1 2 3 4	STATE OF CALIFORNIA Department of Industrial Relations Division of Labor Standards Enforcement BY: EDNA GARCIA EARLEY, State Bar No. 195661 320 W. 4th Street, Suite 430 Los Angeles, California 90013 Tel.: (213) 897-1511 Fax: (213) 897-2877						
5	Attorney for the Labor Commissioner						
7							
8							
9	BEFORE THE LABOR COMMISSIONER						
10	OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA						
11							
12	DANIEL RODRIGUEZ and D&G ) CASE NO. TAC 49-05						
13	MUSIC,						
14	Petitioners, DETERMINATION OF CONTROVERSY						
_15_							
16	<b>}</b>						
17	PATTY ANN NICHOLS, {						
18	Respondent.						
19	The above-captioned matter a petition to determine controversy under Labor Code						
20	The above-captioned matter, a petition to determine controversy under Labor Code §1700.44, came on regularly for hearing on August 14, 2006 in Los Angeles, California,						
21	before the undersigned attorney for the Labor Commissioner assigned to hear this case.						
22	Petitioners DANIEL RODRIGUEZ and D&G MUSIC, (hereinafter, collectively referred to						
23	as "Petitioner Rodriguez"), appeared and were represented by Robert S. Besser, Esq.						
24	Respondent PATTY ANN NICHOLS, (hereinafter, referred to as "Respondent Nichols"),						
25	appeared and was represented by Michael R. Sohigian, Esq.						
26							
27	1						
28	DETERMINATION OF CONTROVERSY						

Based on the evidence presented at this hearing and on the other papers on file in this matter, the Labor Commissioner hereby adopts the following decision.

## **FINDINGS OF FACT**

Petitioner Rodriguez is a singer who began pursuing singing professionally after September 11, 2001. Petitioner D&G Music is the company through which Petitioner Rodriguez provides his performing services. Prior to September 11, 2001, Petitioner Rodriguez primarily served as a New York City Police officer. Petitioner Rodriguez testified that even as a police officer, he was known as the "singing cop." After the events of September 11, 2001, (hereinafter, referred to as "9/11"), Petitioner Rodriguez was asked to perform at various events such as CNN, the Yankees' first game post 9/11, David Letterman, and at least 150 funerals of fallen officers and fallen victims from 9/11.

Petitioner Rodriguez met Tom Scott, also an artist, in 2001at the taping of the Grammy Awards Show, which was eventually canceled when the United States bombed Afghanistan. Mr. Scott, impressed with Petitioner Rodriguez's performance of "America the Beautiful," at the taping, offered to work with Petitioner Rodriguez on recording a single-of "God Bless America," with the proceeds going to the Twin Towers fund. Soon thereafter, Petitioner Rodriguez and Mr. Scott agreed to work together again on recording a second album.

Due to the demand after 9/11 for Petitioner Rodriguez's performing services,

Petitioner Rodriguez decided to hire a personal manager and a talent agent. Mr. Scott
agreed to represent Petitioner Rodriguez as his manager and suggested to Petitioner

Rodriguez that he also hire Respondent Nichols, who had been working in the industry as a
personal manager, to be a co-manager. Petitioner Rodriguez agreed and in January 2002,
entered into an oral management agreement with Mr. Scott and Respondent Nichols. Mr.

Scott also introduced Petitioner Rodriguez to Terry Rindal of POW MIA company, who
eventually agreed to represent Petitioner Rodriguez as his talent agent.

.25

In July, 2002, Petitioner Rodriguez terminated the management agreement with Mr. Scott. Likewise, in October, 2002, Petitioner Rodriguez terminated the management agreement with Respondent Nichols.

On October 27, 2004, two years after her termination, Respondent Nichols filed an action in the Los Angeles Superior Court, (hereinafter, referred to as "superior court action"), against Petitioner Rodriguez for unpaid commissions allegedly due under the management agreement. The superior court action has been stayed pending resolution of this case.

As a defense to the superior court action and in this petition, Petitioner Rodriguez alleges that the management agreement with Respondent Nichols is void and illegal because Respondent Nichols attempted to procure employment for Petitioner Rodriguez with Jeep vehicles.

