fears that the presiding judge is biased against him because he testified publicly against the presiding judge during the CHSWC/Rand study public hearing and the presiding judge later mentioned his public testimony.

Complaints filed during 2002 for which investigations were completed in 2004:
1. An injured worker alleged that the WCALJ gave testimony in the trial and refused to require a physician to testify.

The investigation included a review of the trial testimony. Although the judge sustained many of the defenses objections to the injured worker’s questions of the witnesses, the judge asked questions on behalf of the injured worker. These questions brought out points and testimony that the injured worker had been trying unsuccessfully to bring out himself and were helpful to the injured worker’s case. The judge also questioned the injured worker extensively during direct testimony so the injured worker could bring his case forward. With regard to the complaint that the WCALJ refused to require a physician to testify, the investigation revealed that the injured worker wanted the physician to testify as to the authenticity of her report. The injured worker filed a petition for reconsideration regarding this issue. The Board held that written medical reports are favored and that a doctor could be brought into court to testify only upon a showing of good cause. The Board held that the injured worker did not provide a showing of good cause and upheld the WCALJ’s ruling. Following its review of the investigation, the Ethics Committee did not identify any ethical violations.
### TABLE 1

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<th>YEAR</th>
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Complaints of Misconduct Filed
with the Ethics Advisory Committee
APPENDIX 1.

Ethics Regulations: Title 8, California Code of Regulations, §9720.1 et seq.
§ 9720.1. Authority.

The rules and regulations contained in Article 1.6 are adopted pursuant to the authority contained in Sections 123.6, 133, and 5307.3 of the Labor Code. This article is designed to enforce the highest ethical standards among workers' compensation referees and to provide all parties with an independent, impartial investigation into allegations of misconduct by referees.

Note: Authority cited: Sections 123.6, 133 and 5307.3, Labor Code.
Reference: Sections 111 and 123.6, Labor Code.

§ 9720.2. Definitions

For purposes of this Article and Section 123.6 of the Labor Code, the following definitions shall apply:

(a) "Code" shall mean the Code of Judicial Conduct. When the Supreme Court adopts a Code of Judicial Ethics pursuant to Article VI, section 18(m), of the Constitution, "Code" shall mean the Code of Judicial Ethics and any subsequent revision thereof.

(b) "Committee" shall mean the Workers' Compensation Ethics Advisory Committee as specified in Section 9722 of these regulations.

(c) "Complaint" shall mean a statement alleging facts that, if true, might constitute misconduct.

(d) "Misconduct" shall mean any conduct of a referee that is contrary to the Code or to the other rules of conduct that apply to referees.

(e) "Referee" shall mean a worker's compensation referee employed by the administrative director pursuant to Section 123.5 of the Labor Code. The term includes Presiding Workers' Compensation Referees, Regional Managers (Claims Adjudication), the Assistant Chief, the Administrative Director and any other person, including pro tem referees and state employees, while they are exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers.

Note: Authority cited: Sections 123.6, 133 and 5307.3, Labor Code.
Reference: Sections 111 and 123.6, Labor Code.
§ 9721.1. Code of Judicial Conduct or Ethics

Every referee shall abide by the Code.

Note: Authority cited: Sections 123.6, 133 and 5307.3, Labor Code.
Reference: Sections 111 and 123.6, Labor Code.

§ 9721.2. Gifts, Honoraria and Travel

(a) No referee may accept any gift, honorarium or travel that is forbidden to legislators under the Political Reform Act of 1974.

(b) No referee may accept any gift, payment, honorarium, travel, meal or any other thing exceeding five dollars in value, the cost of which is significantly paid for by attorneys who practice before the Workers Compensation Appeals Board or by others whose interests have come or are likely to come before the Board, without first obtaining the written approval of the administrative director. Copies of requests and responses shall be forwarded to the Committee for its annual report. For purposes of this section, "attorneys" includes individual attorneys, law firms, and professional associations that include attorneys as members. For purposes of this section, "others whose interests have come or are likely to come before the Board" includes, but is not limited to, any person or entity which is or has been a party or lien claimant in a workers' compensation proceeding, represents a party or lien claimant, provides educational, consulting or other services relating to workers' compensation, otherwise participates in the workers' compensation adjudicatory process or is an association that includes such persons as members or represents their interests.

(c) This section does not apply to (1) gifts, payments, travel, meals or other things of value given to a referee by a family member who does not appear before the referee in question, (2) ordinary, modest social hospitality in a private home or attendance at a wedding, graduation or religious ceremony, (3) payments, including a division of attorney's fees, made to a referee by the referee's former law firm or other former employer, for services actually rendered prior to the referee's appointment, or (4) union activities of referees.

Note: Authority cited: Sections 123.6, 133 and 5307.3, Labor Code.
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Note: Authority cited: Sections 123.6, 133 and 5307.3, Labor Code.
Reference: Sections 111 and 123.6, Labor Code.

§ 9721.32. Duty to Report Misconduct

When circumstances warrant, a referee shall take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against a referee, lawyer, party, witness, or other person who participates in the workers' compensation process for unprofessional, fraudulent or other improper conduct of which the referee becomes aware.

Note: Authority cited: Sections 123.6, 133 and 5307.3, Labor Code.
Reference: Sections 111 and 123.6, Labor Code.

§ 9722. The Workers' Compensation Ethics Advisory Committee

(a) There shall be a Workers' Compensation Ethics Advisory Committee consisting of nine members appointed by the administrative director:

(1) a member of the public representing organized labor,

(2) a member of the public representing insurers,

(3) a member of the public representing self-insured employers,

(4) an attorney who formerly practiced before the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board and who usually represented insurers or employers,

(5) an attorney who formerly practiced before the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board and
who usually represented applicants,

(6) a presiding referee,

(7) a referee or retired referee,

(8) and (9) two members of the public outside the workers' compensation community.

Members shall serve for a term of four years. However, to create staggered terms, the first term of members in odd-numbered categories above shall be two years. The administrative director shall designate a chairperson.

(b) The Committee shall meet as necessary to carry out its responsibilities under this article. State employees shall meet on state time and at state expense.

(c) The Committee may do the following:

(1) Receive complaints made against referees,

(2) Forward those complaints to the administrative director with a recommendation to investigate or not to investigate,

(3) Monitor the outcome of complaints, and

(4) Make reports and recommendations to the administrative director, the legislature and the public concerning the integrity of the workers' compensation adjudicatory process. The Committee shall make a public report on or before February 15 or each year, summarizing the activities of the Committee in the previous calendar year. The report shall not contain personally identifiable information concerning complainants or referees, unless the information is already public.

(d) The administrative director shall make staff available to the Committee to assist it in carrying out its functions.

(e) The Committee may receive information that is not available to the public. The Committee shall hold such information strictly confidential from public disclosure. However, this rule of confidentiality shall not prevent the Committee from disclosing information to the referee, if the referee is otherwise entitled to the information.

Note: Authority cited: Sections 123.6, 133 and 5307.3, Labor Code.
Reference: Sections 111 and 123.6, Labor Code.

§ 9722.1. Commencing an Investigation

(a) Any person may file a complaint with the Committee. The Committee may require complaints to be filed in a particular form. Nothing in these regulations prohibits any person from complaining
directly to a presiding referee or to the administrative director. The presiding referee or the administrative director may, but is not required to, refer such complaints to the Committee.

(b) The Committee shall review the complaint. The Committee may make brief, informal inquiries to obtain information needed to clarify the complaint.

c) If the Committee determines that the complaint does not allege facts that might constitute misconduct, or if the complaint is merely conjectural or conclusory, obviously unfounded, or stale, or alleges only isolated legal error by the referee, the Committee shall forward the complaint to the administrative director with a recommendation not to proceed with the complaint.

d) If the Committee determines that the complaint might have merit, the Committee shall refer the complaint to the administrative director. Complaints against the administrative director shall be referred to the Director of Industrial Relations.

(e) Complaints making substantial allegations of criminal conduct, invidious discrimination, sexual harassment, or other serious acts that might require the administrative director's immediate attention, shall be referred forthwith to the administrative director. All other complaints shall be referred to the administrative director within 60 days.

(f) During the course of the investigation, the administrative director shall inform the referee of the nature of the charges. The referee shall have the opportunity to submit a response. A referee who has been informed of the charges shall also be informed of the outcome of the investigation.

Note: Authority cited: Sections 123.6, 133 and 5307.3, Labor Code.
Reference: Sections 111 and 123.6, Labor Code.

