Miles E. Locker, CSB #103510 1 DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT 2 Department of Industrial Relations State of California 455 Golden Gate Avenue, 9th Floor 3 San Francisco, California 94102 Telephone: (415) 703-4863 4 (415) 703-4806 Fax: Attorney for State Labor Commissioner 5 б 7 BEFORE THE LABOR COMMISSIONER 8 STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 FANNY GAMBLE, as guardian ad litem for ) No. TAC 40-03 11 MICHELLE GAMBLE, a minor, 12 Petitioner, 13 vs. 14 DETERMINATION OF SOMA MANAGEMENT, LLC, CONTROVERSY 15 Respondent. 16 17 The above-captioned matter, a petition to determine 18 controversy under Labor Code §1700.44, came on regularly for 19 hearing on April 1, 2004, in San Francisco, California, before 20 the Labor Commissioner's undersigned hearing officer. Petitioner 21 appeared in propria persona; Kim Chew appeared on behalf of the 22 Respondent. Based on the evidence presented at this hearing and 23 on the other papers on file in this mater, the Labor Commissioner 24 hereby adopts the following decision. 25 FINDINGS OF FACT 26 SOMA MANAGEMENT, LLC (hereinafter "SOMA") has been 27 1. licensed as a talent agency by the State Labor Commissioner, 28 1 TAC 40-03 Decision

1 pursuant to Labor Code section 1700.5, at all times relevant 2 herein.

In 2002, Fanny Gamble brought her daughter, Michelle 3 2. Gamble (hereinafter "Petitioner") to SOMA's office to discuss 4 whether SOMA could obtain modeling work for Michelle. 5 Karen Walterscheid, SOMA's director, advised Ms. Gamble that in order 6 7 to get modeling work, it would be necessary to schedule a photo shoot and print composites that could be shown to potential 8 clients. Fanny Gamble informed Walterscheid that she did not 9 10 have the funds to pay for the photo shoot and prints. Ms. Gamble 11 testified that Karen Walterscheid told her that she would not 12 have to pay for the photo shoot, and that she would only need to 13 pay \$180 for the composite prints. SOMA disputes that, and asserts that Ms. Gamble was told that although SOMA would advance 14 the funds for the photo shoot, and pay part of the total needed 15 to print the composites, once Petitioner obtained modeling work 16 17 she would have to reimburse SOMA for these advanced funds. As 18 discussed below, it is unnecessary to resolve this particular 19 factual dispute, as all other relevant fact are not in dispute, and we would make the same determination that we reach below 20 without regard to whether Petitioner was told that she would have 21 to reimburse SOMA for these funds. 22

3. EC Morgan, SOMA's president and CEO, took the
photographs of Michelle Gamble that were later printed as
composites. The photo shoot took place at SOMA's studio. The
photos were printed by a separate photo printing business that is
not related to SOMA, and Fanny Gamble paid \$180 directly to this
separate business.

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Almost nine months later, in January 2003, Karen 1 4. 2 Walterscheid telephoned Fanny Gamble to inform her that SOMA obtained a modeling job for Michelle, and that it would pay 3 \$2,500 less SOMA's 20% commission. Ms. Gamble agreed to have 4 Michelle take this job, and John Gamble, Petitioner's father, 5 signed a written contract with SOMA on Petitioner's behalf, for a 6 7 term of nine days, making SOMA the Petitioner's sole and exclusive agent in the fields of modeling and entertainment. 8 The 9 contract, signed on January 15, 2003, entitles SOMA to commissions in the amount of 20% of petitioner's gross modeling 10 11 earnings during the period from January 15 to January 24, 2003. 12 The contract also provides that petitioner shall "reimburse [SOMA] for all out-of-pocket expenses which you incur from time 13 to time on [petitioner's] behalf." Finally, the contract 14 provides that "all income may be paid directly to [SOMA], and 15 [SOMA] agree[s] to promptly pay the balance of such income to 16 [petitioner] after deducting [the] commission and any out of -17pocket expenses which [SOMA] incur[s]on [petitioner's] behalf." 18 19 The form of the contract, that is, its general substantive 20 provisions, had been approved by the Labor Commissioner as part 21 of the talent agency licensing process.

