1 2 3 4 5	STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INDUDSTRIAL RELA DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ENF Patricia Salazar, Esq. (SBN 249935) 320 W. 4th Street, Suite 600 Los Angeles, California 90013 Telephone No.: (213) 897-1511 Facsimile No.: (213) 897-2877 Attorney for the State Labor Commissioner	
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7 8	SUPERIOR COURT OF	THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
9	FOR THE COU	NTY OF LOS ANGELES
10		
11	MINAKO AMERICA CORPORATION	Case No.: 19STCP02356
12	DBA MINCO CONSTRUCTION; AND REFAAT HILMAY MINA,	[Assigned to the Honorable Mary H. Strobel]
13	Petitioners,	RETURN TO PEREMPTORY WRIT OF
14	VS.	MANDAMUS
15 16 17	CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT and DOES 1 through 20, Inclusive,	
18	Respondents.	
19	respondence	
20	TO THE COURT:	
21		
22	Respondent CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, DIVISION	
23	OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT, through her counsel of record, makes the following	
24	return to peremptory writ of mandamus issued in this action:	
25	1. The Division of Labor Standards Enforcement ("DLSE") Hearing Officer's Proposed	
26	Statement of Decision, dated May 16, 2019, in the administrative proceeding titled, "In	
27	the matter of the Debarment Proce	eding Against: Minako America Corporation dba
20		

Minco Construction; Refaat Hilmy Mina," DLSE Case No. LB6333, which recommended that Petitioner "shall be ineligible to, and shall not, bid on or be awarded a contract for a public works project, and shall not perform work as a subcontractor on a "public works" project as defined by Labor Code sections 1720, 1720.2, and 1720.3, for a period of two (2) years, effective 45 days after this decision is issued by the Labor Commissioner is hereby **SET ASIDE**. The Hearing Officer's Proposed Statement of Decision finding, "[a] two-year period is appropriate under these circumstances where Respondents MINAKO AMERICA CORPORATION DBA MINCO CONSTRUCTION; REFAAT HILMY MINA 'wilfully' violated public works laws, with a history of violations on numerous public works projects" ("Proposed Decision") is hereby **SET ASIDE**.

- 2. The Decision re: Debarment, dated May 16, 2019, in the administrative proceeding titled, "In the matter of the Debarment Proceeding Against: Minako America Corporation dba Minco Construction; Refaat Hilmy Mina," DLSE Case No. LB 6333, which adopted the Hearing Officer's Proposed Decision that Petitioners be debarred from working on public works projects in the State of California for two years ("Decision") is hereby SET ASIDE.
- 3. The Hearing Officer has reconsidered the portion of the Decision debarring Petitioners under California Labor Code § 1777.1(d), in light of the Court's ruling under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5(f), because substantial evidence does not support the Hearing Officer's findings of "a history of prior violations" of the apprenticeship requirements, which finding was material to the conclusion that Petitioners committed "serious" violations of Labor Code § 1777.5, and the Court does not know whether the Hearing Officer would have reached the same result (i.e. debarment under California

ATTACHMENT A

1 2 3 4	STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATION DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORMATICATION STANDARD ENFORMATICATION STANDARDS ENFORMATICATION STANDARD ENFORMATION ENFORMATICATION STANDARD ENFORMATICATION ENF		
5	Attorney for the State Labor Commissioner		
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7			
8	BEFORE THE DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT		
9	DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS		
10	FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
11			
12	In the Matter of the Debarment Proceeding Against:	CASE NO.: LB6333	
13		PROPOSED STATEMENT OF DECISION RE: DEBARMENT OF RESPONDENTS	
14 15	MINAKO AMERICA CORPORATION DBA MINCO CONSTRUCTION; REFAAT HILMY MINA,	FROM PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS AFTER ISSUANCE OF PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS BY THE	
16 17	Respondents.	SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES ON MINAKO AMERICA CORPORATION DBA MINCO CONSTRUCTION'S AND REFAAT HILMAY MINA'S VERIFIED	
		PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE	
18		[Labor Code § 1777.1]	
19			
20 21	Debarment proceedings pursuant to Lab	por Code section 1777.1 were initiated by the	
22		RCEMENT, STATE LABOR COMMISSIONER,	
23			
24	against the following named respondents in the administrative matter known as: MINAKO		
	AMERICA CORPORATION DBA MINCO C	ONSTRUCTION; REFAAT HILMY MINA.	
25	The hearing in this matter was held in L	Los Angeles, California on July 24 to July 26,	
2627	2017, December 14 to December 15, 2017, and January 8 to January 11, 2018. Patricia Salazar,		
28	¹ Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references ar	re to the Labor Code.	

the court issued a Minute Order, followed on June 14, 2021 by a Peremptory Writ of Mandamus, a Judgment granting the Peremptory Writ of Mandamus, and a Notice of Entry of Judgment (collectively, the "Order").

