

**WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

VIRGINIA MARIN, *Applicant*

vs.

**VINAS DEL MAR, LLC dba FRIDA'S MEXICAN GRILL;
PROCENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY, administered by
ILLINOIS MIDWEST INSURANCE AGENCY, LLC, *Defendants***

**Adjudication Number: ADJ20949280
Santa Rosa District Office**

**OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING PETITION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
AND DECISION AFTER
RECONSIDERATION**

Applicant¹ seeks reconsideration of the Findings and Order (F&O) issued by the workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) on April 10, 2026, wherein the WCJ found that applicant did not sustain injury arising out of and in the course of employment to her head and nervous system (stress and psyche)² while employed during the period of November 15, 2010 through May 9, 2025 as a waitress for defendant, and that defendant established all elements of the good faith personnel action pursuant to Labor Code section 3208.3(h).

Applicant filed a timely, verified Petition for Reconsideration without crossing out any of the statutory grounds under Labor Code section 5903 listed on the form, and adding a handwritten explanation in Spanish to the effect that applicant has found new evidence and witnesses that were not present or available at the time of hearing. The handwritten notation also alleges that someone has been harassing her and trying to make her quit.³

¹ The record reflects that applicant is represented, but the Petition is filed by applicant.

² The parties and the WCJ are reminded that stress is not a properly pled body part; it is a cause of injury. Moreover, there is no evidence that applicant was claiming physical injuries to her head or nervous system.

³ Subsequently, on May 8, 2026, an English translation was filed by the WCJ, which was erroneously titled as a petition for reconsideration.

We received a timely, verified Answer from defendant.

We received a supplemental pleading from applicant that alleges retaliatory conduct and bad faith discovery, which we accept for filing. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10964.) We note however, that we do not consider the merits of the allegations in the supplemental pleading, because as discussed below, we are returning the matter to the WCJ.

The WCJ prepared a Report and Recommendation on Petition for Reconsideration (Report) dated May 11, 2026, recommending that we deny reconsideration.

We have considered the allegations of the Petition for Reconsideration and the Answer, and the contents of the Report. Based on our review of the record, and for the reasons discussed below, we will grant reconsideration, rescind the F&O, and return this matter to the trial level for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

FACTS

Applicant worked as a waitress for defendant from November 15, 2010 through May 9, 2025, during which time she claims to have sustained injury arising out of and in the course of employment to her head and nervous system, which is parenthetically specified to mean “stress and psych[e].”

Over the course of three days of trial proceedings, the WCJ heard testimony from seven witnesses and admitted sixteen exhibits into evidence. Of the exhibits in evidence, only two are medical reports: an October 9, 2025 evaluation report and a December 1, 2025 supplemental report from Panel Qualified Medical Evaluator (PQME) Ann E. Allen, M.D., a psychiatrist. At the conclusion of the second day of trial, the parties agreed to submit issues for decision including whether applicant sustained injury arising out of and in the course of employment, whether she sustained a compensable psychiatric injury under Labor Code⁴ section 3208.3, and whether actual events of employment were the predominate cause of injury and whether defendant met its burden for a good faith personnel action defense pursuant to section 3208.3(h). (Minutes of Hearing and Summary of Evidence dated February 11, 2026, page 3, lines 3-21; Minutes of Hearing and Summary of Evidence dated March 18, 2026, page 1, line 43.)

Dr. Allen evaluated applicant on October 9, 2025. (Joint Exhibit J1.) Dr. Allen provided a history of applicant’s claimed injury in the form of psyche as follows:

⁴ Any further section references are to the California Labor Code unless otherwise noted.

Virginia Marin began working for Frida's Mexican Grill in November of 2010. She works full-time as a Waitress. Depending on the day, she works with another coworker. On weekends, the team includes another waitress, a busboy, a bartender, and the manager.

As Ms. Marin described it, problems at her job- began 12 years ago, when the manager, Carlos, accused her of stealing. The owner, his brother, Arturo, found out that he was the one stealing, and this ended up in his termination. He would drink alcohol and consume drugs during his work hours. The brother went through a rehabilitation program for drugs, and Carlos returned to the restaurant after five years.