5. On or about January 20, 2003, Petitioner performed print modeling services for Sonic Solutions, on the job that had been obtained by SOMA. Based on Karen Walterscheid's representation that \$2,500 would be charged for this job, Fanny Gamble expected that SOMA would deduct \$500 for their commission, and that Michelle would receive \$2,000. Sonic Solutions was billed by SOMA in the amount of \$2,500. By check dated March 4, 2003,

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Sonic Solutions paid \$2,500 to SOMA for petitioner's modeling
 services.

In April 2003, SOMA mailed a check to the petitioner for б. 3 her modeling services for Sonic Solutions. The check, dated 4 March 15, 2003, was written in the amount of \$277. It came with 5 a cover letter that explained the basis for the deductions from б 7 the amount that petitioner was expecting to receive for her The cover letter failed to state that SOMA billed 8 services. Sonic Solutions at the rate of \$2,500. Rather, according to this 9 cover letter, the rate was \$2,000, from which SOMA deducted its 10 20% commission, resulting in \$1,600 earned by the petitioner. 11 From this amount, according to the cover letter, SOMA deducted 12 \$1,323 for "advanced charges," consisting of \$750 for the photo 13 shoot, \$150 for the photo shop, \$300 for web hosting, and \$123 14 for mailing and messenger fees, leaving petitioner with the net 15 payment of \$277. 16

7. Fanny Gamble sent a letter to SOMA, dated May 14, 2003,  $17^{-1}$ demanding payment of \$1,723, the difference between the \$2,000 of 18 net modeling earnings that Michelle was supposed to have received 19 20 (based on gross earnings of \$2,500 less SOMA's 20% commission), and the amount of the check that had been sent. According to 21 this letter, and according to Ms. Gamble's testimony at this 22 hearing, Ms. Gamble did not authorize any of the deductions that 23 were made from petitioner's earnings, except for SOMA's 20% 24 25 commission. According to a letter from Karen Walterscheid to Fanny Gamble, dated May 23, 2003, SOMA "advanced all charges for 26 27 the photos, web hosting and marketing cost. . . . I made it very clear to you that if Michelle worked all charges are paid back to 28

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1 the agency first." By letter to Karen Walterscheid, dated May 2 24, 2003, Fanny Gamble disputed the existence of any agreement to 3 re-pay any of the so-called advanced charges: "You didn't mention 4 anything about me paying anything."

5 SOMA did not pay any additional money to petitioner. 8. 6 The next communication between the parties took place on July 25, 7 2003, following petitioner's unsuccessful attempt to deposit the \$277 check that SOMA had sent to petitioner more than three 8 months earlier. The check was returned to petitioner by her bank 9 without payment, due to insufficient funds in SOMA's account. 10 In 11 a letter to SOMA, John Gamble demanded payment. Shortly thereafter, SOMA issued a new, negotiable check for \$277. 12

13 Ms. Gamble filed this petition to determine controversy 9. 14 with the Labor Commissioner on November 7, 2003, seeking payment of the amounts that had been deducted by SOMA from petitioner's 15 16 gross modeling earnings (except for amounts deducted for payment 17 of\_SOMA's\_20% commission). Around the same time, Ms. Gamble also filed a small claims court complaint against SOMA, 18 19 concerning the same dispute and seeking the same remedy. There was a hearing in small claims court, and on January 21, 2004, the 20 small claims court issued a judgment in favor of SOMA, awarding 21 22 nothing to Ms. Gamble. (Gamble v. SOMA Management, LLC, Marin 23 County Small Claims Court, Case No. 0311563.) At the outset of the Labor Commissioner hearing, SOMA's representative, Kim Chew, 24 25 moved for dismissal of the petition to determine controversy on the ground that the dispute had already been heard, and resolved 26 27 in SOMA's favor, by the Marin County Superior Court.

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## LEGAL ANALYSIS

Petitioner is an "artist" within the meaning of Labor Code section 1700.4(b). SOMA is a "talent agency" within the meaning of Labor Code section 1700.4(a). This dispute, concerning the alleged failure of a talent agency to disburse funds to an artist within thirty days of receipt, constitutes a controversy within the meaning of Labor Code §1700.44(c), and thus, is properly before the Labor Commissioner. (Labor Code §1700.25(c).)