§ 9722.2. Investigation and Action by the Administrative Director

(a) Upon receiving a complaint from the Committee, the administrative director shall investigate whether a referee has engaged in misconduct.

(b) If the administrative director determines after investigation that the complaint is unfounded or insufficient to justify discipline or other action, the administrative director shall so inform the complainant and the Committee.

(c) If the administrative director determines after investigation that misconduct has occurred, he or she shall take appropriate disciplinary or other action against the referee. The administrative director's action shall be in the form required by Government Code section 19574 or section 19590(b).

(d) The administrative director shall provide the Committee with a copy of his or her decision and shall inform the complaining party of the outcome of the investigation.

Note: Authority cited: Sections 123.6, 133 and 5307.3, Labor Code.
§ 9723. Miscellaneous Provisions

(a) This article does not replace or diminish the procedural rights of a referee under the State Civil Service Act. Documentation of unfounded or unsustained complaints or complaints which warrant no further investigation shall not be retained in the employee's personnel file.

(b) This article does not replace or diminish the authority of the administrative director to investigate allegations of misconduct, to impose appropriate discipline, or to take any other action authorized by law.

(c) Nothing in this article shall affect the rights and obligations of the administrative director and referees concerning the probationary period under Government Code sections 19170 through 19180.

(d) Pursuant to Government Code section 19574.5, the administrative director may place a referee on leave of absence pending investigation of the accusations listed in that section.

(e) No civil action may be maintained against any person, or adverse employment action taken against a person by any employer, public or private, based on statements presented by the person in proceedings under this section.

(f) A referee or other interested person may request the administrative director to issue an advisory opinion on the application of the Code or other rules to a particular situation. The administrative director may, in his or her sole discretion, issue an advisory opinion. The administrative director may issue an advisory opinion on his or her own initiative.

Note: Authority cited: Sections 123.6, 133 and 5307.3, Labor Code.
Reference: Sections 111 and 123.6, Labor Code.
APPENDIX

DIVISION II. California Code of Judicial Ethics

Amended by the Supreme Court of California effective December 13, 2000; previously amended effective March 4, 1999

Preface
Preamble
Terminology
Canon 1. A judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.
Canon 2. A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge’s activities.
Canon 3. A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially and diligently.
Canon 4. A judge shall so conduct the judge’s quasi-judicial and extrajudicial activities as to minimize the risk of conflict with judicial obligations.
Canon 5. A judge or judicial candidate shall refrain from inappropriate political activity.
Canon 6. Compliance with the code of judicial ethics.
PREFACE

Formal standards of judicial conduct have existed for more than 50 years. The original Canons of Judicial Ethics promulgated by the American Bar Association were modified and adopted in 1949 for application in California by the Conference of California Judges (now the California Judges Association).

In 1969, the American Bar Association determined that current needs and problems warranted revision of the Canons. In the revision process, a special American Bar Association committee, headed by former California Chief Justice Roger Traynor, sought and considered the views of the bench and bar and other interested persons. The American Bar Association Code of Judicial Conduct was adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association August 16, 1972.


In 1990, the American Bar Association Model Code was further revised after a lengthy study. The California Judges Association again reviewed the model code and adopted a revised California Code of Judicial Conduct on October 5, 1992.

Proposition 190 (amending Cal. Const., art. VI, § 18(m), effective March 1, 1995) created a new constitutional provision that states, "The Supreme Court shall make rules for the conduct of judges, both on and off the bench, and for judicial candidates[*] in the conduct of their campaigns. These rules shall be referred to as the Code of Judicial Ethics."

The Supreme Court formally adopted the 1992 Code of Judicial Conduct in March 1995, as a transitional measure pending further review.

The Supreme Court formally adopted the Code of Judicial Ethics effective January 15, 1996.

The Supreme Court formally adopted amendments to the Code of Judicial Ethics, effective April 15, 1996. The Advisory Committee Commentary is published by the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics.

[*] Terms with an asterisk (*) are defined in the Terminology section.
Preamble

Our legal system is based on the principle that an independent, fair, and competent judiciary will interpret and apply the laws that govern us. The role of the judiciary is central to American concepts of justice and the rule of law. Intrinsic to this code are the precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in our legal system. The judge is an arbiter of facts and law for the resolution of disputes and a highly visible member of government under the rule of law.

The Code of Judicial Ethics ("Code") establishes standards for ethical conduct of judges on and off the bench and for candidates for judicial office. The Code consists of broad declarations called Canons, with subparts, and a Terminology section. Following each Canon is a Commentary section prepared by the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics. The Commentary, by explanation and example, provides guidance as to the purpose and meaning of the Canons. The Commentary does not constitute additional rules and should not be so construed. All members of the judiciary must comply with the Code. Compliance is required to preserve the integrity of the bench and to ensure the confidence of the public.

The Canons should be read together as a whole, and each provision should be construed in context and consistent with every other provision. They are to be applied in conformance with constitutional requirements, statutes, other court rules, and decisional law. Nothing in the Code shall either impair the essential independence of judges in making judicial decisions or provide a separate basis for civil liability or criminal prosecution.

The Code governs the conduct of judges and judicial candidates* and is binding upon them. Whether disciplinary action is appropriate, and the degree of discipline to be imposed, requires a reasoned application of the text and consideration of such factors as the seriousness of the transgression, whether there is a pattern of improper activity, and the effect of the improper activity on others or on the judicial system.
TERMINOLOGY

Terms explained below are noted with an asterisk (*) in the Canons where they appear. In addition, the Canons in which terms appear are cited after the explanation of each term below.

"Appropriate authority" denotes the authority with responsibility for initiation of the disciplinary process with respect to a violation to be reported. See Commentary to Canon 3D.

"Candidate." A candidate is a person seeking election for or retention of judicial office by election. A person becomes a candidate for judicial office as soon as he or she makes a public announcement of candidacy, declares or files as a candidate with the election authority, or authorizes solicitation or acceptance of contributions or support. The term "candidate" has the same meaning when applied to a judge seeking election to nonjudicial office, unless on leave of absence. See Preamble and Canons 2B(3), the preliminary paragraph of 5, 5A, 5B, 5C, and 6E.

"Court personnel" does not include the lawyers in a proceeding before a judge. See Canons 3B(4), 3B(7)(b), 3B(9), and 3C(2).

"Fiduciary" includes such relationships as executor, administrator, trustee, and guardian. See Canons 4E, 6B, and 6F (Commentary).

"Law" denotes court rules as well as statutes, constitutional provisions, and decisional law. See Canons 1 (Commentary), 2A, 2C (Commentary), 3A, 3B(2), 3B(7), 3E, 4B (Commentary), 4C, 4D(6)(a)-(b), 4F, 4H, and 5D.

"Member of the judge's family" denotes a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent, or other relative or person with whom the judge maintains a close familial relationship. See Canons 2B(2), 4D(1) (Commentary), 4D(2), 4E, 4G (Commentary), and 5A.

"Member of the judge's family residing in the judge's household" denotes a spouse and those persons who reside in the judge's household who are relatives of the judge including relatives by marriage, or persons with whom the judge maintains a close familial relationship. See Canons 4D(5) and 4D(6).

"Nonprofit youth organization" is any nonprofit corporation or association, not organized for the private gain of any person, whose purposes are irrevocably dedicated to benefiting and serving the interests of minors and which maintains its
Terminology

nonprofit status in accordance with applicable state and federal tax laws. See Canon 2C.

"Nonpublic information" denotes information that, by law, is not available to the public. Nonpublic information may include but is not limited to information that is sealed by statute or court order, impounded, or communicated in camera; and information offered in grand jury proceedings, presentencing reports, dependency cases, or psychiatric reports. See Canon 3B(11).

"Political organization" denotes a political party, political action committee, or other group, the principal purpose of which is to further the election or appointment of candidates to nonjudicial office. See Canon 5A.

"Temporary Judge." A temporary judge is an active or inactive member of the bar who serves or expects to serve as a judge once, sporadically, or regularly on a part-time basis under a separate court appointment for each period of service or for each case heard. See Canons 4C(3)(d)(i), 6A, and 6D.

"Require." Any Canon prescribing that a judge "require" certain conduct of others means that a judge is to exercise reasonable direction and control over the conduct of those persons subject to the judge's direction and control. See Canons 3B(3), 3B(4), 3B(6), 3B(8) (Commentary), 3B(9), and 3C(2).
CANON 1

A JUDGE SHALL UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY

An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall personally observe those standards so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved. The provisions of this Code are to be construed and applied to further that objective. A judicial decision or administrative act later determined to be incorrect legally is not itself a violation of this Code.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY

Deference to the judgments and rulings of courts depends upon public confidence in the integrity and independence of judges. The integrity and independence of judges depend in turn upon their acting without fear or favor. Although judges should be independent, they must comply with the law* and the provisions of this Code. Public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary is maintained by the adherence of each judge to this responsibility. Conversely, violations of this Code diminish public confidence in the judiciary and thereby do injury to the system of government under law.