I. THE COURT'S ORDER

a. Prevailing Wage Violations per Sections 1777.1(a)-(b)

In its Order, the Court found "substantial evidence" did not support the hearing officer's findings that Petitioners committed prevailing wage violations with "intent to defraud" pursuant to section 1777.1(a) with respect to the Joint Water Project, Bike Parking Project, and JOC 1029 Project. (Order, p. 22.) The Court further determined substantial evidence did not support the hearing officer's findings that Petitioners committed multiple "willful" violations per section 1777.1(b) within a three-year period regarding the Joint Water Project, Bike Parking Project, and JOC 1029 Project. (*Id.*, pp. 22-23.)

b. The Apprenticeship Requirements of Section 1777.5

The next issue before the Court was whether substantial evidence supported the hearing officer's findings that Petitioners committed "serious" violations of the apprenticeship requirements of section 1777.5 with respect to Long Beach Main, Joint Water Project, Bike Parking Project, JOC 1029 Project, Eastern Avenue Project, and the JOC 1026 Project.

The Court cited the applicable legal authority to determine whether substantial evidence supported the hearing officer's findings of violations of the apprenticeship requirements under section 1777.5.

Section 1777.1(d)(1) authorizes debarment "[i]n the event a contractor or subcontractor is determined by the Labor Commissioner to have knowingly committed a serious violation of any provision of Section 1777.5." (Order, p. 23.) "Section 1777.5 sets forth apprenticeship requirements that apply to public contractors." (*Id.*) In finding whether a violation is "serious, and in determining whether and for how long a party should be debarred for violating Section 1777.5," the Labor Commissioner "shall consider" five "circumstances." (Labor Code § 1777.1(d)(2)(A)-(E); see also Order, p. 23.)

A "knowing" violation of apprenticeship requirements of section 1777.5 is determined as follows:

For purposes of Labor Code Section 1777.7, a contractor knowingly violates Labor Code Section 1777.5 if the contractor knew or should have known of the requirements of that Section and fails to comply, unless the failure to comply was due to circumstances beyond the contractor's control. There is an irrebuttable presumption that a contractor knew or should have known of the requirements of Section 1777.5 if the contractor had previously been found to have violated that Section, or the contract and/or bid documents notified the contractor of the obligation to comply with Labor Code provisions applicable to public works projects, or the contractor had previously employed apprentices on a public works project.

(California Code of Regulations ("C.C.R."), tit. 8, § 231(h); see also Order, p. 23.)

With the exception of the hearing officer's findings of a "history of prior violations," the Court found substantial evidence supported the hearing officer's findings that Petitioners knowingly violated section 1777.5 for all six projects. (Order, pp. 23-24.) The Court also found substantial evidence, with the exception of a "history of prior violations," supported the hearing officer's findings that Petitioners' violations of section 1777.5 were serious. (*Id.*, p. 24.) The Court pointed to the hearing officer's findings of violations under section 1777.5 as serious to include: the violations were intentional, and Minco failed to employ 3,300 apprentice hours depriving "apprentices of learning opportunities during the span of three years or more." (*Id.*)(citing AR 41-42; see also Labor Code § 1777.1(d)(2)(A), (C)-(E).)

Moreover, and with the exception of a "history of prior violations," the Court referenced multiple examples from the administrative record in support of this same conclusion, including:

- Each of the six public works contracts or bid documents notified Petitioners of the obligation to comply with Labor Code provisions applicable to public work projects. (Order, p. 24)(citing AR 198; 543; 820; 1081; 1214.)
- Petitioners' admission they failed to submit DAS 140 (Contract Award Information) and DAS 142 (Request for Dispatch of an Apprentice) forms to the union Joint Apprenticeship Training Committees. (*Id.*)(citing AR 21-27; 4439, 4697-4706.)
- DLSE testimony from its investigators and documentary evidence that support

concluded substantial evidence did not support the hearing officer's findings of a "history of

28

prior violations." (Id., pp. 25-26.)