When Arturo rehired Carlos, he made a condition that he would no longer bother Ms. Marin. Then Carlos was all right for a few years. However, after the pandemic, the restaurant was short-staffed, and Carlos began working again as the manager. This occurred in 2020. As time went on, Carlos was frequently telling her that she was not doing her job tasks correctly. He would criticize her hair and say that it was not sufficiently tied back. He did not hold the other waitresses to the same standards. He would also hold her to a different standard pertaining to using her cell phone at work.

Another waitress, Elsa, a friend of Carlos, started to bother Ms. Marin. Elsa would claim that Ms. Marin was taking her tables, and Carlos would defend her accusation. He would raise his voice at her and say that he was tired of her. Then he would go to her brother, and Carlos would say he was tired of working with Elsa and Ms. Marin because they were always arguing. In actuality, it was Elsa who was causing the problems.

On September 12, 2024, Ms. Marin asked to speak to Carlos after she finished her shift. She let him know that she did not agree with the way that he spoke to her. She told him that he was always defending Elsa when she was the one at fault. She objected to him sending her home early, despite the fact that she had more seniority than the other waitresses. Carlos said that the other employees and the waitress complained about her and did not want to work with Ms. Marin. He told her that she would do as she pleased and acted like she was the owner of the restaurant. The other workers complained that she would give them orders as if she were the manager.

The next day, Carlos gave his version of the situation to his brother, Arturo. Elsa and Ms. Marin both received a warning. The warning was for events on the date of September 13, 2024, and she met with two other managers to discuss what had occurred along with Elsa. They said that Carlos was tired of the situation. They were both given warnings during the meeting.

Ms. Marin filed her workers' compensation claim in May of 2025. She had gotten to her limit and could not take the situation any longer. The anxiety began after she received the warning. Also, Carlos was more critical of her after she received the warning. She felt depressed. She had problems with her sleep and lost her appetite.

As far as treatment, Ms. Marin sought treatment through Kaiser in May of 2025. She was referred to the Behavioral Health Department. She had telephonic sessions and participated in weekly sessions for two months. She found the intervention helpful, and learned different techniques, such as meditation and other ways to relax when she felt anxious. She focused on how to prepare mentally when she was going to work and to do breathing exercises. She was not prescribed any psychotropic medications.

At this juncture, she continues to work with the manager, Carlos. Arturo said that he is not going to fire his brother, but offered that he would help him. She wants to leave her employment but is unable to find another job, and perhaps will leave next year.

(Joint Exhibit J1, Report of Dr. Allen dated October 9, 2025, pages 3-4.)

Dr. Allen diagnosed an Undifferentiated Anxiety Disorder. (*Id.* at page 11.) Dr. Allen's opinion and analysis of causation of injury is as follows:

It is reasonable, probable, and based on substantial evidence, if Ms. Marin's descriptions of behaviors by her manager, Carlos, are actual and true, and given the effects of the write-up incident, and with difficulties concerning a coworker, Elsa, that contributed to her stress, but acknowledging the contribution from raising an autistic son as a single parent, and all facts of the case, the work stress, CT 5/9/2025, predominated and met the 51% threshold for causation of psychiatric injury.

A Rolda analysis is as follows. She reported the onset of significant anxiety after participating in a disciplinary meeting where she was given a write-up for arguing with her coworker, Elsa, in the restaurant in front of clients. It was after that incident that her psychiatric symptoms significantly worsened, and thus, this was a substantial contributing factor, and 35% of psychiatric injury was caused by receipt of the warning on September 13, 2024.

Ms. Marin reported significant behaviors by the manager, Carlos, which caused her stress. As she described it, his criticisms are excessive, along with other behaviors, such as unequal treatment of workers. The manager's behavior was the predominant cause of her psychiatric disturbance and propelled her emotional difficulties after receipt of the disciplinary measures, and 60% causation of psychiatric injury was due to the behaviors by the manager, Carlos. 5% causation of psychiatric injury was a result of conflicts with the coworker, Elsa. The coworker changed her ways and was no longer a source of stress, but still contributed to the initiation of her anxiety problems.