9 At the outset, we must consider whether the judgment that has been issued by the small claims court is binding so as to 10 preclude the Labor Commissioner from independently determining 11 this controversy. We have already considered this question in 12 Garcia v. Bonilla (TAC 04-02) and de Beky v. Bonilla (TAC 11-02). 13 14 We see no reason to depart from the analysis set out in those determinations, wherein we noted the Labor Commissioner has 15 exclusive primary jurisdiction to determine all controversies 16 17 arising under the Talent Agencies Act. The Act specifies that "[i]n cases of controversy arising under this chapter, the 18 parties involved shall refer the matters in dispute to the Labor 19 Commissioner, who shall hear and determine the same, subject to 20 an appeal . . . to the superior court where the same shall be 21 22 heard de novo.' (Labor Code §1700.44(a).) Courts cannot 23 encroach upon the Labor Commissioner's exclusive original 24 jurisdiction to hear matters, including defenses, arising under 25 || the Talent Agencies Act.

26 "The Commissioner has the authority to hear and determine 27 various disputes, including the validity of artists' manager-28 artist contracts and the liability of parties thereunder.

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1 ([Buchwald v. Superior Court, supra, 254 Cal.App.2d 347,] 357.)
2 The reference of disputes involving the [A]ct to the Commissioner
3 is mandatory. (Id. at p. 358.) Disputes must be heard by the
4 Commissioner, and all remedies before the Commissioner must be
5 exhausted before the parties can proceed to the superior court.
6 (Ibid.)" (REO Broadcasting Consultants v. Martin (1999) 69
7 Cal.App.4th 489, 494-495, italics in original.)

8 Therefore, the Labor Commissioner, not the court, has "the exclusive right to decide in the first instance all the legal and 9 10 factual issues" that arise in connection with a claim or defense based upon the Talent Agencies Act, Styne v. Stevens (2001) 26 11 Cal.4th 42, 56, fn. 6. There is no concurrent original 12 jurisdiction: "[T]he plain meaning of section 1700.44, 13 subdivision (a), and the relevant case law, negate any inference 14 that courts share original jurisdiction with the Commissioner in-15 controversies arising under the Act. On the contrary, the 16 Commissioner's original jurisdiction of such matters is 17 exclusive." Styne v. Stevens, supra at 58. Here, as in the two 18 Bonilla cases, the small claims court acted in excess of its 19 20 jurisdiction by hearing and deciding a matter over which the 21 Labor Commissioner has exclusive primary jurisdiction.

Here, as in the Bonilla cases, we are confronted by a final judgment that was issued by a court that lacked subject matter jurisdiction. For the same reasons that were extensively set forth in the Bonilla cases, we conclude that this small claims judgment was properly subject to collateral attack based on the small claims court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Witkin, 8 Cal. Proc. (4th), Attack on Judgment in Trial Court,

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1 §6. A judgment "void on its face" may be collaterally attacked when the defect may be shown without going outside the record or 2 3 judgment roll. Becker v. S.P.V. Const. Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 489, Alternatively, a judgment that is not void on its face may 493. be collaterally attacked through extrinsic evidence as to which 5 61 no objection was made when the evidence is offered. See Witkin, 8 Cal. Proc. (4th), Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, §13. Thus, 7 8 whether we view the small claims judgment as void on its face, or we consider the extrinsic evidence as to which no objection was 9 10 made showing that the dispute heard and decided by the small claims court was the exact same dispute as that presented to the 11 Labor Commissioner through this petition to determine 12 controversy, we are compelled to conclude that the small claims 13 14 court judgment was void, as it was issued by a court that lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and that this void judgment is 15 subject to collateral attack raised by this proceeding before 16 Labor Commissioner. 17

18 Having found that this proceeding to determine controversy under the Talent Agencies Act is not barred by the judgment on 19 || 20 II the small claims proceeding, we now turn to the merits of the dispute. Labor Code section 1700.40(a) provides, in relevant 21 part: "No talent agency shall collect a registration fee." 22 The term "registration fee" is defined for purposes of the Talent 23 Agencies Act at Labor Code section 1700.02(b) to include, any 24 25 charge made, or attempted to be made, to an artist for 26 || registering or listing an applicant for employment in the entertainment industry, letter writing, photographs, film strips, 27 28 video tapes, or other reproductions of the applicant, or any

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1 activity of a like nature. The amounts that SOMA charged 2 petitioner for the photo shoot (\$750), the photo shop (\$150), web 3 hosting (\$300), and mailing and messenger fees (\$123), all fall 4 within this definition of "registration fees," and thus, are all 5 prohibited by Labor Code section 1700.40(a).

6 Thus, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that SOMA had 7 informed petitioner of these fees and petitioner had agreed to 8 them, any such agreement would be unenforceable and void as 9 contrary to the express provisions of the Talent Agencies Act<sup>1</sup>.