The Court concluded:

Based on the foregoing, substantial evidence supports the hearing officer's findings that Petitioners knowingly committed violations of Labor Code section 1777.5 on the Long Beach Main Project, Joint Water Project, Bike Parking Project, JOC 1029 Project, Eastern Avenue Project, and the JOC 1026 Project. (AR 43.) However, substantial evidence does not support the hearing officer's finding of 'a history of prior violations' of the apprenticeship requirements. (AR 42.) That finding was material to the conclusion that Petitioners committed "serious" violations of section 1777.5. (AR 41-43.) The court does not know whether the hearing officer would have reached the same result without such finding. Accordingly, the matter must be remanded so that Respondent can reconsider whether Petitioners committed serious violations of section 1777.5 without the finding of a history of prior violations. [Emphasis added.]

The Court concluded substantial evidence did not support a "history of prior violations," which was one of the findings the hearing officer cited to in support of the second "circumstance" under section 1777.1(d)(2)(B). (See *Id.*, p. 26.) However, the Court did not reach the same conclusion for any of the remaining four "circumstances" of section 1777.1(d)(2). The Labor Commissioner was also required to consider the other "circumstances" in order to determine whether there was a serious violation of section 1777.5 apprenticeship requirements.

c. The Propriety of the Penalty

Petitioners argued DLSE failed to consider mitigating factors as required by 8 C.C.R. section 16802(a) regarding the propriety of the penalty. (*Id.*, p. 30.) In rejecting Petitioners' argument, the Court found the hearing officer "gave a reasoned explanation for the penalty decision, and the extensive findings in the decision further show the basis for the penalty." (*Id.*)(citing AR 41-43; AR 12-40.) The Court further noted, "[a]s required, the hearing officer considered 'the nature of the offense; the amount of underpayment of wages per worker; the experience of the Respondent in the area of public works; and the Respondent's compliance with Labor Code section 1776." (*Id.*)(citing 8 C.C.R. § 16802(a).)

However, in ordering the two-year debarment, the Court stated the debarment penalty was based on findings of prevailing wage violations under section 1777.1(a)-(b), and a finding under section 1777.1(d)(2) of a serious violation of apprenticeship requirements per section

a "history of prior violations," which the Court later determined was not supported by substantial evidence.

Section 1777.1(d)(2) is one of *multiple* provisions found in the Prevailing Wage Law (or, "PWL") in California. (See *Azusa Land Partners v. Dep't of Indus. Rels.* (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 1, 14)("*Azusa Land Partners*").) In providing an overview of PWL, the California Supreme Court states it is the Legislature's intent that the public policy of California "vigorously enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or permitted to work under substandard unlawful conditions, and to protect employers who comply with the law from those who attempt to gain competitive advantage at the expense of their workers by failing to comply with minimum labor standards." (*Id.*)(citing Labor Code § 90.5.) (*Lusardi Construction Co. v. Aubry* (1992) 1 Cal.4th 976, 985)("*Lusardi*").) The PWL was also enacted to protect and benefit the workers on public works projects, the public, and are to be liberally construed. (*Id.*; *City of Long Beach v. Dep't of Indus. Rels.* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 942, 949-950.)

In interpreting the statutory provisions at issue, the court's first task is to determine legislative intent. (*Henson v. C. Overaa & Co.* (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 184, 193) ("*Henson*")(discussing Labor Code section 1777.5.) To determine intent, the courts look to the plain language of the statute which, if clear and unambiguous, will control, obviating the need for judicial construction. (*Id.*) However, courts do not view the language of the statute in isolation and, instead, construe the words of the statute in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose. (*Id.*) The courts will choose the construction that comports most closely with the legislative intent, with a view toward promoting, not defeating, the statute's general purpose. (*Azusa Land Partners, supra*, 191 Cal.App.4th at 21-22.) The drafters of PWL took into account multiple considerations regarding apprenticeship requirements, including the basic idea of an apprenticeship program "to allow on-the-job training for apprentices who work under the supervision of journeymen" and "to encourage and assist persons to enter into the skilled work force. . ." (See *Henson* at 189.)

