

**WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

MIGUEL PULIDO, *Applicant*

vs.

**GOLDEN STATE FOODS CORP;
TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY COMPANY OF AMERICA, *Defendants***

**Adjudication Number: ADJ15158069
Van Nuys District Office**

**OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING PETITION FOR
RECONSIDERATION**

Applicant seeks reconsideration of the August 11, 2025 Findings and Order issued by the workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ). Therein, the WCJ found that applicant sustained admitted injury arising out of and in the course of employment (AOE/COE) to his shoulders, hands, and right ankle, while employed on July 10, 2019. The WCJ further found that the Rishi Garg, M.D., is the primary treating physician and that "a Request for Authorization for a home health assessment is subject to Utilization Review." The WCJ deferred all other issues.

Applicant contends that the WCJ erred in finding that a home health assessment constitutes medical treatment subject to utilization review (UR).

We received an Answer. The WCJ issued a Report and Recommendation of Workers' Compensation Administrative Law Judge on Petition for Reconsideration recommending that we deny reconsideration.

We have considered the Petition for Reconsideration, the contents of the Report, and have reviewed the record in this matter. Based upon our preliminary review of the record, we will grant applicant's Petition for Reconsideration. Our order granting the Petition for Reconsideration is not a final order, and we will order that a final decision after reconsideration is deferred pending further review of the merits of the Petition for Reconsideration and further consideration of the entire record in light of the applicable statutory and decisional law. Once a final decision after

reconsideration is issued by the Appeals Board, any aggrieved person may timely seek a writ of review pursuant to Labor Code¹ section 5950 et seq.

I.

Preliminarily, we note that former section 5909 provided that a petition for reconsideration was deemed denied unless the Appeals Board acted on the petition within 60 days from the date of filing. (Lab. Code, § 5909.) Effective July 2, 2024, section 5909 was amended to state in relevant part that:

- (a) A petition for reconsideration is deemed to have been denied by the appeals board unless it is acted upon within 60 days from the date a trial judge transmits a case to the appeals board.
- (b)
 - (1) When a trial judge transmits a case to the appeals board, the trial judge shall provide notice to the parties of the case and the appeals board.
 - (2) For purposes of paragraph (1), service of the accompanying report, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 5900, shall constitute providing notice.

Under section 5909(a), the Appeals Board must act on a petition for reconsideration within 60 days of transmission of the case to the Appeals Board. Transmission is reflected in Events in the Electronic Adjudication Management System (EAMS). Specifically, in Case Events, under Event Description is the phrase “Sent to Recon” and under Additional Information is the phrase “The case is sent to the Recon board.”

Here, according to Events, the case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on September 5, 2025 and 60 days from the date of transmission is November 4, 2025. This decision is issued by or on November 4, 2025, so that we have timely acted on the petition as required by section 5909(a).

Section 5909(b)(1) requires that the parties and the Appeals Board be provided with notice of transmission of the case. Transmission of the case to the Appeals Board in EAMS provides notice to the Appeals Board. Thus, the requirement in subdivision (1) ensures that the parties are notified of the accurate date for the commencement of the 60-day period for the Appeals Board to act on a petition. Section 5909(b)(2) provides that service of the Report and Recommendation shall be notice of transmission.

¹ All further statutory references are to the Labor Code, unless otherwise noted.

Here, according to the proof of service for the Report and Recommendation by the workers' compensation administrative law judge, the Report was served on September 5, 2025, and the case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on September 5, 2025. Service of the Report and transmission of the case to the Appeals Board occurred on the same day. Thus, we conclude that the parties were provided with the notice of transmission required by section 5909(b)(1) because service of the Report in compliance with section 5909(b)(2) provided them with actual notice as to the commencement of the 60-day period on September 5, 2025.

II.

The WCJ stated following in the Report:

II. FACTS

Petitioner sustained industrial injury on July 10, 2019 to his shoulders, hands, and right ankle while working for Golden State Foods Corp.

On March 11, 2025, Primary Treating Physician (PTP) Dr. Rishi Garg submitted a medical report and Request for Authorization (RFA) for a home health assessment to UR. On March 18, 2025, UR issued a denial notice in response to the RFA.

Following an Expedited Hearing, this case was submitted for decision on July 30, 2025 before the undersigned on the sole issue of whether a RFA for a home health assessment is subject to UR. (Minutes of Hearing dated 7/24/24 at p. 2.)