Consideration was given to the credibility of Ms. Marin's history in the analysis of medical-legal issues. She appeared to be a fair historian; she was not overly dramatic or emotive, and her responses were spontaneous and natural. Results of the MMPI-3, as interpreted by Yossef Ben-Porath, Ph.D., suggested that she was accurately portraying her emotional complaints. Her history was internally consistent throughout the interview. Thus, there was sufficient reason to accept

her report of the development of a psychiatric disorder that was caused by the work events, CT 5/9/2025.

(*Id.* at pages 15-16.)

In Dr. Allen's supplemental report, she made no changes to her opinion, except to comment that applicant's history and deposition testimony do not provide any reason to request a neurological evaluation of a head injury in this case. (Joint Exhibit J2, Report of Dr. Allen dated December 1, 2025, page 2.)

After the conclusion of trial, the WCJ issued an F&O on April 10, 2026.

Applicant filed a timely, verified Petition for Reconsideration dated April 28, 2026. According to the English translation of May 8, 2026, she alleged that:

I found new evidence and witnesses for this case that were not present and available during the Hearing. There are new proceedings under affidavit, under testimony, and to testify under oath. Also, because I don't know how my case ended, because the problem is still there, the person keeps harassing me and he is treating me worse, doing everything possible to tire me out and make me quit. But they do not have a reason to fire me.

DISCUSSION

I

Prior to July 2, 2024, section 5909 provided that a petition for reconsideration was deemed denied unless the Appeals Board acted on the petition within 60 days from the date of filing. (Lab. Code, § 5909.) Effective July 2, 2024, section 5909 was amended to state in relevant part that:

- (a) A petition for reconsideration is deemed to have been denied by the appeals board unless it is acted upon within 60 days from the date a trial judge transmits a case to the appeals board.
- (b)
 - (1) When a trial judge transmits a case to the appeals board, the trial judge shall provide notice to the parties of the case and the appeals board.
 - (2) For purposes of paragraph (1), service of the accompanying report, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 5900, shall constitute providing notice.

Under section 5909(a), the Appeals Board must act on a petition for reconsideration within 60 days of transmission of the case to the Appeals Board. Transmission is reflected in Events in the Electronic Adjudication Management System (EAMS). Specifically, in Case Events, under

Event Description is the phrase “Sent to Recon” and under Additional Information is the phrase “The case is sent to the Recon board.”

Here, according to Events, the case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on May 11, 2026 and 60 days from the date of transmission is Friday, July 10, 2026. This decision is issued by or on July 10, 2026 so that we have timely acted on the petition as required by section 5909(a).

Section 5909(b)(1) requires that the parties and the Appeals Board be provided with notice of transmission of the case. Transmission of the case to the Appeals Board in EAMS provides notice to the Appeals Board. Thus, the requirement in subdivision (1) ensures that the parties are notified of the accurate date for the commencement of the 60-day period for the Appeals Board to act on a petition. Section 5909(b)(2) provides that service of the Report and Recommendation shall be notice of transmission.

Here, according to the proof of service for the Report and Recommendation by the workers’ compensation administrative law judge, the Report was served on May 11, 2026, and the case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on May 11, 2026. Service of the Report and transmission of the case to the Appeals Board occurred on the same day. Thus, we conclude that the parties were provided with the notice of transmission required by section 5909(b)(1) because service of the Report in compliance with section 5909(b)(2) provided them with actual notice as to the commencement of the 60-day period on May 11, 2026.