With these principles in mind, the hearing officer addresses whether debarment is

warranted where the Court ruled substantial evidence did not support her findings of a "history of prior violations," and whether the hearing officer would have reached the same conclusion of "serious" violations without it.

Section 1777.1(d)(2) requires the hearing officer consider **all** the "circumstances" to determine whether Petitioners' violations were serious in supporting a finding of debarment for violations of apprenticeship requirements under section 1777.5. The hearing officer's findings regarding a "history of prior violations" supported one of the five circumstances articulated by section 1777.1(d)(2). However, the finding of a "history of prior violations," assisted the hearing officer in considering the second circumstance of section 1777.1(d)(2)(B), "whether the party has committed *other*" section 1777.5 violations. This second "circumstance" cannot be viewed in isolation of the other "circumstances" of section 1777.1(d)(2). (See *Henson*, *supra*, 238 Cal.App.4th at 193.)

Rather, the hearing officer's finding regarding a "history of prior violations" must be construed in the larger context and statutory purpose of the PWL so as not to defeat the statute's general purpose. (See *Id.* at 193; see also *Azusa Land Partners*, *supra*, 191 Cal.App.4th at 21-22.) This includes the Legislature's goals behind the apprenticeship program, which is to allow on-the-job training opportunities for apprentices, and encourage and assist persons to enter into the skilled work force. (*Henson* at 189.) It also includes interpreting section 1777.1(d)(2) with the purpose of protecting and benefitting workers on public works projects. (*Lusardi*, *supra*, 1 Cal.4th at 985; *City of Long Beach*, *supra*, 34 Cal.4th at 949-950.) This is consistent with the hearing officer's other findings that Petitioners' violations were intentional, and Minco failed to employ 3,300 apprentice hours, which deprived apprentices of learning opportunities during the span of three years or more. (Order, p. 24.) These further support the hearing officer's findings of *other* serious violations under section 1777.1(d)(2)(A), (D)-(E). (See AR 41-42.)

In sum, the rules of statutory construction prohibit the hearing officer from considering one of the "circumstances" of section 1777.1(d)(2) in isolation. It also requires the hearing officer to consider the legislative goals of PWL, including the drafters' considerations regarding

apprenticeship requirements, and the liberal construction of PWL provisions. Accordingly, these considerations compel the hearing officer to determine that she must consider **all** five "circumstances" under Labor Code section 1777.1(d)(2) to determine whether Petitioners' violations of apprenticeship requirements were "serious."

Moreover, with the exception of a "history of prior violations," the Court stated the other hearing officer findings concerning the serious nature of section 1777.5 violations were supported by substantial evidence. (See Order, p. 24.) This not only included the hearing officer's findings that the violations were intentional, and Minco's failure to employ 3,300 apprentice hours deprived apprentices of learning opportunities during the span of three years or more. It also included the Court's references to multiple examples from the administrative record to support the hearing officer's, and ultimately, its conclusion, that substantial evidence supports these other findings.

These examples include: (i) the public works contracts or bid documents on all six projects notifying Petitioners of the obligation to comply with Labor Code provisions applicable to public work projects; (ii) Petitioners' admission that they failed to submit DAS 140 and DAS 142 forms to the union Joint Apprenticeship Training Committees; (iii) Petitioners' evidence, the DAS 140 Forms, which explain that contractors were required to submit contract award information to "ALL" applicable apprenticeship committees of the craft or trade in the area of the site of public work; and (iv) DLSE testimony from its investigators and documentary evidence supporting the findings of apprenticeship violations. (*Id.*, p. 24.)

The hearing officer's findings regarding a "history of prior violations" may have been material to the conclusion that Petitioners committed "serious" violations of section 1777.5. However, that was not the only consideration which led to this conclusion. As discussed above, the "history of prior violations" assisted the hearing officer in considering the "second" "circumstance" of section 1777.1(d)(2)(B). In weighing all the circumstances of section 1777.1(d)(2), however, substantial evidence supports the hearing officer's *other* findings that Petitioners committed serious apprenticeship violations. These other findings were also material

to the hearing officer's conclusion.