On August 11, 2025, the undersigned issued a F&O finding that a home health evaluation is subject to UR. Petitioner filed a timely Petition for Reconsideration on August 29, 2025 on both ADJ14965176 and ADJ15158069; however, the F&O was solely issued on ADJ15158069, so this Report and Recommendation only pertains to ADJ15158069. No answer from Defendant has been received to date.

(Report, at pp. 1-2.)

III.

We highlight the following legal principles that may be relevant to our review of this matter:

Section 4610 requires employers to establish an UR process by which it can,

[R]eview and approve, modify, delay, or deny, based in whole or in part on medical necessity to cure and relieve, treatment recommendations by physicians, as defined in Section 3209.3, prior to, retrospectively, or concurrent with the provision of medical treatment services pursuant to section 4600.

(Lab. Code, § 4610(a).)

Section 4600 defines medical treatment broadly, as “[m]edical, surgical, chiropractic, acupuncture, and hospital treatment, including nursing, medicines, medical and surgical supplies, crutches, and apparatuses, including orthotic and prosthetic devices and services, that is reasonably required to cure or relieve the injured worker from the effects of his or her injury[.]” (Lab. Code, § 4600(a).)

Section 4060(b) allows for a medical-legal evaluation by a treating physician and section 4620(a) defines a medical-legal expense as a cost or expense that a party incurs “for the purpose of proving or disproving a contested claim.” (Lab. Code, § 4620(a).) Section 4620(b) sets forth the parameters for determining whether a contested claim existed. (Lab. Code, § 4620(b).) “Essentially, there is a contested claim when: 1) the employer knows or reasonably should know of an employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits; and 2) the employer denies the employee’s claim outright or fails to act within a reasonable time regarding the claim.” (*Colamonico v. Secure Transportation* (2019) (84 Cal.Comp.Cases 1059) (Appeals Board en banc).) A “contested claim” includes “[w]here the claims administrator has accepted liability for a claim and a disputed medical fact exists.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 9793(b).) A “comprehensive medical-legal evaluation” may be performed by a primary treating physician. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 9793(c).)

It is well established that decisions by the Appeals Board must be supported by substantial evidence. (Lab. Code, §§ 5903, 5952(d); *Lamb v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 274 [39 Cal.Comp.Cases 310]; *Garza, supra*; *LeVesque v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 16].) “The term ‘substantial evidence’ means evidence which, if true, has probative force on the issues. It is more than a mere scintilla, and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion ... It must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.” (*Braewood Convalescent Hosp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Bolton)* (1983) 34 Cal.3d 159, 164 [48 Cal.Comp.Cases 566], emphasis removed and citations omitted.) To constitute substantial evidence “... a medical opinion must be framed in terms of reasonable medical probability, it must not be speculative, it must be based on pertinent facts and on an adequate examination and history, and it must set forth reasoning in support of its conclusions.” (*Escobedo v. Marshalls* (2005) 70 Cal.Comp.Cases 604, 621 (Appeals Board en banc).)

Based on our review, we are not persuaded that the record is properly developed. Where the evidence or opinion on an issue is incomplete, stale, and no longer germane, or is based on an inaccurate history, or speculation, it does not constitute substantial evidence. (*Place v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1970) 3 Cal.3d 372 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 525]; *Escobedo v. Marshalls* (2005) 70 Cal.Comp.Cases 604, 621 (Appeals Board en banc).) Here, we are not persuaded that there is substantial evidence to support the WCJ's decision.

Taking into account the statutory time constraints for acting on the petition, and based upon our initial review of the record, we believe reconsideration must be granted to allow sufficient opportunity to further study the factual and legal issues in this case. We believe that this action is necessary to give us a complete understanding of the record and to enable us to issue a just and reasoned decision. Reconsideration is therefore granted for this purpose and for such further proceedings as we may hereafter determine to be appropriate.

IV.

In addition, under our broad grant of authority, our jurisdiction over this matter is continuing.