II

As we noted in *Pasquotto v. Hayward Lumber* (2006) 71 Cal.Comp.Cases 223 (Appeals Board en banc), a petition for reconsideration gives the Appeals Board authority to make new and different findings on any issues submitted for decision at trial, and not just on those issues that are specifically discussed in the petition:

The Labor Code provides that "all judicial powers" and original jurisdiction in workers' compensation matters are vested with the Appeals Board itself. (Lab. Code, §§ 111(a), 5300, 5301.) The WCJs conduct trials and make initial determinations pursuant to a delegation by the Appeals Board. (Lab. Code, §§ 5309, 5310; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10348.) A decision of a WCJ only becomes the decision of the Appeals Board if reconsideration is not granted. (Lab. Code, § 5900 et seq.; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10348.)

Moreover, section 5906 provides that "[u]pon the filing of a petition for reconsideration . . . the appeals board may, with or without further proceedings and with or without notice affirm, rescind, alter, or amend the order, decision, or award

made and filed by the appeals board or the workers' compensation judge . . . " (Lab. Code, § 5906.) Similarly, section 5908 provides that "[a]fter . . . a consideration of all the facts the appeals board may affirm, rescind, alter, or amend the original order, decision, or award." (Lab. Code, § 5908.)

Based on these statutes, it is settled law that a grant of reconsideration has the effect of causing "the whole subject matter [to be] reopened for further consideration and determination" (*Great Western Power Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (Savercool)* (1923) 191 Cal. 724, 729 [218 P. 1009] [10 I.A.C. 322]) and of "[throwing] the entire record open for review." (*State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Com. (George)* (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 201, 203 [270 P.2d 55] [19 Cal.Comp.Cases 98].) Thus, once reconsideration has been granted, the Appeals Board has the full power to make new and different findings on issues presented for determination at the trial level, even with respect to issues not raised in the petition for reconsideration before it. (*Ibid.*; e.g., also, *Tate v. Industrial Acc. Com.* (1953) 120 Cal.App.2d 657, 663 [261 P.2d 759] [18 Cal.Comp.Cases 246]; *Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (Sowell)* (1943) 58 Cal.App.2d 262, 266–267 [136 P.2d 633] [8 Cal.Comp.Cases 79].)

(*Pasquotto, supra*, 71 Cal.Comp.Cases at 229, fn. 7.)

Accordingly, even if the allegations were not well articulated, because applicant's Petition for Reconsideration was timely filed, we have jurisdiction to consider the record on the submitted issue of whether applicant has sustained a compensable injury that is not barred by the good faith personnel action defense under section 3208.3 and to render our own decision.

III

Section 3208.3 requires as a condition of compensation that an injured worker prove by a preponderance of the evidence that actual events of employment predominantly caused the psychological injury. (Lab. Code, § 3208.3(b)(1).) This requires the WCJ to determine whether actual events of employment occurred, and it requires a psychologist or psychiatrist to determine whether actual events of employment were a predominant cause of an injury to the psyche. (*Rolda v. Pitney Bowes, Inc.* (2001) 66 Cal.Comp.Cases 241, 245 (Appeals Board en banc).)

The phrase "predominant as to all causes" means that "the work-related cause has greater than a 50 percent share of the entire set of causal factors." (*Dep't of Corr. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Garcia)* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 810, 816 [64 Cal.Comp.Cases 1356].) In order to apply this standard, the evaluating physician must take a history of all events alleged to have contributed to the psychiatric injury, then render an opinion as to causation in terms of first whether

the employment events were a predominant, or greater than fifty percent, cause of the injury. (*Rolda, supra*, 66 Cal.Comp.Cases at p. 245.)

Section 3208.3 also provides a defense barring compensation for a psychiatric injury if the injury was substantially caused by a lawful, nondiscriminatory, good faith personnel action. (Lab. Code, § 3208.3(h).) The statute expressly assigns the burden of proof on this issue to the defendant who raises the defense.

In order to determine whether the good faith personnel action defense bars compensation, the WCJ must determine whether any “personnel action” occurred, and if so, whether it was lawful, nondiscriminatory, and in good faith. The defense also requires a psychologist or psychiatrist to determine whether such personnel action was a “substantial cause” of an injury to the psyche, which is defined by section 3208.3 as “at least 35 to 40 percent of the causation from all sources combined.” (Lab. Code, § 3208.3(b)(3); *Rolda, supra*, 66 Cal.Comp.Cases at p. 246.)