Accordingly, with the exception of a "history of prior violations," a debarment penalty remains warranted where Petitioners' violations of apprenticeship requirements under section 1777.5 were serious, based on the weighing of all the other circumstances of section 1777.1(d)(2).

c. The Debarment Penalty

Next, in weighing all the circumstances, with the exception of a "history of prior violations," the Labor Commissioner shall determine how long Petitioners should be disbarred. Because Petitioners knowingly committed serious violations of Labor Code section 1777.5, the Labor Commissioner may deny Petitioners "the right to bid on or to be awarded or perform work as a subcontractor on any public works contract for a period of up to one year for the first violation and for a period of up to three years for a second or subsequent violation." (Labor Code § 1777.1(d)(1).)

The hearing officer previously ordered a two-year debarment against Petitioners. However, the Court ruled substantial evidence did not support the hearing officer's findings of prevailing wage violations under Labor Code sections 1777.1(a)-(b), or the finding of a "history or prior violations," which the hearing officer determined under one of the five circumstances articulated in section 1777.1(d)(2)(A)-(E). In light of the Court's ruling regarding no substantial evidence supported the findings of prevailing wage violations under section 1777.1(a)-(b), or based on a "history or prior violations," the two-year debarment is reduced to one year.

III. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

Based on the substantial evidence, and in light of the Court's Order, this *Proposed*Statement of Decision Re: Debarment of Petitioners from Public Work Projects is amended to state we find that MINAKO AMERICA CORPORATION DBA MINCO CONSTRUCTION;

REFAAT HILMY MINA, knowingly committed serious violations of section 1777.5 on the Long Beach Main Project, Joint Water Project, Bike Parking Project, JOC 1029 Project, Eastern Avenue Project, and JOC 1026 Project.

Debarment

"Although debarment can have a severe economic impact on contractors, it 'is not intended as punishment. It is instead, a necessary means to enable the contracting governmental agency to deal with irresponsible bidders and contractors, and to administer its duties with efficiency." (Southern Cal. Underground Contractors, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 533, 542.) The evidence established that Minco repeatedly acted irresponsibly. With the exception of a "history of prior violations," the evidence establishes Minco knowingly committed serious violations of the apprenticeship requirements. Accordingly, debarment is appropriate. The proper period of debarment for purposes of the sanctions mandated by section 1777.1 and California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Section 16802(a), is one (1) year. The debarment applies to MINAKO AMERICA CORPORATION DBA MINCO CONSTRUCTION; REFAAT HILMY MINA.

AMENDED ORDER OF DEBARMENT

In accordance with the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that Respondents MINAKO AMERICA CORPORATION DBA MINCO CONSTRUCTION; REFAAT HILMY MINA, shall be ineligible to, and shall not, bid on or be awarded a contract for a public works project, and shall not perform work as a subcontractor on a "public works" project as defined by Labor Code sections 1720, 1720.2 and 1720.3, for a period of one (1) year, effective 45 days after this decision is issued by the Labor Commissioner. A one-year period is appropriate under these circumstances where Respondents MINAKO AMERICA CORPORATION DBA MINCO CONSTRUCTION; REFAAT HILMY MINA, knowingly committed serious violations of the apprenticeship requirements.

This debarment shall also apply to any other contractor or subcontractor in which MINAKO AMERICA CORPORATION DBA MINCO CONSTRUCTION; REFAAT HILMY MINA, have any interest or for which either MINAKO AMERICA CORPORATION DBA MINCO CONSTRUCTION; REFAAT HILMY MINA, act as responsible managing employees,

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1	responsible managing officers, general partners, managers, supervisors, owners, partners,	
2	officers, employees, agents, consultants, or representatives. As defined under Labor Code	
3	section 1777.1(h), "'Any interest' includes, but is not limited to, all instances where the	
4	debarred contractor or subcontractor receives payments, whether cash or any other form of	
5	compensation, from any entity bidding or performing work on the public works project, or enters	
6	into any contracts or agreements with the entity bidding or performing work on the public works	
7	project for services performed or to be performed for contracts that have been or will be assigned	
8	or sublet, or for vehicles, tools, equipment or supplies that have been or will be sold, rented or	
9	leased during the period of from the initiation of the debarment proceedings until the end of the	
10	term of the debarment period."	
11	Dated: August 11, 2021 Africa Slavar	
12	PATRICIA SALAZAR Hearing Officer	
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ATTACHMENT B