The basic function of an independent and honorable judiciary is to maintain the utmost integrity in decision making, and this Code should be read and interpreted with that function in mind.
A JUDGE SHALL AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE
APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL OF THE
JUDGE'S ACTIVITIES

A. Promoting Public Confidence

A judge shall respect and comply with the law* and shall act at all times
in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY

Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper
conduct by judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of
impropriety. A judge must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. A
judge must therefore accept restrictions on the judge's conduct that might be viewed
as burdensome by other members of the community and should do so freely and
willingly.

The prohibition against behaving with impropriety or the appearance of
impropriety applies to both the professional and personal conduct of a judge.

The test for the appearance of impropriety is whether a person aware of the
facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to act with
integrity, impartiality, and competence.

See also Commentary under Canon 2C.

B. Use of the Prestige of Judicial Office

(1) A judge shall not allow family, social, political, or other relationships
to influence the judge's judicial conduct or judgment, nor shall a judge convey
or permit others to convey the impression that any individual is in a special
position to influence the judge.

(2) A judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the
pecuniary or personal interests of the judge or others; nor shall a judge
testify voluntarily as a character witness. A judge shall not initiate
communications with a sentencing judge or a probation or corrections officer,
but may provide them with information for the record in response to an official
request. A judge may initiate communications with a probation or corrections
officer concerning a member of the judge's family,* provided the judge is not
identified as a judge in the communication.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY
A strong judicial branch, based on the prestige which comes from effective
and ethical performance, is essential to a system of government in which the
judiciary functions independently of the executive and legislative branches. Judges
should distinguish between proper and improper use of the prestige of office in all
of their activities.

A judge must avoid lending the prestige of judicial office for the
advancement of the private interests of the judge or others. For example, a judge
must not use the judicial position to gain advantage in a civil suit involving a
member of the judge's family;* or use his or her position to gain deferential
treatment when stopped by a police officer for a traffic offense.

As to the use of a judge's title to identify a judge's role in the presentation
and creation of legal education programs and materials, see Commentary to Canon
4B. In contracts for publication of a judge's writings, a judge should retain control
over the advertising, to the extent feasible, to avoid exploitation of the judge's
office. As to the acceptance of awards, see Canon 4D(6)(c) and Commentary.

A judge must not testify as a character witness without being subpoenaed
because to do so may lend the prestige of the judicial office in support of the party
for whom the judge testifies. A judge may provide information on behalf of a lawyer
or a judge involved in disciplinary proceedings, and shall provide information to
disciplinary bodies when officially requested to do so. This Canon does not afford
judges a privilege against testifying in response to any official summons.

This Canon does not preclude internal discussions among judges regarding
the application of substantive or procedural provisions of law to any pending
criminal or civil case.

(3) A judge may respond to judicial selection inquiries, provide
recommendations (including a general character reference, relating to the
evaluation of persons being considered for a judgeship) and otherwise
participate in the process of judicial selection.

(4) A judge shall not use the judicial title in any written communication
intended to advance the personal or pecuniary interest of the judge. A judge
may serve as a reference or provide a letter of recommendation only if based on
the judge's personal knowledge of the individual. These written communications
may include the judge's title and be written on stationery that uses the judicial
title.

C. Membership in Organizations

A judge shall not hold membership in any organization that practices
invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, or
sexual orientation.

This Canon does not apply to membership in a religious organization or
an official military organization of the United States. So long as membership
does not violate Canon 4A, this Canon does not bar membership in a nonprofit
youth organization.*

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY

Membership of a judge in an organization that practices invidious
discrimination gives rise to a perception that the judge's impartiality is impaired.
This Canon exempts membership in religious and military organizations and,
subject to Canon 4A, does not bar membership in nonprofit youth organizations.*
These exemptions are necessary because membership in United States military
organizations is subject to current valid military regulations, and religious beliefs
are constitutionally protected. Membership in nonprofit youth organizations* is not
barred to accommodate individual rights of intimate association and free
expression.

Canon 2C refers to the current practices of the organization. Whether an
organization practices invidious discrimination is often a complex question to which
judges should be sensitive. The answer cannot be determined from a mere
examination of an organization's current membership rolls but rather depends on
how the organization selects members and other relevant factors, such as whether
the organization is dedicated to the preservation of religious, ethnic, or cultural
values of legitimate common interest to its members, or whether it is in fact and
effect an intimate, purely private organization whose membership limitations could
not be constitutionally prohibited. Absent such factors, an organization is generally
said to discriminate invidiously if it arbitrarily excludes from membership on the
basis of race, religion, sex, national origin, or sexual orientation persons who
would otherwise be admitted to membership.

Although Canon 2C relates only to membership in organizations that
invidiously discriminate on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, or
sexual orientation, a judge's membership in an organization that engages in any
discriminatory membership practices prohibited by law* also violates Canon 2 and
Canon 2A and gives the appearance of impropriety. In addition, it would be a
violation of Canon 2 and Canon 2A for a judge to arrange a meeting at a club that the judge knows practices such invidious discrimination or for the judge to use such a club regularly. Moreover, public manifestation by a judge of the judge's knowing approval of invidious discrimination on any basis gives the appearance of impropriety under Canon 2 and diminishes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary in violation of Canon 2A.
CANON 3

A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM THE DUTIES OF JUDICIAL
OFFICE IMPARTIALLY AND DILIGENTLY

A. Judicial Duties in General

All of the judicial duties prescribed by law shall take precedence over
all other activities of every judge. In the performance of these duties, the
following standards apply.

B. Adjudicative Responsibilities

(1) A judge shall hear and decide all matters assigned to the judge except
those in which he or she is disqualified.

Advisory Committee Commentary
Canon 3B(1) is based upon the affirmative obligation contained in the Code
of Civil Procedure.

(2) A judge shall be faithful to the law regardless of partisan interests,
public clamor, or fear of criticism, and shall maintain professional competence
in the law.*

(3) A judge shall require order and decorum in proceedings before the
judge.

(4) A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors,
witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity,
and shall require similar conduct of lawyers and of all court staff and
personnel under the judge's direction and control.

(5) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A
d judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct
manifest bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice based
upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or
socioeconomic status.

Advisory Committee Commentary
A judge must refrain from speech, gestures, or other conduct that could
reasonably be perceived as sexual harassment.
(6) A judge shall require* lawyers in proceedings before the judge to refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status against parties, witnesses, counsel, or others. This Canon does not preclude legitimate advocacy when race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, socioeconomic status or other similar factors are issues in the proceeding.

(7) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, full right to be heard according to law.* A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding, except as follows:

(a) A judge may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law* applicable to a proceeding before the judge if the judge gives notice to the parties of the person consulted and the substance of the advice, and affords the parties reasonable opportunity to respond.

(b) A judge may consult with court personnel* whose function is to aid the judge in carrying out the judge's adjudicative responsibilities or with other judges.

(c) A judge may, with the consent of the parties, confer separately with the parties and their lawyers in an effort to mediate or settle matters pending before the judge.

(d) A judge may initiate ex parte communications, where circumstances require, for scheduling, administrative purposes, or emergencies that do not deal with substantive matters provided:

(i) the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communication, and

(ii) the judge makes provision promptly to notify all other parties of the substance of the ex parte communication and allows an opportunity to respond.

(e) A judge may initiate or consider any ex parte communication when expressly authorized by law* to do so.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY
The proscription against communications concerning a proceeding includes communications from lawyers, law professors, and other persons who are not participants in the proceeding, except to the limited extent permitted by the exceptions noted in Canon 3B(7).

This Canon does not prohibit a judge from initiating or considering an ex parte communication when authorized to do so by stipulation of the parties.

This Canon does not prohibit court staff from communicating scheduling information or carrying out similar administrative functions.

An appropriate and often desirable procedure for a court to obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on legal issues is to invite the expert to file an amicus curiae brief.

A judge must not independently investigate facts in a case and must consider only the evidence presented, unless otherwise authorized by law.* For example, a judge is statutorily authorized to investigate and consult witnesses informally in small claims cases.