As we noted in our en banc decision in *Rolda, supra*, and also in significant panel decisions⁵ *Larch v. Contra Costa County* (1998) 63 Cal.Comp.Cases 831, 833–839 and *Stockman v. State of California Department of Corrections* (1998) 63 Cal.Comp.Cases 1042, 1044–1047, not every action by a supervisor constitutes a “personnel action” for purposes of section 3208.3, and the WCJ must analyze this issue by applying the appropriate legal guidelines. (*Rolda, supra*, 66 Cal.Comp.Cases at p. 246.) The *Rolda* decision points out that in *County of Butte v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Purcell)* (2000) 65 Cal.Comp.Cases 1054 (writ denied), memos which criticized the applicant's job performance, but did not contain disciplinary actions, threats or warnings of disciplinary actions, did not constitute personnel actions.

Furthermore, the WCJ must analyze whether personnel actions were in good faith. We provided examples of this in *Rolda, supra*. One case, *Contel of California v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Holly)* (1998) 63 Cal.Comp.Cases 847 (writ denied) held that discipline in a manner contrary to the employer's policy manual was not a good faith personnel action. Another case, *County of Kern v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Johnson)* (1998) 63 Cal.Comp.Cases 1068 (writ

⁵ A “significant panel decision” is a decision of the Appeals Board that has been designated by all members of the Appeals Board as of significant interest and importance to the workers' compensation community. Although not binding precedent, significant panel decisions are intended to augment the body of binding appellate and en banc decisions by providing further guidance to the workers' compensation community. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10305(u).)

denied), held that supervision by harassment, ridicule, and generally unprofessional conduct was not a good faith personnel action.

Moreover, all decisions by a WCJ must be supported by substantial evidence. (*Lamb v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 274 [39 Cal.Comp.Cases 310]; *LeVesque v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 16]; *Bracken v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 246 [54 Cal.Comp.Cases 349].) Substantial evidence has been described as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and must be more than a mere scintilla. (*Braewood Convalescent Hosp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Bolton)* (1983) 34 Cal.3d 159 [48 Cal.Comp.Cases 566].) To constitute substantial evidence "...a medical opinion must be framed in terms of reasonable medical probability, it must not be speculative, it must be based on pertinent facts and on an adequate examination and history, and it must set forth reasoning in support of its conclusions." (*Escobedo v. Marshalls* (2005) 70 Cal.Comp.Cases 604, 621 (Appeals Board en banc).) "Medical reports and opinions are not substantial evidence if they are known to be erroneous, or if they are based on facts no longer germane, on inadequate medical histories and examinations, or on incorrect legal theories. Medical opinion also fails to support the Board's findings if it is based on surmise, speculation, conjecture or guess." (*Hegglin v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1971) 4 Cal.3d 162, 169 [36 Cal.Comp.Cases 93, 97].)

It is well established that there must be some solid basis in a medical report for the doctor's ultimate opinion. The Appeals Board may not blindly accept a medical opinion which lacks a solid underlying basis, and must carefully judge its weight and credibility. (*National Convenience Stores v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Kesser)* (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 420, 426 [46 Cal.Comp.Cases 783].) In other words, the Appeals Board must look to the underlying facts of a medical opinion to determine whether or not that opinion constitutes substantial evidence, and accordingly, the expert's opinion is no better than the facts on which it is based. (*Turner v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 1036, 1044 [39 Cal.Comp.Cases 780].) These requirements apply to all medical evidence, including a physician's analysis of the good faith personnel action defense under section 3208.3 and *Rolda, supra*.