Petitioner Rodriguez testified that in July, 2002, he was booked to perform at an outdoor camp festival sponsored by Jeep. At some point during this festival, Petitioner Rodriguez and Respondent Nichols discussed doing a SWAG<sup>1</sup> with Jeep. Petitioner Rodriguez testified that he understood Respondent Nichols to be working out a deal with Jeep wherein he would sing or represent Jeep in some type of advertising capacity and be paid in part with a Jeep vehicle.

In support of this assertion, Respondent Nichols' deposition taken in the superior court action was introduced and the following was read into the record:

Mr. Besser: Well, you told me about for one of your client you got him a deal with a tape company, I believe, where he got recording tape because he was a recording engineer, so I could understand he would need a lot of recording tape. Did you do anything similar for Daniel?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>A "SWAG" was understood by the hearing officer to mean a "trade." For example, Petitioner Rodriguez would perform on behalf of Jeep and in exchange, he would be paid a Jeep, instead of cash, as he was normally paid.

1	Ms. Nichols: We were—I was looking around and had met with people about some things. There were a couple times they didn't go through.					
3	Mr. Besser: What kinds of things were you looking for, though? That's what I'm					
4	Ms. Nichols: We did a show for Jeep Liberty. Originally they were interested in him possibly working with Jeep Liberty in commercials, but after I talked them a few times, they did not—they decided not to.					
6	Mr. Besser:	Who did you talk to at Jeep Liberty?				
7	Ms. Nichols: It was a gentleman–I would have to look it up, but it was a gentleman we met at the Jeep Liberty show.					
8	Mr. Besser:	What is Jeep Liberty?				
9	Ms. Nichols:	That's the name of the Jeep, you know, Jeep Cherokee, Jeep Liberty.				
10	Mr. Besser:	I didn't know. Thank you for telling me.				
11 12	Ms. Nichols:	Oh, because that year they had a Liberty version out and it was red, white, and blue.				
13	Mr. Besser:	So Daniel had done a show for Jeep Liberty?				
14	Ms. Nichols:	Yes.				
_15_	Mr. Besser:	What kind of a show?				
16 17	Ms. Nichols:	Camp—they have a Camp Jeep where they invite everybody who owns a Jeep to come camp for the weekend and they provide entertainment and				
18	Mr. Besser:	Okay. And Daniel provided he performed?				
19	Ms. Nichols:	Yes, he performed.				
20	Mr. Besser:	And you were there?				
21	Ms. Nichols:	Yes.				
22	Mr. Besser:	And you met people from Jeep Liberty?				
23	Ms. Nichols:	Yes.				
24	Mr. Besser:	So then did you later approach somebody from Jeep Liberty and say do you want to do an endorsement deal?				
25	Ms. Nichols:	Yes.				
26	Deposition of Patty	Ann Nichols, R.T. 170:12-172:2.				
27						
28	•	4				

Respondent Nichols testified at the hearing on this petition that Jeep eventually decided not to use Petitioner Rodriguez's services for any type of commercial or endorsement deals. Moreover, Respondent Nichols testified that she pursued this opportunity for Petitioner Rodriguez at the request of and in conjunction with Petitioner Rodriguez's agent, Mr. Rindal.

Through the testimony of both parties, it was revealed that Mr. Rindal was not licensed with the State of California as a talent agent during the period that Respondent Nichols worked as Petitioner Rodriguez's manager.

## **LEGAL ANALYSIS**

Petitioner Rodriguez is an "artist" within the meaning of Labor Code §1700.4(b). At no time, has Respondent Nichols been licensed as a talent agency with the State of California.

Labor Code §1700.5 provides that "[n]o person shall engage in or carry on the occupation of a talent agency without first procuring a license...from the Labor Commissioner." The Talent Agencies Act, (hereinafter, referred to as "Act"), is a remedial statute that must be liberally construed to promote its general object, the protection of artists seeking professional employment. Buchwald v. Superior Court (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 347, 354. For that reason, the overwhelming weight of judicial authority supports the Labor Commissioner's historic enforcement policy, and holds that "even the incidental or occasional provision of [talent agency] services requires licensure." Styne v. Stevens (2001) 26 Cal.4th 42, 51. These services are defined at Labor Code §1700.4(a) to include offering to procure or promising to procure or attempting to procure or procuring employment for an artist.