(8) A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters fairly, promptly, and efficiently.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY

The obligation of a judge to dispose of matters promptly and efficiently must not take precedence over the judge’s obligation to dispose of the matters fairly and with patience. A judge should monitor and supervise cases so as to reduce or eliminate dilatory practices, avoidable delays, and unnecessary costs. A judge should encourage and seek to facilitate settlement, but parties should not feel coerced into surrendering the right to have their controversy resolved by the courts.

Prompt disposition of the court's business requires a judge to devote adequate time to judicial duties, to be punctual in attending court and expeditious in determining matters under submission, and to require* that court officials, litigants, and their lawyers cooperate with the judge to that end.

(9) A judge shall not make any public comment about a pending or impending proceeding in any court, and shall not make any nonpublic comment that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing. The judge shall require* similar abstention on the part of court personnel* subject to the judge's direction and control. This Canon does not prohibit judges from making statements in the course of their official duties or from explaining for public information the procedures of the court, and does not apply to proceedings in
which the judge is a litigant in a personal capacity. Other than cases in which
the judge has personally participated, this Canon does not prohibit judges from
discussing in legal education programs and materials, cases and issues pending
in appellate courts. This educational exemption does not apply to cases over
which the judge has presided or to comments or discussions that might interfere
with a fair hearing of the case.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY
The requirement that judges abstain from public comment regarding a
pending or impending proceeding continues during any appellate process and until
final disposition. This Canon does not prohibit a judge from commenting on
proceedings in which the judge is a litigant in a personal capacity, but in cases such
as a writ of mandamus where the judge is a litigant in an official capacity, the judge
must not comment publicly.

(10) A judge shall not commend or criticize jurors for their verdict other
than in a court order or opinion in a proceeding, but may express appreciation
to jurors for their service to the judicial system and the community.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY
Commending or criticizing jurors for their verdict may imply a judicial
expectation in future cases and may impair a juror's ability to be fair and impartial
in a subsequent case.

(11) A judge shall not disclose or use, for any purpose unrelated to
judicial duties, nonpublic information* acquired in a judicial capacity.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY
This Canon makes it clear that judges cannot make use of information from
affidavits, jury results, or court rulings, before they become public information, in
order to gain a personal advantage.

C. Administrative Responsibilities

(1) A judge shall diligently discharge the judge's administrative
responsibilities without bias or prejudice and maintain professional competence
in judicial administration, and shall cooperate with other judges and court
officials in the administration of court business.

(2) A judge shall require* staff and court personnel* under the judge's
direction and control to observe appropriate standards of conduct and to
refrain from manifesting bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion,
national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status in the performance of their official duties.

(3) A judge with supervisory authority for the judicial performance of other judges shall take reasonable measures to ensure the prompt disposition of matters before them and the proper performance of their other judicial responsibilities.

(4) A judge shall not make unnecessary court appointments. A judge shall exercise the power of appointment impartially and on the basis of merit. A judge shall avoid nepotism and favoritism. A judge shall not approve compensation of appointees above the reasonable value of services rendered.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY
Appointees of a judge include assigned counsel, officials such as referees, commissioners, special masters, receivers, and guardians, and personnel such as clerks, secretaries, court reporters, court interpreters, and bailiffs. Consent by the parties to an appointment or an award of compensation does not relieve the judge of the obligation prescribed by Canon 3C(4).

D. Disciplinary Responsibilities

(1) Whenever a judge has reliable information that another judge has violated any provision of the Code of Judicial Ethics, the judge shall take or initiate appropriate corrective action, which may include reporting the violation to the appropriate authority.*

(2) Whenever a judge has personal knowledge that a lawyer has violated any provision of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the judge shall take appropriate corrective action.

(3) A judge who is charged by prosecutorial complaint, information, or indictment or convicted of a crime in the United States, other than one that would be considered a misdemeanor not involving moral turpitude or an infraction under California law, but including all misdemeanors involving violence (including assaults), the use or possession of controlled substances, the misuse of prescriptions, or the personal use or furnishing of alcohol, shall promptly and in writing report that fact to the Commission on Judicial Performance.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY
Appropriate corrective action could include direct communication with the judge or lawyer who has committed the violation, other direct action if available, or
a report of the violation to the presiding judge, appropriate authority,* or other
agency or body. Judges should note that in addition to the action required by
Canon 3D(2), California law imposes additional reporting requirements regarding
lawyers.

(Canon 3D (3) amended effective March 4, 1999; previously amended
effective June 19, 1997; adopted effective January 15, 1996.)

E. Disqualification.

(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which
disqualification is required by law.

(2) In all trial court proceedings, a judge shall disclose on the record
information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider
relevant to the question of disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no
actual basis for disqualification.

(3) An appellate justice shall disqualify himself or herself in any
proceeding if for any reason: (i) the justice believes his or her recusal would
further the interest of justice; or (ii) the justice substantially doubts his or her
capacity to be impartial; or (iii) the circumstances are such that a reasonable
person aware of the facts would doubt the justice’s ability to be impartial.
Disqualification is required in the following instances:

(a) The appellate justice has appeared or otherwise served as a lawyer in
the pending matter, or has appeared or served as a lawyer in any other matter
involving any of the same parties if that other matter related to the same
contested issues of fact and law as the present matter.

(b) Within the last two years, (i) a party to the proceeding, or an officer,
director or trustee thereof, either was a client of the justice when the justice was
engaged in the private practice of law or was a client of a lawyer with whom the
justice was associated in the private practice of law; or (ii) a lawyer in the
proceeding was associated with the justice in the private practice of law.

(c) The appellate justice represented a public officer or entity and
personally advised or in any way represented such officer or entity concerning
the factual or legal issues in the present proceeding in which the public officer
or entity now appears.

(d) The appellate justice, or his or her spouse, or a minor child residing
in the household, has a financial interest or is a fiduciary who has a financial
interest in the proceeding, or is a director, advisor, or other active participant
in the affairs of a party. A financial interest is defined as ownership of more
than a 1 percent legal or equitable interest in a party, or a legal or equitable
interest in a party of a fair market value exceeding one thousand five hundred
dollars. Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities
does not itself constitute a financial interest; holding office in an educational,
religious, charitable, fraternal or civic organization does not confer a financial
interest in the organization’s securities; and a proprietary interest of a
policyholder in a mutual insurance company or mutual savings association or
similar interest is not a financial interest unless the outcome of the proceeding
could substantially affect the value of the interest. A justice shall make
reasonable efforts to keep informed about his or her personal and fiduciary
interests and those of his or her spouse and of minor children living in the
household.

(e) The justice or his or her spouse, or a person within the third degree of
relationship to either of them, or the spouse thereof, is a party or an officer,
director or trustee of a party to the proceeding, or a lawyer or spouse of a
lawyer in the proceeding is the spouse, former spouse, child, sibling, or parent
of the justice or of the justice’s spouse, or such a person is associated in the
private practice of law with a lawyer in the proceeding.

(f) The justice (i) served as the judge before whom the proceeding was
tried or heard in the lower court, (ii) has a personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding, or (iii) has a personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer. The justice’s spouse or a
person within the third degree of relationship to the justice or his or her spouse,
or the person’s spouse, was a witness in the proceeding.

(g) A temporary or permanent physical impairment renders the judge
unable properly to perceive the evidence or conduct the proceedings.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY

Canon 3(E)(1) sets forth the general duty to disqualify applicable to a judge
of any court. Sources for determining when recusal or disqualification is
appropriate may include the applicable provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure,
other provisions of the Code of Judicial Ethics, the Code of Conduct for United
States Judges, the American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct,
and related case law.

The introductory paragraph to Canon 3E(3) sets forth the general standards
for recusal of an appellate justice. The term “appellate justice” includes justices of
both the Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court. Generally, the provisions
concerning disqualification of an appellate justice are intended to assist justices in
determining whether recusal is appropriate and to inform the public why recusal
may occur.

However, the rule of necessity may override the rule of disqualification. For
example, a judge might be required to participate in judicial review of a judicial
salary statute, or might be the only judge available in a matter requiring judicial
action, such as a hearing on probable cause or a temporary restraining order. In
the latter case, the judge must promptly disclose on the record the basis for possible
disqualification and use reasonable efforts to transfer the matter to another judge
as soon as practicable.