In this case, Dr. Allen's two reports fail to provide substantial medical evidence due to the lack of reasoning in support of the percentages of causation that she assigned. To justify and explain the assignment of 35 percent of all causes of injury to applicant's receipt of a warning from

the manager, Carlos, Dr. Allen simply states that applicant's "symptoms significantly worsened" after "participating in a disciplinary meeting where she was given a write-up for arguing with her coworker, Elsa, in the restaurant in front of clients." (Joint Exhibit J1, Report of Dr. Allen dated October 9, 2025, page 15.) There is no identification of what specifically became worse, and the evidence that shows worsening at that time, or how much the symptoms worsened. There is also no explanation of the mechanism of injury, that is, how the stressor caused the psychiatric injury as a matter of reasonable medical probability. Even assuming the truth of the assertion that symptoms significantly worsened following applicant's write-up, the chronology alone does not prove causation without establishing the connection between cause and effect. *Post hoc, ergo propter hoc* (Latin for "after this, therefore caused by this") is a recognized logical fallacy.

Dr. Allen furthermore did not explain why 35 percent, which happens to be the legal threshold for the good faith personnel action defense, was selected instead of a third, 50 percent, or some other number. The assignment of other percentages of causation to total 100 percent does not sufficiently justify Dr. Allen's selection of 35 percent of causation for applicant's write-up, because 60 percent is attributed to "behaviors" by the manager, Carlos, lumping together his criticisms, alleged unequal treatment of applicant, and unspecified "other behaviors," and five percent of causation of psychiatric injury is attributed to conflicts with Elsa, a coworker. (*Ibid.*) The reason Dr. Allen gives for assigning such a small percentage of causation to conflict with the coworker is that although Elsa contributed to the initiation of applicant's anxiety problems, she later changed her ways and is no longer a source of applicant's stress. (*Id.*, at page 16.) While this might be a cogent reason not to apportion present permanent disability to workplace conflicts with Elsa, it does not suffice to explain the degree to which those conflicts caused the initial injury.

This scrutiny of the connection between evidence and conclusions is more than a mere formality. As noted by the California Supreme Court, the chief value of an expert's opinion rests upon the material from which it is fashioned and the reasoning by which it progresses from the material to the conclusion, and it does not lie in the mere expression of the conclusion. The opinion of an expert is no better than the reasons upon which it is based. (*People v. Bassett* (1968) 69 Cal.2d 122, 141, 144 [443 P.2d 777, 70 Cal. Rptr. 193].)

Dr. Allen should provide a supplemental report to ensure the availability of current, germane medical evidence from a physician who has already reported in the case. (See *McDuffie v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority* (2002) 67 Cal.Comp.Cases 138 (Appeals

Board en banc).) To ensure an adequate history and factual basis, the PQME's supplemental report should review the testimony and evidence taken at trial, and connect all available evidence to a detailed analysis that justifies each conclusion, including each assigned percentage of causation. Reasonable medical probability must be proven, and not merely asserted. The WCJ should then analyze this additional medical evidence to ensure that it is substantial, and that the causes are selected and described in accordance with a correct legal theory.

Accordingly, we grant the Petition for Reconsideration, and as our decision after reconsideration, we will rescind the F&O and return the matter to the trial level for further proceedings consistent with this decision. When the WCJ issues a new decision, any aggrieved person may timely seek reconsideration.

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Reconsideration of the Findings and Order of April 10, 2026 is **GRANTED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED as the Decision After Reconsideration of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board that the Findings and Order issued by the WCJ on April 10, 2026 is **RESCINDED** and that the matter is **RETURNED** to the trial level for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

/s/ KATHERINE WILLIAMS DODD, COMMISSIONER

I CONCUR,

/s/ KATHERINE A. ZALEWSKI, CHAIR

PAUL F. KELLY, COMMISSIONER
CONCURRING NOT SIGNING



DATED AND FILED AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

JULY 9, 2026

SERVICE MADE ON THE ABOVE DATE ON THE PERSONS LISTED BELOW AT THEIR ADDRESSES SHOWN ON THE CURRENT OFFICIAL ADDRESS RECORD.

**VIRGINIA MARIN
ABRAMSON LABOR GROUP
MULLEN & FILIPPI, LLP**

CWF/cs

I certify that I affixed the official seal of
the Workers' Compensation Appeals
Board to this original decision on this date.
CS