"Under certain very narrow circumstances set out at Labor Code §1700.44(d), a person who is not licensed as a talent agency may engage in limited activities that would otherwise require licensure. Section 1700.44(d) provides: 'It is not unlawful for a person or corporation which is not licensed pursuant to this chapter to act in conjunction with, and at the

Massey v. Landis TAC 42-03, p.11.

In defense to the allegation of attempted procurement, Respondent Nichols argues that Petitioner Rodriguez has not met his burden in establishing that she attempted to procure "employment" for him. We disagree.

"The burden of proof is found at Evidence Code §115 which states, '[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, the burden of proof requires proof by preponderance of the evidence.' Further, McCoy v. Board of Retirement of the County of Los Angeles Employees Retirement Association (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1044 at 1051 states, 'the party asserting the affirmative at an administrative hearing has the burden of proof, including both the initial burden of going forward and the burden of persuasion by preponderance of the evidence.' (cite omitted) 'Preponderance of the evidence' standard of proof requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence."

In re Michael G. 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 642, 63 Cal.App.4th 700 [Emphasis added]; See also Robi v. Wolf, TAC No. 29-00 at pp.6-7, Behr v. Dauer, TAC No. 21-00 at pp. 8-9. We find that Petitioner Rodriguez has met his burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent Nichols attempted to procure employment for him with Jeep vehicles.

While "employment" is not defined under the Act, our state supreme court long ago defined the term as follows: "Employment implies a contract on the part of the employer to hire, and on the part of the employee to perform services." *Malloy v. Board of Education* (1894) 102 Cal.642, 646. Additionally, Section 2(D) of Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) Order 12-01, regulating the wages, hours and working conditions in the motion picture industry defines "employ" as, "...to engage, suffer, or permit to work." In her superior court action deposition, Respondent Nichols admits that she approached a Jeep Liberty official for the purpose of determining whether Jeep vehicles was interested in entering into an endorsement deal with Petitioner Rodriguez. Significantly, Petitioner Rodriguez testified that he understood the deal to include his services as a singer in

promoting Jeep in exchange for compensation which would be partly comprised of a Jeep vehicle. "Clearly, 'employment'... requires a duty of the employee to act. One cannot be an employee if there is no affirmative duty to render services." *Jewel Kilcher v. Inga Vainshtein, et al.* TAC No.02-99, p.23. Here, the implication, as well as the understanding by Petitioner Rodriguez, was that he would be employed to sing on behalf of Jeep in exchange for some type of compensation.

While Jeep decided not to go forward with such a deal, this does not negate the fact that Respondent Nichols *attempted* to seek such a deal by soliciting the Jeep official. In past decisions we have held that the act of procuring or attempting to procure work for an artist includes solicitation. See *Hall v. X Management, Inc.* TAC 19-90; *Sevano v. Artistic Productions, Inc.* 8-93.

Respondent Nichols argues that even if the solicitation to the Jeep official is considered an attempt to procure employment, Respondent Nichols did not violate the Act because she sought this opportunity for Petitioner Rodriguez "at the request of and in conjunction with" Mr. Rindal, whom she believed to be a licensed talent agent. The exemption found at Labor Code §1700.44(d) expressly requires that the act of procurement or attempted procurement be done at the "request of and in conjunction with a licensed talent agent." There is no defense under this section in a situation where a talent agent holds himself out to be licensed when he's not. It is the responsibility of the manager who intends on relying on this exemption, to verify that the talent agent he or she is working "at the request of and in conjunction with," is licensed. A list of "licensed" talent agents is readily available on the DLSE's website. In fact, Respondent Nichols testified that she eventually found out that Mr. Rindal was not licensed by looking him up on the website. However, Respondent Nichols was obligated to look up this information prior to attempting to procure the Jeep endorsement opportunity for Petitioner Rodriguez. Her failure to do so brings her

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> www.dir.ca.gov

in violation of the Act. Having found that Respondent Nichols violated the Act by acting as a talent agent without the requisite license, we must necessarily conclude that the management agreement between the parties is void ab initio, and that Respondent Nichols has no enforceable rights thereunder. **ORDER** For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY DETERMINED that the management agreement between Petitioners DANIEL RODRIGUEZ and D&G MUSIC and Respondent PATTY ANN NICHOLS is void ab initio and that Respondent PATTY ANN NICHOLS has no enforceable rights thereunder. Dated: January 29, 2007 Special Hearing Officer Adopted: Dated: January 31, 2007 Acting State Labor Commissioner