Canon 3E amended effective December 13, 2000; previously amended effective
A JUDGE SHALL SO CONDUCT THE JUDGE'S QUASI-JUDICIAL AND EXTRAJUDICIAL ACTIVITIES AS TO MINIMIZE THE RISK OF CONFLICT WITH JUDICIAL OBLIGATIONS

A. Extrajudicial Activities in General

A judge shall conduct all of the judge's extrajudicial activities so that they do not

(1) cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially;

(2) demean the judicial office; or

(3) interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY
Complete separation of a judge from extrajudicial activities is neither possible nor wise; a judge should not become isolated from the community in which the judge lives.

Expressions of bias or prejudice by a judge, even outside the judge's judicial activities, may cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially as a judge. Expressions which may do so include jokes or other remarks demeaning individuals on the basis of a classification such as their race, sex, religion, sexual orientation, or national origin. See Canon 2C and accompanying Commentary.

B. Quasi-judicial and Avocational Activities

A judge may speak, write, lecture, teach, and participate in activities concerning legal and nonlegal subject matters, subject to the requirements of this Code.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY
As a judicial officer and person specially learned in the law, a judge is in a unique position to contribute to the improvement of the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice, including revision of substantive and procedural law and improvement of criminal and juvenile justice. To the extent that time permits, a judge may do so, either independently or through a bar or judicial association or other group dedicated to the improvement of the law.
It may be necessary to promote legal education programs and materials by
identifying authors and speakers by judicial title. This is permissible, provided such
use of the judicial title does not contravene Canons 2A and 2B.

Judges are not precluded by their office from engaging in other social,
community, and intellectual endeavors so long as they do not interfere with the
obligations under Canons 2C and 4A.

C. Governmental, Civic, or Charitable Activities

(1) A judge shall not appear at a public hearing or officially consult with
an executive or legislative body or public official except on matters concerning
the law,* the legal system, or the administration of justice or in matters
involving the judge's private economic or personal interests.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY
See Canon 2B regarding the obligation to avoid improper influence.

(2) A judge shall not accept appointment to a governmental committee or
commission or other governmental position that is concerned with issues of fact
or policy on matters other than the improvement of the law,* the legal system,
or the administration of justice. A judge may, however, serve in the military
reserve or represent a national, state, or local government on ceremonial
occasions or in connection with historical, educational, or cultural activities.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY
Canon 4C(2) prohibits a judge from accepting any governmental position
except one relating to the law,* legal system, or administration of justice as
authorized by Canon 4C(3). The appropriateness of accepting extrajudicial
assignments must be assessed in light of the demands on judicial resources and the
need to protect the courts from involvement in extrajudicial matters that may prove
to be controversial. Judges shall not accept governmental appointments that are
likely to interfere with the effectiveness and independence of the judiciary, or which
constitute a public office within the meaning of the California Constitution, article
VI, section 17.

Canon 4C(2) does not govern a judge's service in a nongovernmental
position. See Canon 4C(3) permitting service by a judge with organizations devoted
to the improvement of the law,* the legal system, or the administration of justice
and with educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organizations not
conducted for profit. For example, service on the board of a public educational
institution, other than a law school, would be prohibited under Canon 4C(2), but
service on the board of a public law school or any private educational institution would generally be permitted under Canon 4C(3).

(3) Subject to the following limitations and the other requirements of this Code,

(a) a judge may serve as an officer, director, trustee, or nonlegal advisor of an organization or governmental agency devoted to the improvement of the law,* the legal system, or the administration of justice provided that such position does not constitute a public office within the meaning of the California Constitution, article VI, section 17;

(b) a judge may serve as an officer, director, trustee, or nonlegal advisor of an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization not conducted for profit;

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY

Canon 4C(3) does not apply to a judge’s service in a governmental position unconnected with the improvement of the law,* the legal system, or the administration of justice. See Canon 4C(2).

Canon 4C(3) uses the phrase, "Subject to the following limitations and the other requirements of this Code." As an example of the meaning of the phrase, a judge permitted by Canon 4C(3) to serve on the board of a fraternal institution may be prohibited from such service by Canon 2C or 4A if the institution practices invidious discrimination or if service on the board otherwise casts reasonable doubt on the judge’s capacity to act impartially as a judge.

Service by a judge on behalf of a civic or charitable organization may be governed by other provisions of Canon 4 in addition to Canon 4C. For example, a judge is prohibited by Canon 4G from serving as a legal advisor to a civic or charitable organization.

Service on the board of a homeowners' association or a neighborhood protective group is proper if it is related to the protection of the judge's own economic interests. See Canons 4D(2) and 4D(4). See Canon 2B regarding the obligation to avoid improper use of the prestige of a judge's office.

(c) a judge shall not serve as an officer, director, trustee, or nonlegal advisor if it is likely that the organization

(i) will be engaged in judicial proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge, or
(ii) will be engaged frequently in adversary proceedings in the
court of which the judge is a member or in any court subject to the appellate
jurisdiction of the court of which the judge is a member;

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY

The changing nature of some organizations and of their relationship to the
law* makes it necessary for the judge regularly to reexamine the activities of each
organization with which the judge is affiliated to determine if it is proper for the
judge to continue the affiliation. Some organizations regularly engage in litigation
to achieve their goals or fulfill their purposes. Judges should avoid a leadership
role in such organizations as it could compromise the appearance of impartiality.

(d) a judge as an officer, director, trustee, or nonlegal advisor, or as a
member or otherwise

(i) may assist such an organization in planning fund raising and
may participate in the management and investment of the organization's funds,
but shall not personally participate in the solicitation of funds or other fund-
raising activities, except that a judge may privately solicit funds for such an
organization from other judges (excluding court commissioners, referees,
retired judges, and temporary judges*);

(ii) may make recommendations to public and private fund-
granting organizations on projects and programs concerning the law,* the legal
system, or the administration of justice;

(iii) shall not personally participate in membership solicitation if
the solicitation might reasonably be perceived as coercive or if the membership
solicitation is essentially a fund-raising mechanism, except as permitted in
Canon 4C(3)(d)(i);

(iv) shall not permit the use of the prestige of his or her judicial
office for fund raising or membership solicitation but may be a speaker, guest of
honor, or recipient of an award for public or charitable service provided the
judge does not personally solicit funds and complies with Canon 4A(1), (2), and
(3).

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY

A judge may solicit membership or endorse or encourage membership efforts
for an organization devoted to the improvement of the law,* the legal system, or the
administration of justice, or a nonprofit educational, religious, charitable,
fraternal, or civic organization as long as the solicitation cannot reasonably be perceived as coercive and is not essentially a fund-raising mechanism. Solicitation of funds for an organization and solicitation of memberships similarly involve the danger that the person solicited will feel obligated to respond favorably to the solicitor if the solicitor is in a position of influence or control. A judge must not engage in direct, individual solicitation of funds or memberships in person, in writing, or by telephone except in the following cases: (1) a judge may solicit other judges (excluding court commissioners, referees, retired judges, court-appointed arbitrators, and temporary judges*) for funds or memberships; (2) a judge may solicit other persons for membership in the organizations described above if neither those persons nor persons with whom they are affiliated are likely ever to appear before the court on which the judge serves; and (3) a judge who is an officer of such an organization may send a general membership solicitation mailing over the judge’s signature.

Use of an organization letterhead for fund raising or membership solicitation does not violate Canon 4C(3)(d), provided the letterhead lists only the judge’s name and office or other position in the organization, and designates the judge’s judicial title only if other persons whose names appear on the letterhead have comparable designations. In addition, a judge must also make reasonable efforts to ensure that the judge’s staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge’s direction and control do not solicit funds on the judge’s behalf for any purpose, charitable or otherwise.

D. Financial Activities

(1) A judge shall not engage in financial and business dealings that
(a) may reasonably be perceived to exploit the judge's judicial position,
or
(b) involve the judge in frequent transactions or continuing business relationships with lawyers or other persons likely to appear before the court on which the judge serves.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY
The Time for Compliance provision of this Code (Canon 6F) postpones the time for compliance with certain provisions of this Canon in some cases.

A judge must avoid financial and business dealings that involve the judge in frequent transactions or continuing business relationships with persons likely to appear either before the judge personally or before other judges on the judge’s court. A judge shall discourage members of the judge's family* from engaging in
dealings that would reasonably appear to exploit the judge's judicial position or
that involve family members in frequent transactions or continuing business
relationships with persons likely to appear before the judge. This rule is necessary
to avoid creating an appearance of exploitation of office or favoritism and to
minimize the potential for disqualification.

Participation by a judge in financial and business dealings is subject to the
general prohibitions in Canon 4A against activities that tend to reflect adversely on
impartiality, demean the judicial office, or interfere with the proper performance of
judicial duties. Such participation is also subject to the general prohibition in
Canon 2 against activities involving impropriety or the appearance of impropriety
and the prohibition in Canon 2B against the misuse of the prestige of judicial office.