A grant of reconsideration has the effect of causing "the whole subject matter [to be] reopened for further consideration and determination" (*Great Western Power Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (Savercool)* (1923) 191 Cal.724, 729 [10 I.A.C. 322]) and of "[throwing] the entire record open for review." (*State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Com. (George)* (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 201, 203 [19 Cal.Comp.Cases 98].) Thus, once reconsideration has been granted, the Appeals Board has the full power to make new and different findings on issues presented for determination at the trial level, even with respect to issues not raised in the petition for reconsideration before it. (See Lab. Code, §§ 5907, 5908, 5908.5; see also *Gonzales v. Industrial Acci. Com.* (1958) 50 Cal.2d 360, 364.) "[t]here is no provision in chapter 7, dealing with proceedings for reconsideration and judicial review, limiting the time within which the commission may make its decision on reconsideration, and in the absence of a statutory authority limitation none will be implied."; see generally Lab. Code, § 5803 ["The WCAB has continuing jurisdiction over its orders, decisions, and awards. . . . At any time, upon notice and after an opportunity to be heard is given to the parties in interest, the appeals board may rescind, alter, or amend any order, decision, or award, good cause appearing therefor.].)

“The WCAB . . . is a constitutional court; hence, its final decisions are given res judicata effect.” (*Azadigian v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 372, 374 [57 Cal.Comp.Cases 391; see *Dow Chemical Co. v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd.* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 483, 491 [32 Cal.Comp.Cases 431]; *Dakins v. Board of Pension Commissioners* (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 374, 381 [184 Cal.Rptr. 576]; *Solari v. Atlas-Universal Service, Inc.* (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 587, 593 [30 Cal.Rptr. 407].) A “final” order has been defined as one that either “determines any substantive right or liability of those involved in the case” (*Rymer v. Hagler* (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1171, 1180; *Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Pointer)* (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 528, 534-535 [45 Cal.Comp.Cases 410]; *Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Kramer)* (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 39, 45 [43 Cal.Comp.Cases 661]), or determines a “threshold” issue that is fundamental to the claim for benefits. Interlocutory procedural or evidentiary decisions, entered in the midst of the workers’ compensation proceedings, are not considered “final” orders. (*Maranian v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1070, 1075 [65 Cal.Comp.Cases 650].) [“interim orders, which do not decide a threshold issue, such as intermediate procedural or evidentiary decisions, are not ‘final’ ”]; *Rymer, supra*, at p. 1180 [“[t]he term [‘final’] does not include intermediate procedural orders or discovery orders”]; *Kramer, supra*, at p. 45 [“[t]he term [‘final’] does not include intermediate procedural orders”].)

Section 5901 states in relevant part that:

No cause of action arising out of any final order, decision or award made and filed by the appeals board or a workers’ compensation judge shall accrue in any court to any person until and unless the appeals board on its own motion sets aside the final order, decision, or award and removes the proceeding to itself or if the person files a petition for reconsideration, and the reconsideration is granted or denied. . . .

Thus, this is not a final decision on the merits of the Petition for Reconsideration, and we will order that issuance of the final decision after reconsideration is deferred. Once a final decision is issued by the Appeals Board, any aggrieved person may timely seek a writ of review pursuant to Labor Code sections 5950 et seq.

V.

Accordingly, we grant applicant’s Petition for Reconsideration, and order that a final decision after reconsideration is deferred pending further review of the merits of the Petition for Reconsideration and further consideration of the entire record in light of the applicable statutory and decisional law. ***While this matter is pending before the Appeals Board, we encourage the***

parties to participate in the Appeals Board's voluntary mediation program. Inquiries as to the use of our mediation program can be addressed to WCABmediation@dir.ca.gov.

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that applicant's Petition for Reconsideration is **GRANTED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a final decision after reconsideration is **DEFERRED** pending further review of the merits of the Petition for Reconsideration and further consideration of the entire record in light of the applicable statutory and decisional law.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

/s/ JOSEPH V. CAPURRO, COMMISSIONER

I CONCUR,

/s/ KATHERINE WILLIAMS DODD, COMMISSIONER

/s/ JOSÉ H. RAZO, COMMISSIONER



DATED AND FILED AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

November 4, 2025

SERVICE MADE ON THE ABOVE DATE ON THE PERSONS LISTED BELOW AT THEIR ADDRESSES SHOWN ON THE CURRENT OFFICIAL ADDRESS RECORD.

**MIGUEL PULIDO
GLAUBER BERENSON VEGO
WOOLFORD & ASSOCIATES**

PAG/bp

*I certify that I affixed the official seal of
the Workers' Compensation Appeals
Board to this original decision on this
date. o.o*