1 2 3 4 5	STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATION DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORMATICATION Patricia Salazar, Esq. (SBN 249935) 320 W. 4th Street, Suite 600 Los Angeles, California 90013 Telephone No.: (213) 897-1511 Facsimile No.: (213) 897-1511		
6	Attorney for the State Labor Commissioner		
7			
8	BEFORE THE DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT		
9	DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS		
10	FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
11			
12	In the Matter of the	CASE NO.: LB6333	
13	Debarment Proceeding Against:	DECISION RE: DEBARMENT OF RESPONDENTS FROM PUBLIC WORKS	
14	MINAKO AMERICA CORPORATION DBA MINCO CONSTRUCTION; REFAAT	PROJECTS AFTER ISSUANCE OF PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS BY THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS	
151617	HILMY MINA, Respondents.	ANGELES ON MINAKO AMERICA CORPORATION DBA MINCO CONSTRUCTION'S AND REFAAT HILMAY MINA'S VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE	
18			
19		[Labor Code § 1777.1]	
20			
21	The Proposed Statement of Decision Re: Debarment of Respondents from Public Works		
22	Projects after Issuance of Peremptory Writ of Mandamus by the Superior Court of Los Angeles		
23	on Minako America Corporation dba Minco Construction's and Refaat Hilmay Mina's Verified		
24	Petition for Writ of Mandate, of the undersigned attorney Patricia Salazar, debarring		
25	Respondents MINAKO AMERICA CORPORATON DBA MINCO CONSTRUCTION;		
26	REFAAT HILMY MINA, from working on public works projects in the State of California for		
27	one year, is hereby adopted by the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement as the Decision in		
28	the above-captioned matter.	-1-	

1	This Decision shall become effective August 11, 2021. The debarment shall
2	commence in 45 days on September 27 , 2021.
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4	IT IS SO ORDERED.
5	Dated: 08-11-2021 STATE OF CALIFORNIA
6	DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT
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9	LILIA GARCIA-BROWER
10	STATE LABOR COMMISSIONER
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PROOF OF SERVICE (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1013)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA Department of Industrial Relations DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT

PROOF OF SERVICE Re: Minako LASC Case No. 19STCP02356 State Case No. LB6333

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)	
)	SS
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)	

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to this action. My business address is Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, 320 W. 4th Street, Suite 600, Los Angeles, California 90013.

On August 13, 2021, I served the following document(s) described as:

- 1. RETURN TO PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS;
- 2. PROPOSED STATEMENT OF DECISION RE: DEBARMENT OF RESPONDENTS FROM PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS AFTER ISSUANCE OF PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS BY THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES ON MINAKO AMERICA CORPORATION DBA MINCO CONSTRUCTION'S AND REFAAT HILMAY MINA'S VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE;
- 3. DECISION RE: DEBARMENT OF RESPONDENTS FROM PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS AFTER ISSUANCE OF PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS BY THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES ON MINAKO AMERICA CORPORATION DBA MINCO CONSTRUCTION'S AND REFAAT HILMAY MINA'S VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE;
- 4. PROOF OF SERVICE

on the interested party(ies) in this action as follows:

Thomas W. Kovacich (<u>TKovacich@aalrr.com</u>)	Lance A. Grucela (<u>LGrucela@dir.ca.gov</u>)
Jillian N. Alexander (<u>JAlexander@aalrr.com</u>)	DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL
ATKINSON, ANDELSON, LOYA, RUUD &	RELATIONS
ROMO, A Professional Corporation	Division of Labor Standards Enforcement
12800 Center Court Drive South, Suite 300	7575 Metropolitan Drive, Suite 210
Cerritos, CA 90703	San Diego, CA 92108

- (BY MAIL) I am readily familiar with the business practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. This correspondence shall be deposited with the United States Postal Service this same day in the ordinary course of business at our office address in Los Angeles, California. Service made pursuant to this paragraph, upon motion of a party served, shall be presumed invalid if the postal cancellation date of postage meter date on the envelope is more than one day after the date of deposit for mailing contained in this affidavit.
- (BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY) I enclosed the documents in an envelope or package provided by an overnight delivery carrier and addressed to the persons at the addresses listed above. I placed the envelope or package for collection and overnight delivery at an office or a regularly utilized drop box of the overnight delivery carrier.

PAGE 2