In addition, a judge must maintain high standards of conduct in all of the
judge’s activities, as set forth in Canon 1.

(2) A judge may, subject to the requirements of this Code, hold and
manage investments of the judge and members of the judge's family,* including
real estate, and engage in other remunerative activities. A judge shall not
participate in, nor permit the judge's name to be used in connection with, any
business venture or commercial advertising that indicates the judge's title or
affiliation with the judiciary or otherwise lend the power or prestige of his or
her office to promote a business or any commercial venture.

(3) A judge shall not serve as an officer, director, manager, or employee
of a business affected with a public interest, including, without limitation, a
financial institution, insurance company, or public utility.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY

Although participation by a judge in business activities might otherwise be
permitted by Canon 4D, a judge may be prohibited from participation by other
provisions of this Code when, for example, the business entity frequently appears
before the judge's court or the participation requires significant time away from
judicial duties. Similarly, a judge must avoid participating in any business activity
if the judge’s participation would involve misuse of the prestige of judicial office.
See Canon 2B.

(4) A judge shall manage personal investments and financial activities so
as to minimize the necessity for disqualification. As soon as reasonably possible,
a judge shall divest himself or herself of investments and other financial
interests that would require frequent disqualification.
(5) Under no circumstance shall a judge accept a gift, bequest, or favor if the donor is a party whose interests have come or are reasonably likely to come before the judge. A judge shall discourage members of the judge’s family residing in the judge’s household* from accepting similar benefits from parties who have come or are reasonably likely to come before the judge.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY

In addition to the prohibitions set forth in Canon 4D(5) regarding gifts, other laws may be applicable to judges, including, for example, Code of Civil Procedure section 170.9 and the Political Reform Act of 1974 (Gov. Code, § 81000 et seq.).

Canon 4D(5) does not apply to contributions to a judge’s campaign for judicial office, a matter governed by Canon 5.

Because a gift, bequest, or favor to a member of the judge’s family residing in the judge’s household* might be viewed as intended to influence the judge, a judge must inform those family members of the relevant ethical constraints upon the judge in this regard and discourage those family members from violating them. A judge cannot, however, reasonably be expected to know or control all of the financial or business activities of all family members residing in the judge's household.*

The application of Canon 4D(5) requires recognition that a judge cannot reasonably be expected to anticipate all persons or interests that may come before the court.

(6) A judge shall not accept and shall discourage members of the judge’s family residing in the judge’s household* from accepting a gift, bequest, favor, or loan from anyone except as hereinafter provided:

(a) any gift incidental to a public testimonial, books, tapes, and other resource materials supplied by publishers on a complimentary basis for official use, or an invitation to the judge and the judge’s spouse or guest to attend a bar-related function or an activity devoted to the improvement of the law,* the legal system, or the administration of justice;

(b) advances or reimbursement for the reasonable cost of travel, transportation, lodging, and subsistence which is directly related to participation in any judicial, educational, civic, or governmental program or bar-related function or activity, devoted to the improvement of the law,* the legal system, or the administration of justice;
Acceptance of an invitation to a law-related function is governed by Canon 2D(6)(a); acceptance of an invitation paid for by an individual lawyer or group of lawyers is governed by Canon 4D(6)(d).

(c) a gift, award, or benefit incident to the business, profession, or other separate activity of a spouse or other member of the judge’s family residing in the judge’s household,* including gifts, awards, and benefits for the use of both the spouse or other family member and the judge, provided the gift, award, or benefit could not reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the judge in the performance of judicial duties;

(d) ordinary social hospitality;

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY
Although Canon 4D(6)(d) does not preclude ordinary social hospitality between members of the bench and bar, a judge should carefully weigh acceptance of such hospitality to avoid any appearance of bias. See Canon 2B.

(e) a gift for a special occasion from a relative or friend, if the gift is fairly commensurate with the occasion and the relationship;

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY
A gift to a judge, or to a member of the judge’s family residing in the judge’s household,* that is excessive in value raises questions about the judge’s impartiality and the integrity of the judicial office and might require disqualification of the judge where disqualification would not otherwise be required. See, however, Canon 4D(6)(f).

(f) a gift, bequest, favor, or loan from a relative or close personal friend whose appearance or interest in a case would in any event require disqualification under Canon 3E;

(g) a loan in the regular course of business on the same terms generally available to persons who are not judges;

(h) a scholarship or fellowship awarded on the same terms and based on the same criteria applied to other applicants.

E. Fiduciary Activities

(1) A judge shall not serve as executor, administrator, or other personal representative, trustee, guardian, attorney in fact, or other fiduciary,* except...
for the estate, trust, or person of a member of the judge's family,* and then only if such service will not interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties.

(2) A judge shall not serve as a fiduciary* if it is likely that the judge as a fiduciary* will be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge, or if the estate, trust, or minor or conservatee becomes engaged in contested proceedings in the court on which the judge serves or one under its appellate jurisdiction.

(3) The same restrictions on financial activities that apply to a judge personally also apply to the judge while acting in a fiduciary* capacity.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY

The Time for Compliance provision of this Code (Canon 6F) postpones the time for compliance with certain provisions of this Canon in some cases.

The restrictions imposed by this Canon may conflict with the judge's obligation as a fiduciary.* For example, a judge shall resign as trustee if detriment to the trust would result from divestiture of trust holdings the retention of which would place the judge in violation of Canon 4D(4).

F. Service as Arbitrator or Mediator

A judge shall not act as an arbitrator or mediator or otherwise perform judicial functions in a private capacity unless expressly authorized by law.*

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY

Canon 4F does not prohibit a judge from participating in arbitration, mediation, or settlement conferences performed as part of his or her judicial duties.

G. Practice of Law

A judge shall not practice law.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY

This prohibition refers to the practice of law in a representative capacity and not in a pro se capacity. A judge may act for himself or herself in all legal matters, including matters involving litigation and matters involving appearances before or other dealings with legislative and other governmental bodies. However, in so doing, a judge must not abuse the prestige of office to advance the interests of the judge or member of the judge's family.* See Canon 2B.

H. Compensation and Reimbursement
A judge may receive compensation and reimbursement of expenses as
provided by law* for the extrajudicial activities permitted by this Code, if the
source of such payments does not give the appearance of influencing the judge's
performance of judicial duties or otherwise give the appearance of impropriety.

(1) Compensation shall not exceed a reasonable amount nor shall it
exceed what a person who is not a judge would receive for the same activity.

(2) Expense reimbursement shall be limited to the actual cost of travel,
food, lodging, and other costs reasonably incurred by the judge and, where
appropriate to the occasion, by the judge's spouse or guest. Any payment in
excess of such an amount is compensation.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY

Judges should be aware of the statutory limitations on accepting gifts,
including honoraria.
A. Political Organizations

Judges and candidates* for judicial office shall not

(1) act as leaders or hold any office in a political organization;*

(2) make speeches for a political organization* or candidate* for nonjudicial office or publicly endorse or publicly oppose a candidate for nonjudicial office; or

(3) personally solicit funds for a political organization* or nonjudicial candidate;* or make contributions to a political party or political organization* or to a nonjudicial candidate in excess of five hundred dollars in any calendar year per political party or political organization* or candidate,* or in excess of an aggregate of one thousand dollars in any calendar year for all political parties or political organizations* or nonjudicial candidates.*

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY

The term "political activity" should not be construed so narrowly as to prevent private comment.

This provision does not prohibit a judge from signing a petition to qualify a measure for the ballot without the use of the judge’s official title.

In judicial elections, judges are neither required to shield themselves from campaign contributions nor are they prohibited from soliciting contributions from anyone including attorneys. Nevertheless, there are necessary limits on judges facing election if the appearance of impropriety is to be avoided. Although it is improper for a judge to receive a gift from an attorney subject to exceptions noted in Canon 4D(6), a judge’s campaign may receive attorney contributions.
Although attendance at political gatherings is not prohibited, any such attendance should be restricted so that it would not constitute an express public endorsement of a nonjudicial candidate* or a measure not directly affecting the administration of justice otherwise prohibited by this Canon.

Subject to the monetary limitation herein to political contributions, a judge may purchase tickets for political dinners or other similar dinner functions. Any admission price to such a political dinner or function in excess of the actual cost of the meal shall be considered a political contribution. The prohibition in Canon 5A(3) does not preclude judges from contributing to a campaign fund for distribution among judges who are candidates for reelection or retention, nor does it apply to contributions to any judge or candidate* for judicial office.