10 SOMA misplaces its reliance on language in its Labor 11 Commissioner approved talent agency agreement that requires an 12 artist to "reimburse [SOMA] for all out-of-pocket expenses" incurred on the artist's behalf, and which allows SOMA to retain, 13 from income received from a client on behalf of an artist, "any 14 15 out-of-pocket expenses" which SOMA incurred on the artist's behalf. Under the Labor Code, there are certain types of 16 17 expenses, that fall under the category of "registration fees," which an agency can never collect or attempt to collect from an 18 19 artist. SOMA's talent agency agreement must therefore be read to allow SOMA to collect all out-of-pocket expenses incurred on the 20

<sup>1</sup>The statute goes beyond prohibiting the collection of any "registration fee." Labor Code §1700.40(b) makes it unlawful for 23 a talent agency to refer an artist to any person, firm or corporation in which the talent agency had a direct or indirect 24 financial interest for other services to be rendered to the artist, including photography, audition tapes, demonstration 25 reels or similar materials, business management, personal 26 management, coaching, acting classes, casting or talent brochures, agency-client directories, or other printing. Labor 27 Code §1700.40(c) prohibits a talent agency from collecting referral fees from any person, firm or corporation providing any 28 of these sorts of services to an artist under contract with the talent agency.

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1 artist's behalf except for those as to which it is unlawful, 2 under the Labor Code, for an agency to collect or attempt to 3 collect from an artist. In other words, the talent agency 4 agreement cannot be construed to override the statutory 5 prohibition against collecting any "registration fee."

6 We therefore conclude that petitioner is entitled to payment 7 of the \$1,723, the amount that SOMA has unlawfully retained from 8 the \$2,500 that it received from Sonic Solutions. SOMA was 9 entitled to retain no more than its 20% commission, leaving 10 petitioner with net earnings of \$2,000. Crediting SOMA with its 11 belated payment of \$277, the amount of \$1,723 remains due and 12 owing to the petitioner.

Labor Code section 1700.25 provides that a licensed talent 13 agency that receives any payment of funds on behalf of an artist 14 shall-immediately deposit that amount in a trust fund account 15 maintained by him or her in a bank, and shall disburse those 16 funds, less the agent's commission, to the artist within 30 days 17 after receipt. Section 1700.25 further provides that if, in a 18 hearing before the Labor Commissioner on a petition to determine 19 controversy, the Commissioner finds that the talent agency 20 willfully failed to disburse these amounts within the required 21 time, the Commissioner may award interest on the wrongfully 22 withheld funds at the rate of 10% per annum, and reasonable 23 24 attorney's fees (if the artist is represented by an attorney).

The term "willful" means that a person has a legal duty to perform an act and intentionally fails to perform that act; evidence of bad faith or intent to defraud is not a prerequisite, and ignorance of the legal duty is not a defense. Hale v. Morgan

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(1978) 22 Cal.3d 388, Davis v. Morris (1940) 37 Cal.App.2d 269. 1 2 Under this standard, we conclude that SOMA's failure to pay petitioner the full \$2,000 owed (consisting of petitioner's gross 3 earnings of \$2,500 less the allowable 20% commission) by April 3, 4 2003 (that is, within thirty days of Sonic Solutions' payment of 5 \$2,500 to SOMA on March 4, 2003) was "willful" within the meaning 6 7 of Labor Code section 1700.25, and that petitioner is therefore entitled to interest at the rate of 10% per annum on the 8 unlawfully retained amounts from the date payment was due. 9 10 ORDER For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 11 Respondent SOMA MANAGEMENT, LLC, shall pay petitioner FANNY 12 GAMBLE, as guardian ad litem for MICHELLE GAMBLE, a minor, a 13 total of \$ 1,897.66, consisting of the following: 14 1. \$-1,723.00 for unlawfully withheld earnings; 15 \$ 174.66 for interest on the unlawfully withheld 16 2. earnings, as of the date of this decision, with interest accruing 17 at the rate of 47 cents per day until paid. 18 19 Dated: 4/8/04 20 21 E. Attorney for the Labor Commissioner 22 23 ADOPTED AS THE DETERMINATION OF THE LABOR COMMISSIONER: 24 25 26 Dated: GREGÕR RUPP Ь. Acting Deputy Chief Labor Commissioner 27 28 TAC 40-03 Decision