Under this Canon, a judge may publicly endorse another judicial candidate.* Such endorsements are permitted because judicial officers have a special obligation to uphold the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary and are in a unique position to know the qualifications necessary to serve as a competent judicial officer.

Although members of the judge's family* are not subject to the provisions of this Code, a judge shall not avoid compliance with this Code by making contributions through a spouse or other family member.

B. Conduct During Judicial Campaigns

A candidate* for election or appointment to judicial office shall not (1) make statements to the electorate or the appointing authority that commit or appear to commit the candidate* with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that could come before the courts, or (2) knowingly misrepresent the identity, qualifications, present position, or any other fact concerning the candidate* or his or her opponent.

C. Speaking at Political Gatherings

Candidates* for judicial office may speak to political gatherings only on their own behalf or on behalf of another candidate for judicial office.

D. Measures to Improve the Law

Except as otherwise permitted in this Code, judges shall not engage in any political activity, other than in relation to measures concerning the improvement of the law,* the legal system, or the administration of justice.
CANON 6

COMPLIANCE WITH THE CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS

A. Judges

Anyone who is an officer of the state judicial system and who performs
judicial functions, including, but not limited to, a magistrate, court
commissioner, referee, court-appointed arbitrator, judge of the State Bar
Court, temporary judge,* or special master, is a judge within the meaning of
this Code. All judges shall comply with this Code except as provided below.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY
For the purposes of this Canon, if a retired judge is serving in the assigned
djudges program, the judge is considered to "perform judicial functions." Because
retired judges who are privately retained may perform judicial functions, their
conduct while performing those functions should be guided by this Code.

B. Retired Judge Serving in the Assigned Judges Program

A retired judge who has filed an application to serve on assignment,
meets the eligibility requirements set by the Chief Justice for service, and has
received an acknowledgment of participation in the assigned judges program
shall comply with all provisions of this Code, except for the following:

4C(2)  Appointment to governmental positions
4D(2)  Participation in business entities and managing
        investments
4E  Fiduciary* activities

C. Retired Judge as Arbitrator or Mediator

A retired judge serving in the assigned judges program is not required to
comply with Canon 4F of this Code relating to serving as an arbitrator or
mediator, or performing judicial functions in a private capacity, except as
otherwise provided in the Standards and Guidelines for Judges Serving on
Assignment promulgated by the Chief Justice.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY
In California, article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution provides
that a "retired judge who consents may be assigned to any court" by the Chief
Justice. Retired judges who are serving in the assigned judges program pursuant to
the above provision are bound by Canon 6B, including the requirement of Canon
4G barring the practice of law. Other provisions of California law, and standards and guidelines for eligibility and service set by the Chief Justice, further define the limitations on who may serve on assignment.

D. Temporary Judge*, Referee, or Court-appointed Arbitrator

A temporary judge, a person serving as a referee pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 638 or 639, or a court-appointed arbitrator shall comply only with the following Code provisions:

(1) A temporary judge, referee or court-appointed arbitrator shall comply with Canons 1 [integrity and independence of the judiciary], 2A [promoting public confidence], 3B(3) [order and decorum] and (4) [patient, dignified, and courteous treatment], 3B(6) [require lawyers to refrain from manifestations of any form of bias or prejudice], 3D(1) [action regarding misconduct by another judge] and (2) [action regarding misconduct by a lawyer], when the temporary judge, referee or court-appointed arbitrator is actually presiding in a proceeding or communicating with the parties, counsel, or court personnel while serving in the capacity of a temporary judge, referee or court-appointed arbitrator in the case.

(2) A temporary judge, referee or court-appointed arbitrator shall, from the time of notice and acceptance of appointment until termination of the appointment:

(a) Comply with Canons 2B(1) [not allow family or other relationships to influence judicial conduct], 3B(1) [hear and decide all matters unless disqualified] and (2) [be faithful to and maintain competence in the law], 3B(5) [perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice], 3B(7) [accord full right to be heard to those entitled; avoid ex parte communications, except as specified] and (8) [dispose of matters fairly and promptly], 3C(1)[discharge administrative responsibilities without bias and with competence and cooperatively], (2) [require staff and personnel to observe standards of conduct and refrain from bias and prejudice]and (4) [make only fair, necessary, and appropriate appointments];

(b) Not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance his, her, or another person’s pecuniary or personal interests and not use his or her judicial title in any written communication intended to advance his, her, or another person’s pecuniary or personal interests, except to show his, her, or another person’s qualifications;

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1 Reference should be made to relevant commentary to analogous or individual Canons cited or described in this Canon and appearing elsewhere in this Code.
(c) Not personally solicit memberships or donations for religious, fraternal, educational, civic, or charitable organizations from the parties and lawyers appearing before the temporary judge, referee, or court-appointed arbitrator;

(d) Under no circumstance accept a gift, bequest, or favor if the donor is a party, person, or entity whose interests are reasonably likely to come before the temporary judge, referee, or court-appointed arbitrator. A temporary judge, referee, or court-appointed arbitrator shall discourage members of the judge’s family residing in the judge’s household from accepting benefits from parties who are reasonably likely to come before the temporary judge, referee, or court-appointed arbitrator.

(e) Disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which disqualification is required by law;

(f) In all proceedings, disclose in writing or on the record information as required by law, or information that the temporary judge, referee or court-appointed arbitrator believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the question of disqualification, even where it is believed that there is no actual basis for disqualification; and

(g) In all proceedings, disclose in writing or on the record membership in any organization that practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, or sexual orientation, except for membership in a religious or an official military organization of the United States and membership in a nonprofit youth organization so long as membership does not violate Canon 4A [conduct of extrajudicial activities].

(3) A temporary judge, referee, or court-appointed arbitrator, from the time of notice and acceptance of appointment until the case is no longer pending in any court, shall not make any public comment about a pending or impending proceeding in which the temporary judge, referee, or court-appointed arbitrator has been engaged, and shall not make any nonpublic comment that might substantially interfere with such proceeding. The temporary judge, referee or court-appointed arbitrator shall require similar abstention on the part of court personnel subject to his or her control. This Canon does not prohibit the following:

(a) Statements made in the course of the official duties of the temporary judge, referee or court-appointed arbitrator; and

(b) Explanations for public information about the procedures of the court.
(4) From the time of appointment and continuing for two years after the case is no longer pending in any court, a temporary judge, referee or court-appointed arbitrator shall under no circumstances accept a gift, bequest, or favor from a party, person, or entity whose interests have come before the temporary judge, referee or court-appointed arbitrator in the matter. The temporary judge, referee or court-appointed arbitrator shall discourage family members residing in the household of the temporary judge, referee or court-appointed arbitrator from accepting any benefits from such parties, persons or entities during the time period stated in this subdivision. The demand for or receipt by a temporary judge, referee or court appointed arbitrator of a fee for his or her services rendered or to be rendered shall not be a violation of this Canon.

(5) A temporary judge, referee or court-appointed arbitrator shall, from time of notice and acceptance of appointment and continuing indefinitely after the termination of the appointment:

(a) Comply with Canons 3(B)(11) [no disclosure of nonpublic information acquired in a judicial capacity] (except as required by law);

(b) Not commend or criticize jurors sitting in a proceeding before the temporary judge, referee or court-appointed arbitrator for their verdict other than in a court order or opinion in such proceeding, but may express appreciation to jurors for their service to the judicial system and the community.

(6) A temporary judge, referee or court-appointed arbitrator shall comply with Canon 6D(2) until the appointment has been terminated formally or until there is no reasonable probability that the temporary judge, referee or court-appointed arbitrator will further participate in the matter. A rebuttable presumption that the appointment has been formally terminated shall arise if, within one year from the appointment or from the date of the last hearing scheduled in the matter, which ever is later, neither the appointing court nor counsel for any party in the matter has informed the temporary judge, referee or court appointed arbitrator that the appointment remains in effect.

(7) A lawyer who has been a temporary judge, referee, or court-appointed arbitrator in a matter shall not accept any representation relating to the matter without the informed written consent of all parties.

(8) When by reason of serving as a temporary judge, referee, or court-appointed arbitrator in a matter, he or she has received confidential information from a party, the person shall not, without the informed written consent of the party, accept employment in another matter in which the confidential information is material.
Canon 6

(Canon 6D amended effective March 4, 1999.)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY

Any exceptions to the Canons do not excuse a judicial officer's separate statutory duty to disclose information that may result in the judicial officer's recusal or disqualification.

E. Judicial Candidate

A candidate* for judicial office shall comply with the provisions of Canon 5.

F. Time for Compliance

A person to whom this Code becomes applicable shall comply immediately with all provisions of this Code except Canons 4D(2) and 4F and shall comply with these Canons as soon as reasonably possible and shall do so in any event within a period of one year.

Canon 6D amended effective March 4, 1999; previously amended effective April 15, 1996; adopted effective January 15, 1996.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY

If serving as a fiduciary* when selected as a judge, a new judge may, notwithstanding the prohibitions in Canon 4F, continue to serve as fiduciary* but only for that period of time necessary to avoid adverse consequences to the beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship and in no event longer than one year. Similarly, if engaged at the time of judicial selection in a business activity, a new judge may, notwithstanding the prohibitions in Canon 4D(2), continue in that activity for a reasonable period but in no event longer than one year.
APPENDIX 3.

Complaint Form
Complaint About a Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge
(Labor Code §123.6 and Title 8, Cal. Code Regs. §9722.1)

Date: _________________________________

Your name: ____________________________    Your telephone number: _______________________________

Your address: ______________________________________________________________________________

Your attorney’s name (if any): __________________________________________________________________

Your attorney’s telephone number: ______________________________________________________________

Judge’s name: _______________________________________________________________________________

Name of your case and WCAB case number: ______________________________________________________

In the space below, please specify exactly what action or behavior of the judge you believe is an ethical violation. Please provide relevant dates and the names of others present. Use additional sheets if needed.

___________________________________________________________________________________________

___________________________________________________________________________________________

___________________________________________________________________________________________

___________________________________________________________________________________________

It may be a felony to make or cause to be made any knowingly false or fraudulent material statements in support of, or in opposition to, any claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Your signature below indicates that you have read and understood the above statement.

Date: _____________________          Signature: ___________________________________________________

Return to: Department of Industrial Relations
Workers’ Compensation Ethics Advisory Committee
P.O. Box 420603
San Francisco, CA 94142

Note: Filing a complaint with the Ethics Advisory Committee is NOT a Petition for Reconsideration or Appeal of an Award or Order.
Judges and Judicial Ethics

All Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judges must follow the California Code of Judicial Ethics. A copy of the Code is available for inspection at any Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board office. A copy of the Code may be obtained for the cost or reproduction ($2.00) by writing to:

Division of Workers’ Compensation
455 Golden Gate Avenue, 9th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94102

Please make your $2.00 check or money order payable to “Division of Workers’ Compensation.”

The California Code of Judicial Ethics is also contained in the Workers’ Compensation Ethics Advisory Committee Annual Report as Appendix 2, which is available on the Division of Workers’ Compensation website: www.dir.ca.gov/DWC

If you have evidence that a Worker’s Compensation Administrative Law Judge has violated the Code of Judicial Ethics, you may complain either to:

The Presiding Workers’ Compensation Judge
at the Workers’ Compensation Board district office
where the judge is employed;

or to:

Workers’ Compensation Ethics Advisory Committee
Department of Industrial Relations
P.O. Box 420603
San Francisco, CA 94142

The Workers’ Compensation Ethics Advisory Committee is an independent state committee. The Committee receives and monitors complaints against Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judges. Complaints must be in writing and must allege specific conduct which violates the Code. If you wish, you may use a complaint form which is available free at every Appeals Board office.

Examples of Code violations are abusive conduct (e.g. threats, harassment, profanity), expressions of bias or prejudice, accepting a payment or gift from a litigant, intoxication, etc.

A ruling by a judge – no matter how wrong that ruling is – is not by itself an ethical violation. If you think the Judge made a wrong decision in your case, you should consult with a lawyer or an Information & Assistance Officer. You may have the right to file a petition for reconsideration or to seek some other legal remedy to correct the wrong ruling.

Note: Filing a complaint with the Ethics Advisory Committee is NOT a Petition for Reconsideration or Appeal of an Award or Order.
If you have a complaint against

An Attorney

Complaints against attorneys -- either your own or your opponent's -- may be addressed to:

The State Bar of California
180 Howard Street
San Francisco, CA  94105
415-538-2000

An Insurance Company

Department of Insurance or Audit Unit

Department of Insurance
Claims Service
300 So. Spring Street
Los Angeles, CA  90013
(800) 927-4357
(213) 987-8921

Division of Workers' Compensation
Audit Unit
2424 Arden Way, Suite 305
Sacramento, CA  95825
(916) 263-2710

A Physician

Medical Board of California or Medical Director, Division of Workers’ Compensation

Department of Consumer Affairs
Medical Board of California
1426 Howe Avenue
Sacramento, CA  95825
(800) 633-2322
(Toll Free Complaint Line)

If your complaint concerns a Qualified Medical Evaluator (QME):

Medical Director, Division of Workers’ Compensation
P. O. Box 420603
San Francisco, CA  94142
(415) 703-4600
EUREKA
100 “H” Street, Suite 202
Eureka, CA 95501-0421

ROBERT KUTZ, Presiding Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge

FRESNO
2550 Mariposa Street, Suite 4078
Fresno, CA 93721-2280

ABEL SHAPIRO, Presiding Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge

GOLETA
6755 Hollister Avenue, Suite 100
Goleta, CA 93117-3018

ROBERT EBENSTEIN, Acting Presiding Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge

GROVER BEACH
1562 Grand Avenue
Grover Beach, CA 93433-2261

MICHAEL LECOVER, Acting Presiding Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge

LONG BEACH
300 Oceangate Street, Suite 200
Long Beach, CA 90802-4339

JOSEPH REBECK, Presiding Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge

LOS ANGELES
320 West 4th Street, 9th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90013-1105

DAVID MARCUS, Presiding Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge

OAKLAND
1515 Clay Street, 6th Floor
Oakland, CA 94612-1401

CHRISTOPHER E. HAMILTON, Presiding Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge

OXNARD
2220 East Gonzales Road, Suite 100
Oxnard, CA 93036-8293

DAVID BROTMAN, Presiding Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge

POMONA
435 W. Mission Blvd., Suite 100
Pomona, CA 91766-1601

ROBERT WELCH, Presiding Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge

REDDING
2115 Civic Center Drive
Redding, CA 96001-2796

MICHAEL HURLEY, Presiding Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge

RIVERSIDE
3737 Main Street, Suite 300
Riverside, CA 92501-3337

ELENA JACKSON, Presiding Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge

SACRAMENTO
2424 Arden Way, Suite 230
Sacramento, CA 95825-2403

JOEL HARTER, Presiding Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge Acting Associate Chief Judge, Northern Region
SALINAS
1880 North Main Street, Suite 100
Salinas, CA 93906-2016
THOMAS CLARKE, Acting Presiding Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge

SAN BERNARDINO
464 West 4th Street, Suite 239
San Bernardino, CA 92401-1411
CHARLES REGNELL, Presiding Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge

SAN DIEGO
7575 Metropolitan Road, Suite 202
San Diego, CA 92108-4402
KEITH DIETTERLE, Presiding Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge

SAN FRANCISCO
455 Golden Gate Avenue, 2nd Floor
San Francisco, CA 94102-3660
Mailing Address:
P. O. Box 429003
San Francisco, CA 94142-9003
SUSAN HAMILTON, Presiding Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge

SAN JOSE
100 Paseo de San Antonio, Room 241
San Jose, CA 95113-1482
OLIVER BOYER, Presiding Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge

SANTA ANA
28 Civic Center Plaza, Room 451
Santa Ana, CA 92701-4070
BILL WHITELEY, Presiding Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge

SANTA MONICA
2701 Ocean Park Boulevard, Suite 220
Santa Monica, CA 90405-5212
ROBERT HJELLE, Presiding Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge

SAN ANTONIO
50 “D” Street, Suite 420
Santa Rosa, CA 95404-4760
JIM JOHNSON, Presiding Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge

SAN FRANCISCO
455 Golden Gate Avenue, 2nd Floor
San Francisco, CA 94102-3660
Mailing Address:
P. O. Box 429003
San Francisco, CA 94142-9003
SUSAN HAMILTON, Presiding Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge

STOCKTON
31 East Channel Street, Room 344
Stockton, CA 95202-2393
BERTRAM COHEN, Presiding Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge

VAN NUYS
6150 Van Nuys Boulevard, Suite 110
Van Nuys, CA 91401-3373
MARK KAHN, Associate Chief Judge
Southern Region
LINDA MORGAN and SAM SOSNA, Presiding Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge